Rigor mortis or rigor, more tests: Necessity, sufficiency, and deterrence logic

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 42, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 675-707

  Harvey, Frank P ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

International relations; Social behavior; Theoretical study

Indexed keywords

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 0032464856     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/0020-8833.00102     Document Type: Article

References (57)

1. ACHEN, C. H., AND D. SNIDAL (1989) Rational Deterrence Theory and Comparative Case Studies. World Politics 41:143-169.
2. BETTS, R. K. (1987) Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
3. BRAMS, S. J. (1985) Superpower Games: Applying Game Theory to Superpower Conflict. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
4. BRAMS, S. J., AND D. M. KILGOUR (1987a) Winding Down If Preemption or Escalation Occurs. Journal of Conflict Resolution 31:547-572.
5. BRAMS, S. J., AND D.M. KILGOUR (1987b) Threat Escalation and Crisis Stability: A Game Theoretic Analysis. American Political Science Review 81:833-850.
6. BRAUMOELLER, B. F., AND G. GOERTZ (1997) The Methodology of Necessary Conditions. Manuscript.
7. BRECHER, M. (1993) Crises in World Politics: Theory and Reality. New York: Pergamon Press.
8. BRECHER, M., AND J. WILKENFELD (1997) A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
9. BUENO DE MESQUITA, B., AND W. RIKER (1982) Assessing the Merits of Nuclear Proliferation. Journal of Conflict Resolution 26:283-306.
10. CRAIG, G. A., AND A. GEORGE (1990) Force and Statecraft: Diplomatic Problems of Our Time. New York: Oxford University Press.
11. DION, D. (1998) Evidence and Inference in the Comparative Case Study. Comparative Politics 30(2): 127-145.
12. FEARON, J. (1994) Signaling versus the Balance of Power and Interests. Journal of Conflict Resolution 38:236-269.
13. FINK, C. F. (1965) More Calculations About Deterrence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 9:54-65.
14. FISCHOFF, B. (1987) Do We Want a Better Theory of Deterrence? Journal of Social Issues 43:73-77.
15. GEORGE, A., AND R. SMOKE (1974) Deterrence in American Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice. New York: Columbia University Press.
16. GEORGE, A., AND R. SMOKE (1989) Deterrence and Foreign Policy. World Politics 41:170-182.
17. GOERTZ, G. (1995) (Enduring) Rivalries and the Study of Deterrence. Paper presented at a conference on Deterrence in Enduring Rivalries, Georgetown University.
18. HARVEY, F. P. (1995) Rational Deterrence Theory Revisited: A Progress Report. Canadian Journal of Political Science 28:403-436.
19. HARVEY, F. P. (1997a) Deterrence and Ethnic Conflict: The Case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, 1993-1994. Security Studies 6:181-209.
20. HARVEY, F. P. (1997b) Deterrence and Compellence in Protracted Crises: Methodology and Preliminary Findings. International Studies Notes 22:12-23.
21. HARVEY, F. P. (1997c) The Future's Back: Nuclear Rivalry, Deterrence Theory and Crisis Stability After the Cold War. Montreal: McGill University Press.
22. HARVEY, F. P. (1998) Predicting Deterrence Success: The Contributions of Boolean Logic and the Comparative Method. Manuscript.
23. HARVEY, F. P., AND P. JAMES (1992) Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Record of Aggregate Testing and an Alternative Research Agenda. Conflict Management and Peace Science 12:17-45.
24. HUTH, P., AND B. RUSSETT (1984) What Makes Deterrence Work? Cases from 1900-1980. World Politics 36:496-526.
25. HUTH, P., AND B. RUSSETT (1988) Deterrence Failure and Crisis Escalation. International Studies Quarterly 32:29-45.
26. HUTH, P., AND B. RUSSETT (1989) Testing Deterrence Theory: Rigor Makes a Difference. World Politics 42:466-501.
27. JAMES, P. (1991) Rational Retaliation: Superpower Response to Crisis, 1948-1979. Public Choice 68:117-135.
28. JAMES, P. (1993) "Rational Choice in the Crisis Domain: An Appraisal of Superpower Interactions, 1948-1979." In Politics and Rationality, edited by W. J. Booth, P. James, and H. Meadwell, pp. 281-303. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
29. JERVIS, R. (1979) Deterrence Theory Revisited. World Politics 31:289-324.
30. JERVIS, R. (1989) Rational Deterrence: Theory and Evidence. World Politics 41:183-207.
31. JERVIS, R., R. N. LEBOW, AND J. G. STEIN (1985) Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
32. Journal of Social Issues (1987) Vol. 43.
33. KUGLER, J. (1984) Terror Without Deterrence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 28:470-506.
34. LEBOW, R. N. (1981) Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crises. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
35. LEBOW, R. N., AND J. G. STEIN (1987) Beyond Deterrence. Journal of Social Issues 43:5-71.
36. LEBOW, R. N., AND J. G. STEIN (1989a) Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter. World Politics 41:208-224.
37. LEBOW, R. N., AND J. G. STEIN (1989b) When Does Deterrence Succeed and How Do We Know? Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association.
38. LEBOW, R. N., AND J. G. STEIN (1990) Deterrence: The Elusive Dependent Variable. World Politics 42:336-369.
39. LENG, R., AND J. D. SINGER (1988) Militarized Interstate Crises: The BCOW Typology and Its Applications. International Studies Quarterly 32:155-173.
40. LEVY, J. (1988) When Do Deterrent Threats Work? British Journal of Political Science 18:485-512.
41. LIEBERMAN, E. (1995) What Makes Deterrence Work?: Lessons from the Egyptian-Israeli Enduring Rivalry. Security Studies 4.
42. MERCER, J. (1996) Reputations and International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
43. MOST, B., AND H. STARR (1989) Inquiry, Logic and International Politics. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press.
44. ORGANSKI, A. F. K., AND J. KUGLER (1980) The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
45. ORME, J. (1987) Deterrence Failures: A Second Look. International Security 11:96-124.
46. PETERSEN, W. J. (1986) Deterrence and Compellence: A Critical Assessment of Conventional Wisdom. International Studies Quarterly 30:269-294.
47. QUESTER, G. (1996) Some Basic Conceptual Distinctions on Deterrence and Enduring Rivalries. Paper presented at a conference on Deterrence in Enduring Rivalries, Georgetown University.
48. RUSSETT, B. M. (1963) The Calculus of Deterrence. Journal of Conflict Resolution 7:97-109.
49. SAFRAN, N. (1981) Israel, the Embattled Ally. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
50. SPENCE, A. M. (1973) Job Market Signalling. Quarterly Journal of Economics 87:355-374.
51. WEEDE, E. (1981) Preventing War by Nuclear Deterrence or by Detente. Conflict Management and Peace Science 6:1-18.
52. WEEDE, E. (1983) Extended Deterrence by Superpower Alliance. Journal of Conflict Resolution 27:231-253.
53. World Politics (1989) Vol. 41.
54. ZAGARE, F. C. (1987) The Dynamics of Deterrence. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
55. ZAGARE, F. C. (1990) Rationality and Deterrence. World Politics 42:238-260.
56. ZAGARE, F. C. (1996) Classical Deterrence Theory: A Critical Assessment. International Interactions 21:365-387.
57. ZAGARE, F. C., AND D. M. KILGOUR (1998) Deterrence Theory and the Spiral Model Revisited. Journal of Theoretical Politics 10:59-87.