The armed peace: A punctuated equilibrium theory of war

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 51, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 755-771

  Leventoǧlu, Bahar ^a   Slantchev, Branislav L ^b  

^a DUKE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34948904722     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: 15405907     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00279.x     Document Type: Article

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