The War Scare of 1946 and Its Consequences

Diplomatic History

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 383-415

  Mark, Eduard ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 0347770109     PISSN: 01452096     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1467-7709.00078     Document Type: Article

References (177)

1. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946 (Washington, 1969), 7: 840-42; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969), 195-96; Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), 192. Accounts of this important meeting differ. In his memoirs Acheson identified Undersecretary of War Kenneth C. Royall as the representative of the War Department. So did Forrestal in the brief account he wrote in his diary that evening. But the telegram that Acheson sent on the day of the meeting to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes states that the "secretary of war" was present. This was clearly an error - Forrestal repeatedly mentions Royall by name, as does another participant, General Handy, in the memorandum cited below. Acheson's memoir wrongly places Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower at the meeting. It also errs in stating that it was the absent Eisenhower who warned Truman of possible war, whereas Forrestal wrote in his diary that evening that the warning was Acheson's. I follow Forrestal's account as probably correct. The president's phrase "to the end" appears not only in the cable to Byrnes but in a number of other contemporary documents. The military representatives were Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, and Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy. Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 15 August 1946, RG 165, Records of the War Department and Special Staffs, ABC files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), sect. 1-B, National Archives, Washington, DC.
2. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946 (Washington, 1969), 7: 840-42; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969), 195-96; Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), 192. Accounts of this important meeting differ. In his memoirs Acheson identified Undersecretary of War Kenneth C. Royall as the representative of the War Department. So did Forrestal in the brief account he wrote in his diary that evening. But the telegram that Acheson sent on the day of the meeting to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes states that the "secretary of war" was present. This was clearly an error - Forrestal repeatedly mentions Royall by name, as does another participant, General Handy, in the memorandum cited below. Acheson's memoir wrongly places Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower at the meeting. It also errs in stating that it was the absent Eisenhower who warned Truman of possible war, whereas Forrestal wrote in his diary that evening that the warning was Acheson's. I follow Forrestal's account as probably correct. The president's phrase "to the end" appears not only in the cable to Byrnes but in a number of other contemporary documents. The military representatives were Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, and Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy. Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 15 August 1946, RG 165, Records of the War Department and Special Staffs, ABC files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), sect. 1-B, National Archives, Washington, DC.
3. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946 (Washington, 1969), 7: 840-42; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department (New York, 1969), 195-96; Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), 192. Accounts of this important meeting differ. In his memoirs Acheson identified Undersecretary of War Kenneth C. Royall as the representative of the War Department. So did Forrestal in the brief account he wrote in his diary that evening. But the telegram that Acheson sent on the day of the meeting to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes states that the "secretary of war" was present. This was clearly an error -Forrestal repeatedly mentions Royall by name, as does another participant, General Handy, in the memorandum cited below. Acheson's memoir wrongly places Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower at the meeting. It also errs in stating that it was the absent Eisenhower who warned Truman of possible war, whereas Forrestal wrote in his diary that evening that the warning was Acheson's. I follow Forrestal's account as probably correct. The president's phrase "to the end" appears not only in the cable to Byrnes but in a number of other contemporary documents. The military representatives were Adm. Chester W. Nimitz, Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, and Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy. Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 15 August 1946, RG 165, Records of the War Department and Special Staffs, ABC files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), sect. 1-B, National Archives, Washington, DC.
4. Bruce R. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East: Great Power Conflict and Diplomacy in Iran, Turkey, and Greece (Princeton, 1994), 359-62.
5. For recent reviews of the literature see Howard Jones and Randall B. Woods, "The Origins of the Cold War in Europe and the Near East," Diplomatic History 17 (Spring 1993): 251-76 and Mark A. Stoler, "A Half Century of Conflict: Interpretations of U.S. World War II Diplomacy," ibid. 18 (Summer 1994): 375-403. For a review of the recent historiography on the Near Eastern crises see Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 441-56. Let me be the first to observe that my own effort to explain changes in the American response to the Soviet Union during 1946 also failed to deal with perceptions of a military threat. Eduard Mark, "October or Thermidor? Interpretations of Stalinism and the Perception of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United States, 1927-1947," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 937-62.
6. For recent reviews of the literature see Howard Jones and Randall B. Woods, "The Origins of the Cold War in Europe and the Near East," Diplomatic History 17 (Spring 1993): 251-76 and Mark A. Stoler, "A Half Century of Conflict: Interpretations of U.S. World War II Diplomacy," ibid. 18 (Summer 1994): 375-403. For a review of the recent historiography on the Near Eastern crises see Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 441-56. Let me be the first to observe that my own effort to explain changes in the American response to the Soviet Union during 1946 also failed to deal with perceptions of a military threat. Eduard Mark, "October or Thermidor? Interpretations of Stalinism and the Perception of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United States, 1927-1947," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 937-62.
7. For recent reviews of the literature see Howard Jones and Randall B. Woods, "The Origins of the Cold War in Europe and the Near East," Diplomatic History 17 (Spring 1993): 251-76 and Mark A. Stoler, "A Half Century of Conflict: Interpretations of U.S. World War II Diplomacy," ibid. 18 (Summer 1994): 375-403. For a review of the recent historiography on the Near Eastern crises see Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 441-56. Let me be the first to observe that my own effort to explain changes in the American response to the Soviet Union during 1946 also failed to deal with perceptions of a military threat. Eduard Mark, "October or Thermidor? Interpretations of Stalinism and the Perception of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United States, 1927-1947," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 937-62.
8. For recent reviews of the literature see Howard Jones and Randall B. Woods, "The Origins of the Cold War in Europe and the Near East," Diplomatic History 17 (Spring 1993): 251-76 and Mark A. Stoler, "A Half Century of Conflict: Interpretations of U.S. World War II Diplomacy," ibid. 18 (Summer 1994): 375-403. For a review of the recent historiography on the Near Eastern crises see Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 441-56. Let me be the first to observe that my own effort to explain changes in the American response to the Soviet Union during 1946 also failed to deal with perceptions of a military threat. Eduard Mark, "October or Thermidor? Interpretations of Stalinism and the Perception of Soviet Foreign Policy in the United States, 1927-1947," American Historical Review 94 (October 1989): 937-62.
9. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "Russian Troop Movements in Eastern and South-East Europe and on the Iran Frontier," 26 June 1946, Record Group 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File (hereafter G-2 Intelligence Document File), doc. no. 926187, National Archives, Washington, DC; Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff (hereafter WDGS), Intelligence Review 20 (27 June 1946), Naval Aide Files, box 16, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. The reports of the British JIS on Soviet troop movements cited in this paper are the "sanitized" versions prepared by the American Joint Staff for dissemination to the intelligence staffs of the services. These documents, which were "Top Secret," have no heading to betray their origins. The copies received from the British remain classified in RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), boxes 37-38.
10. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "Russian Troop Movements in Eastern and South-East Europe and on the Iran Frontier," 26 June 1946, Record Group 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File (hereafter G-2 Intelligence Document File), doc. no. 926187, National Archives, Washington, DC; Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff (hereafter WDGS), Intelligence Review 20 (27 June 1946), Naval Aide Files, box 16, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. The reports of the British JIS on Soviet troop movements cited in this paper are the "sanitized" versions prepared by the American Joint Staff for dissemination to the intelligence staffs of the services. These documents, which were "Top Secret," have no heading to betray their origins. The copies received from the British remain classified in RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), boxes 37-38.
11. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "Russian Troop Movements in Eastern and South-East Europe and on the Iran Frontier," 26 June 1946, Record Group 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File (hereafter G-2 Intelligence Document File), doc. no. 926187, National Archives, Washington, DC; Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff (hereafter WDGS), Intelligence Review 20 (27 June 1946), Naval Aide Files, box 16, Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, Missouri. The reports of the British JIS on Soviet troop movements cited in this paper are the "sanitized" versions prepared by the American Joint Staff for dissemination to the intelligence staffs of the services. These documents, which were "Top Secret," have no heading to betray their origins. The copies received from the British remain classified in RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45), boxes 37-38.
12. See, for example, Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War (New York, 1979), 55-56; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston, 1978), 234-35. The phrase "Holy Pretense" is of course Lloyd Gardner's. I use it as shorthand for the view, which many scholars appear to accept, that Soviet aims were so limited and so cautiously pursued that American officials had to concoct "Soviet expansionism" in order to justify policies that in fact addressed other concerns. See, for example, Gardner's chapter on Dean Acheson in Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago, 1970). "Allusions to force" during the meeting in the White House of 15 August "were contrived," Professor Leffler writes. American anxieties did not stem "from aggressive Soviet moves against Turkey. The Soviets had done little more than send a diplomatic note." The real concern was the recession of British power, which, with the concomitant rise of militant nationalism, threatened American access to oil and airfields, especially in Turkey. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Trauman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 124-25. See also idem, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," Journal of American History 71 (March 1985): 807-25.
13. See, for example, Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War (New York, 1979), 55-56; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston, 1978), 234-35. The phrase "Holy Pretense" is of course Lloyd Gardner's. I use it as shorthand for the view, which many scholars appear to accept, that Soviet aims were so limited and so cautiously pursued that American officials had to concoct "Soviet expansionism" in order to justify policies that in fact addressed other concerns. See, for example, Gardner's chapter on Dean Acheson in Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago, 1970). "Allusions to force" during the meeting in the White House of 15 August "were contrived," Professor Leffler writes. American anxieties did not stem "from aggressive Soviet moves against Turkey. The Soviets had done little more than send a diplomatic note." The real concern was the recession of British power, which, with the concomitant rise of militant nationalism, threatened American access to oil and airfields, especially in Turkey. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Trauman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 124-25. See also idem, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," Journal of American History 71 (March 1985): 807-25.
14. See, for example, Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War (New York, 1979), 55-56; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston, 1978), 234-35. The phrase "Holy Pretense" is of course Lloyd Gardner's. I use it as shorthand for the view, which many scholars appear to accept, that Soviet aims were so limited and so cautiously pursued that American officials had to concoct "Soviet expansionism" in order to justify policies that in fact addressed other concerns. See, for example, Gardner's chapter on Dean Acheson in Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago, 1970). "Allusions to force" during the meeting in the White House of 15 August "were contrived," Professor Leffler writes. American anxieties did not stem "from aggressive Soviet moves against Turkey. The Soviets had done little more than send a diplomatic note." The real concern was the recession of British power, which, with the concomitant rise of militant nationalism, threatened American access to oil and airfields, especially in Turkey. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Trauman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 124-25. See also idem, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," Journal of American History 71 (March 1985): 807-25.
15. See, for example, Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War (New York, 1979), 55-56; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston, 1978), 234-35. The phrase "Holy Pretense" is of course Lloyd Gardner's. I use it as shorthand for the view, which many scholars appear to accept, that Soviet aims were so limited and so cautiously pursued that American officials had to concoct "Soviet expansionism" in order to justify policies that in fact addressed other concerns. See, for example, Gardner's chapter on Dean Acheson in Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago, 1970). "Allusions to force" during the meeting in the White House of 15 August "were contrived," Professor Leffler writes. American anxieties did not stem "from aggressive Soviet moves against Turkey. The Soviets had done little more than send a diplomatic note." The real concern was the recession of British power, which, with the concomitant rise of militant nationalism, threatened American access to oil and airfields, especially in Turkey. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Trauman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 124-25. See also idem, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," Journal of American History 71 (March 1985): 807-25.
16. See, for example, Thomas G. Paterson, On Every Front: The Making of the Cold War (New York, 1979), 55-56; Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State (Boston, 1978), 234-35. The phrase "Holy Pretense" is of course Lloyd Gardner's. I use it as shorthand for the view, which many scholars appear to accept, that Soviet aims were so limited and so cautiously pursued that American officials had to concoct "Soviet expansionism" in order to justify policies that in fact addressed other concerns. See, for example, Gardner's chapter on Dean Acheson in Architects of Illusion: Men and Ideas in American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (Chicago, 1970). "Allusions to force" during the meeting in the White House of 15 August "were contrived," Professor Leffler writes. American anxieties did not stem "from aggressive Soviet moves against Turkey. The Soviets had done little more than send a diplomatic note." The real concern was the recession of British power, which, with the concomitant rise of militant nationalism, threatened American access to oil and airfields, especially in Turkey. Melvyn P. Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Trauman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford, 1992), 124-25. See also idem, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," Journal of American History 71 (March 1985): 807-25.
17. There are various reasons for the evidentiary lacunae. Many records from 1946 (some of them bearing on the subject of this essay) remain classified. These include anything related to signals intelligence, reports received from several foreign countries, and certain records regarding nuclear weapons. Some records have been destroyed for various reasons. Certainly the most serious loss is the postwar minutes of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which were burned at the time of the Watergate scandal of 1974 - a perfect catastrophe. The minutes of the Committee of Three are missing for some critical periods, and the Secretary of State's Staff Committee did not meet at the height of the Turkish crisis in August-September 1946. The daily intelligence briefings for the secretary of state have not been preserved for the early postwar period. Another problem is the rather casual bureaucratic procedures that prevailed throughout much of the U. S. government in 1946. There was no central body like the later National Security Council to coordinate policy and track its execution. Nor was there anything akin to the British system of "minutes," wherefore it is often difficult or even impossible to tell who read what. Historians have long faced this problem with diplomatic cables. The situation is worse for intelligence reports, which rarely have associated commentary. This is somewhat offset, however, by the fact that they usually bear a table of distribution showing the departments of government to which they were sent.
18. The whole question of the relation of intelligence to policymaking in the early Cold War remains virgin territory. While a certain smugness on the part of scholars about the sufficiency of traditional diplomatic records has contributed to this state of affairs, the chief cause has of course been the tardy declassification of intelligence records. Relatively few U. S. intelligence reports are available for the period after the disestablishment of the Strategic Services Unit in October 1946. The chief exceptions to this are the very general and often banal "assessments" and "appreciations" of the CIA, many of which have long been available in the presidential libraries. I can attest that these documents convey little of the flavor of the daily intelligence reports that passed over officials' desks - the sort of reports that figure prominently in the present essay. The British, as is well known, declassify little in the way of intelligence records. Strange to say, for the period after 1946 the situation is better in Russia than in the United States or Britain. Many files in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation contain reports from the NKGB, SMERSH, and other intelligence organizations that afford some insights into the daily intelligence stream. Lists of the daily intelligence reports sent to Stalin and Molotov have been published in the series Arkhiv noveishei istorii Rossii (Archive of Contemporary Russian History). V. A. Kozlova and C. V. Mironenko, eds., "Osobaya papka" I. V. Stalina [The "Special Notebook" of J. V. Stalin] and "Osobaya papka" V. M. Molotova [The "Special Notebook" of V. M. Molotov] (Moscow, 1994). (The reports themselves are available in the State Archive of the Russian Federation.) Also useful are various studies and publications by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in Fond 17 of the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents on Recent History, which incorporate intelligence.
19. The whole question of the relation of intelligence to policymaking in the early Cold War remains virgin territory. While a certain smugness on the part of scholars about the sufficiency of traditional diplomatic records has contributed to this state of affairs, the chief cause has of course been the tardy declassification of intelligence records. Relatively few U. S. intelligence reports are available for the period after the disestablishment of the Strategic Services Unit in October 1946. The chief exceptions to this are the very general and often banal "assessments" and "appreciations" of the CIA, many of which have long been available in the presidential libraries. I can attest that these documents convey little of the flavor of the daily intelligence reports that passed over officials' desks - the sort of reports that figure prominently in the present essay. The British, as is well known, declassify little in the way of intelligence records. Strange to say, for the period after 1946 the situation is better in Russia than in the United States or Britain. Many files in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation contain reports from the NKGB, SMERSH, and other intelligence organizations that afford some insights into the daily intelligence stream. Lists of the daily intelligence reports sent to Stalin and Molotov have been published in the series Arkhiv noveishei istorii Rossii (Archive of Contemporary Russian History). V. A. Kozlova and C. V. Mironenko, eds., "Osobaya papka" I. V. Stalina [The "Special Notebook" of J. V. Stalin] and "Osobaya papka" V. M. Molotova [The "Special Notebook" of V. M. Molotov] (Moscow, 1994). (The reports themselves are available in the State Archive of the Russian Federation.) Also useful are various studies and publications by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in Fond 17 of the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents on Recent History, which incorporate intelligence.
20. The whole question of the relation of intelligence to policymaking in the early Cold War remains virgin territory. While a certain smugness on the part of scholars about the sufficiency of traditional diplomatic records has contributed to this state of affairs, the chief cause has of course been the tardy declassification of intelligence records. Relatively few U. S. intelligence reports are available for the period after the disestablishment of the Strategic Services Unit in October 1946. The chief exceptions to this are the very general and often banal "assessments" and "appreciations" of the CIA, many of which have long been available in the presidential libraries. I can attest that these documents convey little of the flavor of the daily intelligence reports that passed over officials' desks - the sort of reports that figure prominently in the present essay. The British, as is well known, declassify little in the way of intelligence records. Strange to say, for the period after 1946 the situation is better in Russia than in the United States or Britain. Many files in the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation contain reports from the NKGB, SMERSH, and other intelligence organizations that afford some insights into the daily intelligence stream. Lists of the daily intelligence reports sent to Stalin and Molotov have been published in the series Arkhiv noveishei istorii Rossii (Archive of Contemporary Russian History). V. A. Kozlova and C. V. Mironenko, eds., "Osobaya papka" I. V. Stalina [The "Special Notebook" of J. V. Stalin] and "Osobaya papka" V. M. Molotova [The "Special Notebook" of V. M. Molotov] (Moscow, 1994). (The reports themselves are available in the State Archive of the Russian Federation.) Also useful are various studies and publications by the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in Fond 17 of the Russian Center for the Preservation and Study of Documents on Recent History, which incorporate intelligence.
21. Before mid-August, President Truman and his advisers consistently downplayed the crisis in public. On 14 March 1946, for example, Truman belittled the reports of Soviet troop movements in Iran; four hours later he told W. Averell Harriman that he feared there might be war. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 324-25. This caution is understandable in view of the reluctance of significant segments of American opinion to embrace a "hard" line against the Soviet Union. While articulate opinion in March 1946 supported the calls of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes for "more firmness and candor" in dealing with the Soviets, it ran strongly against Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech, from which Truman somewhat disingenuously disassociated himself. "Fortnightly Review of American Opinion on International Affairs," no. 47 (20 March 1946), Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Office of Public Opinion Studies, box II, National Archives, Washington, DC. The Truman administration, moreover, did not decide that it would take a firm stand on Turkey until 15 August, and the crisis ended rather suddenly before attempts to mobilize public opinion had gone beyond "off-the-record" briefings for leading journalists, as recounted below.
22. Before mid-August, President Truman and his advisers consistently downplayed the crisis in public. On 14 March 1946, for example, Truman belittled the reports of Soviet troop movements in Iran; four hours later he told W. Averell Harriman that he feared there might be war. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 324-25. This caution is understandable in view of the reluctance of significant segments of American opinion to embrace a "hard" line against the Soviet Union. While articulate opinion in March 1946 supported the calls of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg and Secretary of State James F. Byrnes for "more firmness and candor" in dealing with the Soviets, it ran strongly against Churchill's "Iron Curtain" speech, from which Truman somewhat disingenuously disassociated himself. "Fortnightly Review of American Opinion on International Affairs," no. 47 (20 March 1946), Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State, Records of the Office of Public Opinion Studies, box II, National Archives, Washington, DC. The Truman administration, moreover, did not decide that it would take a firm stand on Turkey until 15 August, and the crisis ended rather suddenly before attempts to mobilize public opinion had gone beyond "off-the-record" briefings for leading journalists, as recounted below.
23. The Joint Intelligence Committee, for example, concluded in October 1945 that "the USSR is likely to avoid the risk of major armed conflict for 5 to 10 years, except for purely defensive purposes." The Joint War Plans Committee reached a similar conclusion in the first days of 1946. "National gains [for the Soviet Union] to be derived internally from 10 to 15 years of peace outweigh any objective in either Europe or Asia which she might attain at the risk of war with the United States of Great Britain." JIC 80/10, Joint Intelligence Committee to the Joint Chiefs, "Russian Capabilities," 25 October 1945, RG 218, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 2; Appendix B, "Russian Intentions and Capabilities," to Enclosure B to JWPC 416/1, Joint War Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs, 8 January 1946, "Military Position of the United States in the Light of Russian Policy," RG 218, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 3.
24. The Joint Intelligence Committee, for example, concluded in October 1945 that "the USSR is likely to avoid the risk of major armed conflict for 5 to 10 years, except for purely defensive purposes." The Joint War Plans Committee reached a similar conclusion in the first days of 1946. "National gains [for the Soviet Union] to be derived internally from 10 to 15 years of peace outweigh any objective in either Europe or Asia which she might attain at the risk of war with the United States of Great Britain." JIC 80/10, Joint Intelligence Committee to the Joint Chiefs, "Russian Capabilities," 25 October 1945, RG 218, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 2; Appendix B, "Russian Intentions and Capabilities," to Enclosure B to JWPC 416/1, Joint War Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs, 8 January 1946, "Military Position of the United States in the Light of Russian Policy," RG 218, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 3.
25. The Joint Intelligence Committee, for example, concluded in October 1945 that "the USSR is likely to avoid the risk of major armed conflict for 5 to 10 years, except for purely defensive purposes." The Joint War Plans Committee reached a similar conclusion in the first days of 1946. "National gains [for the Soviet Union] to be derived internally from 10 to 15 years of peace outweigh any objective in either Europe or Asia which she might attain at the risk of war with the United States of Great Britain." JIC 80/10, Joint Intelligence Committee to the Joint Chiefs, "Russian Capabilities," 25 October 1945, RG 218, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 2; Appendix B, "Russian Intentions and Capabilities," to Enclosure B to JWPC 416/1, Joint War Plans Committee to the Joint Chiefs, 8 January 1946, "Military Position of the United States in the Light of Russian Policy," RG 218, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 3.
26. In April 1946, while the Turkish crisis was approaching its first peak of tension, the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee delivered this warning: "There is no evidence that the Soviet Union desires a major war at this time. On the contrary, there are many indications that it needs and wishes a period of reconstruction and development. The great danger therefore is that the Soviet leaders may extend their expansionist policies to a point beyond which Great Britain or the United States in their own vital security interest, could tolerate." "Political Estimate of Soviet Policy for Use in Connection with Military Studies: Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee," 6 April 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 6. I have emphasized the phrase "Western powers" in the text and "major war" in the passage just quoted because there has been an almost universal tendency in the historiography of the Cold War to make blanker statements that American officials believed that the Soviets wanted to avoid war. In fact, the documents on which these assertions rest usually state only that the USSR would endeavor to avoid major conflicts. Since the United States had made no commitments to defend Iran or Turkey, no one (before 15 August 1946, at least) had any reason to suppose that a Soviet invasion of Turkey would lead to war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, we now know that the Soviets supposed that they had an essentially free hand in the Near East as regards the United States.
27. See, for example, Leffler, A Preponderance of Power, 111-14. Leffler attributes the beginning of the war planning to the Iran crisis. It was actually Iran and Turkey, and the planning became most intense after the military threat to Iran had subsided with the withdrawal of Soviet forces from the country in May. The JCS, moreover, early on took the position (which the president ratified on 15 August 1946) that Turkey was worth a war. As far as I have been able to establish, no official ever accorded a similar importance to Iran.
28. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 255, 257-58. The map on page 289 of Kuniholm's book illustrates the seriousness of the Soviet claims.
29. Ibid., 262; Joseph C. Grew to Harry S. Truman, 3 July 1945, "Current Foreign Developments," Harry S. Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File (hereafter PSF), "Reports - Current Foreign Developments, Folder 2," Truman Library; James F. Byrnes to Truman, 5 July 1945, "Current Foreign Developments," Truman Papers, PSF, "Reports - Current Foreign Developments, Folder 2"; Gen. George C. Marshall to Truman, 8 November 1945, "USSR Troop Movements along Turkish Border," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, 091 Russia, box 2; Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, Intelligence Review 4 (7 March 1946), Naval Aide Files, box 15, Truman Library. One of the closest observers of Soviet troop movement in the Balkans was Brig. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, the U.S. representative to the Allied Control Commission for Romania. He began to wonder in June 1945 whether the Soviet concentrations in the Balkans might presage an attack on Turkey, and with his small staff he began to keep close watch on Soviet troop movements. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler diary, Papers of Gen Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, 18, 26 June 1945, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
30. Ibid., 262; Joseph C. Grew to Harry S. Truman, 3 July 1945, "Current Foreign Developments," Harry S. Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File (hereafter PSF), "Reports - Current Foreign Developments, Folder 2," Truman Library; James F. Byrnes to Truman, 5 July 1945, "Current Foreign Developments," Truman Papers, PSF, "Reports - Current Foreign Developments, Folder 2"; Gen. George C. Marshall to Truman, 8 November 1945, "USSR Troop Movements along Turkish Border," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, 091 Russia, box 2; Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, Intelligence Review 4 (7 March 1946), Naval Aide Files, box 15, Truman Library. One of the closest observers of Soviet troop movement in the Balkans was Brig. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, the U.S. representative to the Allied Control Commission for Romania. He began to wonder in June 1945 whether the Soviet concentrations in the Balkans might presage an attack on Turkey, and with his small staff he began to keep close watch on Soviet troop movements. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler diary, Papers of Gen Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, 18, 26 June 1945, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
31. Ibid., 262; Joseph C. Grew to Harry S. Truman, 3 July 1945, "Current Foreign Developments," Harry S. Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File (hereafter PSF), "Reports - Current Foreign Developments, Folder 2," Truman Library; James F. Byrnes to Truman, 5 July 1945, "Current Foreign Developments," Truman Papers, PSF, "Reports - Current Foreign Developments, Folder 2"; Gen. George C. Marshall to Truman, 8 November 1945, "USSR Troop Movements along Turkish Border," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, 091 Russia, box 2; Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, Intelligence Review 4 (7 March 1946), Naval Aide Files, box 15, Truman Library. One of the closest observers of Soviet troop movement in the Balkans was Brig. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, the U.S. representative to the Allied Control Commission for Romania. He began to wonder in June 1945 whether the Soviet concentrations in the Balkans might presage an attack on Turkey, and with his small staff he began to keep close watch on Soviet troop movements. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler diary, Papers of Gen Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, 18, 26 June 1945, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
32. Ibid., 262; Joseph C. Grew to Harry S. Truman, 3 July 1945, "Current Foreign Developments," Harry S. Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File (hereafter PSF), "Reports - Current Foreign Developments, Folder 2," Truman Library; James F. Byrnes to Truman, 5 July 1945, "Current Foreign Developments," Truman Papers, PSF, "Reports - Current Foreign Developments, Folder 2"; Gen. George C. Marshall to Truman, 8 November 1945, "USSR Troop Movements along Turkish Border," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, 091 Russia, box 2; Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, Intelligence Review 4 (7 March 1946), Naval Aide Files, box 15, Truman Library. One of the closest observers of Soviet troop movement in the Balkans was Brig. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, the U.S. representative to the Allied Control Commission for Romania. He began to wonder in June 1945 whether the Soviet concentrations in the Balkans might presage an attack on Turkey, and with his small staff he began to keep close watch on Soviet troop movements. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler diary, Papers of Gen Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, 18, 26 June 1945, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
33. Ibid., 262; Joseph C. Grew to Harry S. Truman, 3 July 1945, "Current Foreign Developments," Harry S. Truman Papers, President's Secretary's File (hereafter PSF), "Reports - Current Foreign Developments, Folder 2," Truman Library; James F. Byrnes to Truman, 5 July 1945, "Current Foreign Developments," Truman Papers, PSF, "Reports - Current Foreign Developments, Folder 2"; Gen. George C. Marshall to Truman, 8 November 1945, "USSR Troop Movements along Turkish Border," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, 091 Russia, box 2; Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, Intelligence Review 4 (7 March 1946), Naval Aide Files, box 15, Truman Library. One of the closest observers of Soviet troop movement in the Balkans was Brig. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, the U.S. representative to the Allied Control Commission for Romania. He began to wonder in June 1945 whether the Soviet concentrations in the Balkans might presage an attack on Turkey, and with his small staff he began to keep close watch on Soviet troop movements. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler diary, Papers of Gen Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, 18, 26 June 1945, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
34. For the cited opinions on the purpose of the Soviet concentrations, see General Marshall's memorandum cited in the previous note and Joint Intelligence Committee, memorandum for information no. 189, "Discussion of the Reported Soviet Threat to Turkey," 31 October 1945, transmitting British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "The Russian Threat to Turkey: Report by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee," RG 226, OSS Archives of the CIA, roll 8, entry 190, National Archives; "S.W.D." to chief, Strategy Section, 15 October 1945, "Situation in Turkey," RG 165, ABC files, 336 Russia, box 96; Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell to Gen. George C. Marshall, 15 November 1945, "The Soviet-Turkish Situation," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, box 2, 091 Russia; Gen. George C. Marshall to Truman, 16 November 1945, "Soviet- Turkish Military Situation," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, 091 Russia, box 2; UNIHOLM, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 297-98; Diary of Eben A. Ayres, Papers of Eben A. Ayres, 1 and 19 November and 16 December 1945, Harry S. Truman Library.
35. For the cited opinions on the purpose of the Soviet concentrations, see General Marshall's memorandum cited in the previous note and Joint Intelligence Committee, memorandum for information no. 189, "Discussion of the Reported Soviet Threat to Turkey," 31 October 1945, transmitting British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "The Russian Threat to Turkey: Report by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee," RG 226, OSS Archives of the CIA, roll 8, entry 190, National Archives; "S.W.D." to chief, Strategy Section, 15 October 1945, "Situation in Turkey," RG 165, ABC files, 336 Russia, box 96; Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell to Gen. George C. Marshall, 15 November 1945, "The Soviet-Turkish Situation," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, box 2, 091 Russia; Gen. George C. Marshall to Truman, 16 November 1945, "Soviet- Turkish Military Situation," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, 091 Russia, box 2; UNIHOLM, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 297-98; Diary of Eben A. Ayres, Papers of Eben A. Ayres, 1 and 19 November and 16 December 1945, Harry S. Truman Library.
36. For the cited opinions on the purpose of the Soviet concentrations, see General Marshall's memorandum cited in the previous note and Joint Intelligence Committee, memorandum for information no. 189, "Discussion of the Reported Soviet Threat to Turkey," 31 October 1945, transmitting British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "The Russian Threat to Turkey: Report by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee," RG 226, OSS Archives of the CIA, roll 8, entry 190, National Archives; "S.W.D." to chief, Strategy Section, 15 October 1945, "Situation in Turkey," RG 165, ABC files, 336 Russia, box 96; Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell to Gen. George C. Marshall, 15 November 1945, "The Soviet-Turkish Situation," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, box 2, 091 Russia; Gen. George C. Marshall to Truman, 16 November 1945, "Soviet- Turkish Military Situation," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, 091 Russia, box 2; UNIHOLM, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 297-98; Diary of Eben A. Ayres, Papers of Eben A. Ayres, 1 and 19 November and 16 December 1945, Harry S. Truman Library.
37. For the cited opinions on the purpose of the Soviet concentrations, see General Marshall's memorandum cited in the previous note and Joint Intelligence Committee, memorandum for information no. 189, "Discussion of the Reported Soviet Threat to Turkey," 31 October 1945, transmitting British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "The Russian Threat to Turkey: Report by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee," RG 226, OSS Archives of the CIA, roll 8, entry 190, National Archives; "S.W.D." to chief, Strategy Section, 15 October 1945, "Situation in Turkey," RG 165, ABC files, 336 Russia, box 96; Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell to Gen. George C. Marshall, 15 November 1945, "The Soviet-Turkish Situation," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, box 2, 091 Russia; Gen. George C. Marshall to Truman, 16 November 1945, "Soviet- Turkish Military Situation," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, 091 Russia, box 2; UNIHOLM, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 297-98; Diary of Eben A. Ayres, Papers of Eben A. Ayres, 1 and 19 November and 16 December 1945, Harry S. Truman Library.
38. For the cited opinions on the purpose of the Soviet concentrations, see General Marshall's memorandum cited in the previous note and Joint Intelligence Committee, memorandum for information no. 189, "Discussion of the Reported Soviet Threat to Turkey," 31 October 1945, transmitting British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "The Russian Threat to Turkey: Report by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee," RG 226, OSS Archives of the CIA, roll 8, entry 190, National Archives; "S.W.D." to chief, Strategy Section, 15 October 1945, "Situation in Turkey," RG 165, ABC files, 336 Russia, box 96; Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell to Gen. George C. Marshall, 15 November 1945, "The Soviet-Turkish Situation," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, box 2, 091 Russia; Gen. George C. Marshall to Truman, 16 November 1945, "Soviet-Turkish Military Situation," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, 091 Russia, box 2; UNIHOLM, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 297-98; Diary of Eben A. Ayres, Papers of Eben A. Ayres, 1 and 19 November and 16 December 1945, Harry S. Truman Library.
39. For the cited opinions on the purpose of the Soviet concentrations, see General Marshall's memorandum cited in the previous note and Joint Intelligence Committee, memorandum for information no. 189, "Discussion of the Reported Soviet Threat to Turkey," 31 October 1945, transmitting British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "The Russian Threat to Turkey: Report by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee," RG 226, OSS Archives of the CIA, roll 8, entry 190, National Archives; "S.W.D." to chief, Strategy Section, 15 October 1945, "Situation in Turkey," RG 165, ABC files, 336 Russia, box 96; Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell to Gen. George C. Marshall, 15 November 1945, "The Soviet-Turkish Situation," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, box 2, 091 Russia; Gen. George C. Marshall to Truman, 16 November 1945, "Soviet- Turkish Military Situation," RG 165, Office of the Chief of Staff: TS General Correspondence, 1944-1945, 091 Russia, box 2; UNIHOLM, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 297-98; Diary of Eben A. Ayres, Papers of Eben A. Ayres, 1 and 19 November and 16 December 1945, Harry S. Truman Library.
40. Among the diplomats most concerned were Edwin Wilson, ambassador to Turkey, and George F. Kennan, first secretary of the Moscow embassy. Kennan predicted that the Soviets would encourage separatist elements like the Kurds and Armenians, much as they had done in neighboring Iran. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 269-70, 293. The recent publication of documents from the Soviet archives about the talks of 1940 confirms the accuracy of the German accounts upon which the State Department based its interpretation: "Poyezdka V. M. Molotova v Berlin v Noyabre 1940 g." [V. M. Molotov's trip to Berlin in November 1940], Novaya i Noveishnaya Istoriya 5 (1993): 64-99.
41. Among the diplomats most concerned were Edwin Wilson, ambassador to Turkey, and George F. Kennan, first secretary of the Moscow embassy. Kennan predicted that the Soviets would encourage separatist elements like the Kurds and Armenians, much as they had done in neighboring Iran. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 269-70, 293. The recent publication of documents from the Soviet archives about the talks of 1940 confirms the accuracy of the German accounts upon which the State Department based its interpretation: "Poyezdka V. M. Molotova v Berlin v Noyabre 1940 g." [V. M. Molotov's trip to Berlin in November 1940], Novaya i Noveishnaya Istoriya 5 (1993): 64-99.
42. The true purpose of the Missouri's visit was manifest, as there was no precedent for using a battleship to return the body of a mere ambassador. It should be added that the origins of the mission were rather more complex than my brief statement would suggest. For a more complete explanation see David J. Alvarez, Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1943-1946 (Thessaloniki, Greece, 1980), 75-85; Intelligence Division, WDGS, Intelligence Review 4 (7 March 1946), 5 (14 March 1946), Naval Aide Files, box 16.
43. The true purpose of the Missouri's visit was manifest, as there was no precedent for using a battleship to return the body of a mere ambassador. It should be added that the origins of the mission were rather more complex than my brief statement would suggest. For a more complete explanation see David J. Alvarez, Bureaucracy and Cold War Diplomacy: The United States and Turkey, 1943-1946 (Thessaloniki, Greece, 1980), 75-85; Intelligence Division, WDGS, Intelligence Review 4 (7 March 1946), 5 (14 March 1946), Naval Aide Files, box 16.
44. The JIS estimated that the Soviets would probably want 400,000 men in Bulgaria before attacking Turkey. It noted that a force of that size could be assembled in Bulgaria by April, when the weather would favor the commencement of operations by drawing on the large Soviet force in Romania. British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "Implications of Recent Russian Movements in South East Europe," RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925342. For a similar appraisal by Allied Force Headquarters in Italy, see Joint Intelligence Committee, Allied Force Headquarters, "JIC Standing Appreciation on Bulgaria," 12 April 1946, RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document file, doc. no. 926307.
45. The JIS estimated that the Soviets would probably want 400,000 men in Bulgaria before attacking Turkey. It noted that a force of that size could be assembled in Bulgaria by April, when the weather would favor the commencement of operations by drawing on the large Soviet force in Romania. British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "Implications of Recent Russian Movements in South East Europe," RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925342. For a similar appraisal by Allied Force Headquarters in Italy, see Joint Intelligence Committee, Allied Force Headquarters, "JIC Standing Appreciation on Bulgaria," 12 April 1946, RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document file, doc. no. 926307.
46. SSU Istanbul, original report D-3090, 18 March 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A; Schuyler Diary, 488 (13 March 1946). General Schuyler's adjutant, Maj. Paul Glaude, quickly developed a command of Romanian and cultivated contacts in the Romanian business community. These ties enabled him to track Soviet orders for military equipment. Interview of Colonel Paul Glaude by the author, 25 March 1992. The Strategic Services Unit succeeded the wartime intelligence organization the Office of Strategic Services, when the latter organization was disestablished on 1 October 1945 by an executive order. The OSS's Research and Analysis Branch went to the Department of State, while its Secret Intelligence (SI) and X-2 (counterintelligence) branches were put under the temporary direction of the undersecretary of war as the SSU while President Truman and his advisers deliberated what sort of permanent intelligence organization the United States should have. SSU dissemination report A-66323, 19 March 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A. This report was reissued again on 2 April with the inclusion of additional details: SSU dissemination report A-68323-a, 2 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 1, frame 410. Bulgaria was already effectively dominated by the Communists, but a few non-Communists (among them General Velchev) remained in important posts to preserve the useful fiction of a coalition government. All SSU dissemination reports were distributed to the Military Intelligence War Department, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the State Department. The symbol "S" within the box for the State Department indicates that this particular report was sent to the office of the secretary, which was most unusual.
47. SSU Istanbul, original report D-3090, 18 March 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A; Schuyler Diary, 488 (13 March 1946). General Schuyler's adjutant, Maj. Paul Glaude, quickly developed a command of Romanian and cultivated contacts in the Romanian business community. These ties enabled him to track Soviet orders for military equipment. Interview of Colonel Paul Glaude by the author, 25 March 1992. The Strategic Services Unit succeeded the wartime intelligence organization the Office of Strategic Services, when the latter organization was disestablished on 1 October 1945 by an executive order. The OSS's Research and Analysis Branch went to the Department of State, while its Secret Intelligence (SI) and X-2 (counterintelligence) branches were put under the temporary direction of the undersecretary of war as the SSU while President Truman and his advisers deliberated what sort of permanent intelligence organization the United States should have. SSU dissemination report A-66323, 19 March 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A. This report was reissued again on 2 April with the inclusion of additional details: SSU dissemination report A-68323-a, 2 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 1, frame 410. Bulgaria was already effectively dominated by the Communists, but a few non-Communists (among them General Velchev) remained in important posts to preserve the useful fiction of a coalition government. All SSU dissemination reports were distributed to the Military Intelligence War Department, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the State Department. The symbol "S" within the box for the State Department indicates that this particular report was sent to the office of the secretary, which was most unusual.
48. James F. Byrnes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 5; Adm. William D. Leahy to James F. Byrnes, JCS 1641/3, 13 March 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 6.
49. James F. Byrnes to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 5; Adm. William D. Leahy to James F. Byrnes, JCS 1641/3, 13 March 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 6.
50. James F. Schnabel, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: The Joints Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, vol. 1, 1945-1947 (Wilmington, DE, 1979), 146-49.
51. Joint Planning Staff minutes, 13 March 1946, RG 318, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 (5-13-45), sec. 2. For other remarks by the planners about the possibility of early war see Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 150. For an early version of Pincher see report by the Joint War Plans Committee, JWPC 423/3, 27 April 1946, "Staff Studies of Certain Military Operation Deriving from Concept of Operations for 'Pincher,'" RG 218 JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 1. On 10 June the JWPC accepted the most recent version of Pincher as the basis for future emergency war planning, a decision the JPS ratified on 18 June. Joint War Plans Committee, "Staff Studies of Certain Military Operation Deriving from 'Concept of Operations for 'Pincher'" 10 June 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 2; Joint Planning Staff minutes, 18 June 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 2.
52. Joint Planning Staff minutes, 13 March 1946, RG 318, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 (5-13-45), sec. 2. For other remarks by the planners about the possibility of early war see Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 150. For an early version of Pincher see report by the Joint War Plans Committee, JWPC 423/3, 27 April 1946, "Staff Studies of Certain Military Operation Deriving from Concept of Operations for 'Pincher,'" RG 218 JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 1. On 10 June the JWPC accepted the most recent version of Pincher as the basis for future emergency war planning, a decision the JPS ratified on 18 June. Joint War Plans Committee, "Staff Studies of Certain Military Operation Deriving from 'Concept of Operations for 'Pincher'" 10 June 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 2; Joint Planning Staff minutes, 18 June 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 2.
53. Joint Planning Staff minutes, 13 March 1946, RG 318, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 (5-13-45), sec. 2. For other remarks by the planners about the possibility of early war see Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 150. For an early version of Pincher see report by the Joint War Plans Committee, JWPC 423/3, 27 April 1946, "Staff Studies of Certain Military Operation Deriving from Concept of Operations for 'Pincher,'" RG 218 JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 1. On 10 June the JWPC accepted the most recent version of Pincher as the basis for future emergency war planning, a decision the JPS ratified on 18 June. Joint War Plans Committee, "Staff Studies of Certain Military Operation Deriving from 'Concept of Operations for 'Pincher'" 10 June 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 2; Joint Planning Staff minutes, 18 June 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 2.
54. Joint Planning Staff minutes, 13 March 1946, RG 318, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 (5-13-45), sec. 2. For other remarks by the planners about
55. Joint Planning Staff minutes, 13 March 1946, RG 318, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 (5-13-45), sec. 2. For other remarks by the planners about the possibility of early war see Schnabel, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, 150. For an early version of Pincher see report by the Joint War Plans Committee, JWPC 423/3, 27 April 1946, "Staff Studies of Certain Military Operation Deriving from Concept of Operations for 'Pincher,'" RG 218 JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 1. On 10 June the JWPC accepted the most recent version of Pincher as the basis for future emergency war planning, a decision the JPS ratified on 18 June. Joint War Plans Committee, "Staff Studies of Certain Military Operation Deriving from 'Concept of Operations for 'Pincher'" 10 June 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 2; Joint Planning Staff minutes, 18 June 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46) sec. 2.
56. Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln to Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, 12 March 1946, enclosing "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff," 12 March 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 350.05 TS, box 78; Lincoln to Gardner and Everest, 10 August 1946, "USFET Planning," enclosing report, 10 August 1946, "USFET Planning," RG 341, Records of Headquarters U.S. Air Force, box 356, entry 335.
57. Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln to Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, 12 March 1946, enclosing "Memorandum for the Chief of Staff," 12 March 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 350.05 TS, box 78; Lincoln to Gardner and Everest, 10 August 1946, "USFET Planning," enclosing report, 10 August 1946, "USFET Planning," RG 341, Records of Headquarters U.S. Air Force, box 356, entry 335.
58. Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (Philadelphia, 1950); Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946 (Washington, 1969), 6:732-36.
59. Walter Bedell Smith, My Three Years in Moscow (Philadelphia, 1950); Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946 (Washington, 1969), 6:732-36.
60. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Middle East, 285-86, 334. Stalin had tendered his promise about Iran to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes when the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Moscow; British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "Russian Troop Movements in South East Europe and Iran," 22 May and 27 April 1946, RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, docs. nos. 926151 and 926244; MID Intelligence Review, 9 May 1946, Naval Aide Files, box 16; Maj. Gen. W. M. Robertson to Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, 13 April 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30.
61. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Middle East, 285-86, 334. Stalin had tendered his promise about Iran to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes when the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Moscow; British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "Russian Troop Movements in South East Europe and Iran," 22 May and 27 April 1946, RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, docs. nos. 926151 and 926244; MID Intelligence Review, 9 May 1946, Naval Aide Files, box 16; Maj. Gen. W. M. Robertson to Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, 13 April 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30.
62. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Middle East, 285-86, 334. Stalin had tendered his promise about Iran to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes when the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Moscow; British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "Russian Troop Movements in South East Europe and Iran," 22 May and 27 April 1946, RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, docs. nos. 926151 and 926244; MID Intelligence Review, 9 May 1946, Naval Aide Files, box 16; Maj. Gen. W. M. Robertson to Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, 13 April 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30.
63. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Middle East, 285-86, 334. Stalin had tendered his promise about Iran to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes when the Council of Foreign Ministers met in Moscow; British Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "Russian Troop Movements in South East Europe and Iran," 22 May and 27 April 1946, RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, docs. nos. 926151 and 926244; MID Intelligence Review, 9 May 1946, Naval Aide Files, box 16; Maj. Gen. W. M. Robertson to Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, 13 April 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30.
64. FRUS: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (Washington, 1960), 2:1481; SSU Germany, original report L-1724, 21 September 1946, RG 226, box 23, entry 108A; SSU Germany, original report L-1310, 28 February 1946, RG 226, box 21, entry 108A; SSU dissemination reports A-67331 and A-67340, 23 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 1, frames 1150 and 1163; SSU dissemination report A-67016, 18 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 1, frame 0792; SSU dissemination report A-67331, 23 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, frame 1150. See also SSU dissemination report A-69745, 5 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 0849; SSU Germany, original report L-1720, 20 September 1946, RG 226, box 22, entry 108A; SSU Germany, original report L-1724, 21 September 1946, RG 226, box 23, entry 108A.
65. FRUS: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (Washington, 1960), 2:1481; SSU Germany, original report L-1724, 21 September 1946, RG 226, box 23, entry 108A; SSU Germany, original report L-1310, 28 February 1946, RG 226, box 21, entry 108A; SSU dissemination reports A-67331 and A-67340, 23 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 1, frames 1150 and 1163; SSU dissemination report A-67016, 18 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 1, frame 0792; SSU dissemination report A-67331, 23 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, frame 1150. See also SSU dissemination report A-69745, 5 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 0849; SSU Germany, original report L-1720, 20 September 1946, RG 226, box 22, entry 108A; SSU Germany, original report L-1724, 21 September 1946, RG 226, box 23, entry 108A.
66. FRUS: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (Washington, 1960), 2:1481; SSU Germany, original report L-1724, 21 September 1946, RG 226, box 23, entry 108A; SSU Germany, original report L-1310, 28 February 1946, RG 226, box 21, entry 108A; SSU dissemination reports A-67331 and A-67340, 23 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 1, frames 1150 and 1163; SSU dissemination report A-67016, 18 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 1, frame 0792; SSU dissemination report A-67331, 23 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, frame 1150. See also SSU dissemination report A-69745, 5 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 0849; SSU Germany, original report L-1720, 20 September 1946, RG 226, box 22, entry 108A; SSU Germany, original report L-1724, 21 September 1946, RG 226, box 23, entry 108A.
67. FRUS: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (Washington, 1960), 2:1481; SSU Germany, original report L-1724, 21 September 1946, RG 226, box 23, entry 108A; SSU Germany, original report L-1310, 28 February 1946, RG 226, box 21, entry 108A; SSU dissemination reports A-67331 and A-67340, 23 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 1, frames 1150 and 1163; SSU dissemination report A-67016, 18 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 1, frame 0792; SSU dissemination report A-67331, 23 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, frame 1150. See also SSU dissemination report A-69745, 5 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 0849; SSU Germany, original report L-1720, 20 September 1946, RG 226, box 22, entry 108A; SSU Germany, original report L-1724, 21 September 1946, RG 226, box 23, entry 108A.
68. FRUS: Diplomatic Papers: The Conference of Berlin (Washington, 1960), 2:1481; SSU Germany, original report L-1724, 21 September 1946, RG 226, box 23, entry 108A; SSU Germany, original report L-1310, 28 February 1946, RG 226, box 21, entry 108A; SSU dissemination reports A-67331 and A-67340, 23 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 1, frames 1150 and 1163; SSU dissemination report A-67016, 18 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 1, frame 0792; SSU dissemination report A-67331, 23 April 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, frame 1150. See also SSU dissemination report A-69745, 5 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 0849; SSU Germany, original report L-1720, 20 September 1946, RG 226, box 22, entry 108A; SSU Germany, original report L-1724, 21 September 1946, RG 226, box 23, entry 108A.
69. SSU dissemination report A-67762, 10 May 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-68030, 24 May 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-68030, 24 May 1946 RG 226 box 4, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-68122, 28 May 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 2, frame 342. Reports of this kind from inside the KKE were common, as Anglo-American intelligence had it wired from top to bottom. Intelligence reports cover such topics as the monthly budgets of the party and its political strategy as well as political guidance and financial assistance received from the Soviet Union.
70. SSU dissemination report A-67762, 10 May 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-68030, 24 May 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-68030, 24 May 1946 RG 226 box 4, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-68122, 28 May 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 2, frame 342. Reports of this kind from inside the KKE were common, as Anglo-American intelligence had it wired from top to bottom. Intelligence reports cover such topics as the monthly budgets of the party and its political strategy as well as political guidance and financial assistance received from the Soviet Union.
71. SSU dissemination report A-67762, 10 May 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-68030, 24 May 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-68030, 24 May 1946 RG 226 box 4, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-68122, 28 May 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 2, frame 342. Reports of this kind from inside the KKE were common, as Anglo-American intelligence had it wired from top to bottom. Intelligence reports cover such topics as the monthly budgets of the party and its political strategy as well as political guidance and financial assistance received from the Soviet Union.
72. SSU dissemination report A-67762, 10 May 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-68030, 24 May 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-68030, 24 May 1946 RG 226 box 4, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-68122, 28 May 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 2, frame 342. Reports of this kind from inside the KKE were common, as Anglo-American intelligence had it wired from top to bottom. Intelligence reports cover such topics as the monthly budgets of the party and its political strategy as well as political guidance and financial assistance received from the Soviet Union.
73. FRUS, 1946 6:605n.; Burton Y. Berry to the secretary of state, 4 June 1946, ibid., 604-5. U.S. military attaché in Moscow to War Department, 15 and 16 June 1946, RG 218, Chairman's File (Admiral Leahy), box 11; SSU to Maj. Wilbur Ward, MID, 19 June 1946, enclosing original report LC-745, 14 June 1946, RG 226, box 28, entry 108A. About 1 June a drunken Soviet officer stated in the presence of Americans "that Russia would strike without warning as it is believed that the United States, as a result of quick demobilization and strikes, and Great Britain, with all her troubles, are not prepared for immediate satisfactory defense." U.S. military attaché in Moscow to War Department for General Vandenberg, 16 June 1946, RG 218, Chairman's File (Admiral Leahy), box 11. There were many such reports from all over Europe. See, for example, military attaché in Warsaw, report R-104-46, 13 June 1946, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926154; SSU Austria, original report LA-418, 22 March 1946, RG 226, box 22, entry 108A; Schuyler Diary, 15 September 1946, 573-75.
74. FRUS, 1946 6:605n.; Burton Y. Berry to the secretary of state, 4 June 1946, ibid., 604-5. U.S. military attaché in Moscow to War Department, 15 and 16 June 1946, RG 218, Chairman's File (Admiral Leahy), box 11; SSU to Maj. Wilbur Ward, MID, 19 June 1946, enclosing original report LC-745, 14 June 1946, RG 226, box 28, entry 108A. About 1 June a drunken Soviet officer stated in the presence of Americans "that Russia would strike without warning as it is believed that the United States, as a result of quick demobilization and strikes, and Great Britain, with all her troubles, are not prepared for immediate satisfactory defense." U.S. military attaché in Moscow to War Department for General Vandenberg, 16 June 1946, RG 218, Chairman's File (Admiral Leahy), box 11. There were many such reports from all over Europe. See, for example, military attaché in Warsaw, report R-104-46, 13 June 1946, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926154; SSU Austria, original report LA-418, 22 March 1946, RG 226, box 22, entry 108A; Schuyler Diary, 15 September 1946, 573-75.
75. FRUS, 1946 6:605n.; Burton Y. Berry to the secretary of state, 4 June 1946, ibid., 604-5. U.S. military attaché in Moscow to War Department, 15 and 16 June 1946, RG 218, Chairman's File (Admiral Leahy), box 11; SSU to Maj. Wilbur Ward, MID, 19 June 1946, enclosing original report LC-745, 14 June 1946, RG 226, box 28, entry 108A. About 1 June a drunken Soviet officer stated in the presence of Americans "that Russia would strike without warning as it is believed that the United States, as a result of quick demobilization and strikes, and Great Britain, with all her troubles, are not prepared for immediate satisfactory defense." U.S. military attaché in Moscow to War Department for General Vandenberg, 16 June 1946, RG 218, Chairman's File (Admiral Leahy), box 11. There were many such reports from all over Europe. See, for example, military attaché in Warsaw, report R-104-46, 13 June 1946, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926154; SSU Austria, original report LA-418, 22 March 1946, RG 226, box 22, entry 108A; Schuyler Diary, 15 September 1946, 573-75.
76. FRUS, 1946 6:605n.; Burton Y. Berry to the secretary of state, 4 June 1946, ibid., 604-5. U.S. military attaché in Moscow to War Department, 15 and 16 June 1946, RG 218, Chairman's File (Admiral Leahy), box 11; SSU to Maj. Wilbur Ward, MID, 19 June 1946, enclosing original report LC-745, 14 June 1946, RG 226, box 28, entry 108A. About 1 June a drunken Soviet officer stated in the presence of Americans "that Russia would strike without warning as it is believed that the United States, as a result of quick demobilization and strikes, and Great Britain, with all her troubles, are not prepared for immediate satisfactory defense." U.S. military attaché in Moscow to War Department for General Vandenberg, 16 June 1946, RG 218, Chairman's File (Admiral Leahy), box 11. There were many such reports from all over Europe. See, for example, military attaché in Warsaw, report R-104-46, 13 June 1946, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926154; SSU Austria, original report LA-418, 22 March 1946, RG 226, box 22, entry 108A; Schuyler Diary, 15 September 1946, 573-75.
77. Lincoln to Gardner and Everest, 10 August 1946, enclosing report, 10 August 1946, "USFET Planning," RG 341, entry 335, box 356; "Brief of USFET Study of Courses of Action to be Taken by the Theater Commander in Event of Hostilities with the Soviet Union," RG 341, box 356, entry 335. For the concern with the French Communists see Joint Staff Planners minutes, 22 May 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), sec. 2. For representative reports of Soviet arms shipments to France see SSU dissemination report A-68797, 19 May 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 2, frame 773; SSU dissemination report A-69833, 7 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 997.
78. Lincoln to Gardner and Everest, 10 August 1946, enclosing report, 10 August 1946, "USFET Planning," RG 341, entry 335, box 356; "Brief of USFET Study of Courses of Action to be Taken by the Theater Commander in Event of Hostilities with the Soviet Union," RG 341, box 356, entry 335. For the concern with the French Communists see Joint Staff Planners minutes, 22 May 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), sec. 2. For representative reports of Soviet arms shipments to France see SSU dissemination report A-68797, 19 May 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 2, frame 773; SSU dissemination report A-69833, 7 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 997.
79. Lincoln to Gardner and Everest, 10 August 1946, enclosing report, 10 August 1946, "USFET Planning," RG 341, entry 335, box 356; "Brief of USFET Study of Courses of Action to be Taken by the Theater Commander in Event of Hostilities with the Soviet Union," RG 341, box 356, entry 335. For the concern with the French Communists see Joint Staff Planners minutes, 22 May 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), sec. 2. For representative reports of Soviet arms shipments to France see SSU dissemination report A-68797, 19 May 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 2, frame 773; SSU dissemination report A-69833, 7 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 997.
80. Lincoln to Gardner and Everest, 10 August 1946, enclosing report, 10 August 1946, "USFET Planning," RG 341, entry 335, box 356; "Brief of USFET Study of Courses of Action to be Taken by the Theater Commander in Event of Hostilities with the Soviet Union," RG 341, box 356, entry 335. For the concern with the French Communists see Joint Staff Planners minutes, 22 May 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), sec. 2. For representative reports of Soviet arms shipments to France see SSU dissemination report A-68797, 19 May 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 2, frame 773; SSU dissemination report A-69833, 7 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 997.
81. Lincoln to Gardner and Everest, 10 August 1946, enclosing report, 10 August 1946, "USFET Planning," RG 341, entry 335, box 356; "Brief of USFET Study of Courses of Action to be Taken by the Theater Commander in Event of Hostilities with the Soviet Union," RG 341, box 356, entry 335. For the concern with the French Communists see Joint Staff Planners minutes, 22 May 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46), sec. 2. For representative reports of Soviet arms shipments to France see SSU dissemination report A-68797, 19 May 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 2, frame 773; SSU dissemination report A-69833, 7 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 997.
82. Forrestal said there would be a war if the Kremlin judged the time propitious to complete the world revolution (which prompted Leahy's agnostic remark). Truman thought that unsettled political conditions in Russia might lead to war if the leadership decided to distract public attention from the problems of demobilization. Memorandum for record by "S.W.D.," 12 June 1945, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 092 TS, box 30; "O.S.P." to Lt. Gen. John Hull and Maj. Gen. Howard A. Craig, 12 June 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 092 TS, box 30; diary, 11 June 1946, Papers of William D. Leahy, Library of Congress.
83. Forrestal said there would be a war if the Kremlin judged the time propitious to complete the world revolution (which prompted Leahy's agnostic remark). Truman thought that unsettled political conditions in Russia might lead to war if the leadership decided to distract public attention from the problems of demobilization. Memorandum for record by "S.W.D.," 12 June 1945, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 092 TS, box 30; "O.S.P." to Lt. Gen. John Hull and Maj. Gen. Howard A. Craig, 12 June 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 092 TS, box 30; diary, 11 June 1946, Papers of William D. Leahy, Library of Congress.
84. Memorandum for record, n.d., "Information on Probable Soviet Line of Action As Given at P&O Conference 20 June," RG 165, ABC files, 336 Russia, box 251.
85. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "Russian Troop Movements in Eastern and South-East Europe and on the Iran Frontier," 26 June 1946, RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926187; Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, Intelligence Review 20 (27 June 1946), Naval Aide Files, box 16 (quoted); Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1696, "Presidential Request for Certain Facts and Information Regarding the Soviet Union," 25 July 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 9.
86. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "Russian Troop Movements in Eastern and South-East Europe and on the Iran Frontier," 26 June 1946, RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926187; Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, Intelligence Review 20 (27 June 1946), Naval Aide Files, box 16 (quoted); Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1696, "Presidential Request for Certain Facts and Information Regarding the Soviet Union," 25 July 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 9.
87. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "Russian Troop Movements in Eastern and South-East Europe and on the Iran Frontier," 26 June 1946, RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926187; Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, Intelligence Review 20 (27 June 1946), Naval Aide Files, box 16 (quoted); Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS 1696, "Presidential Request for Certain Facts and Information Regarding the Soviet Union," 25 July 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 9.
88. Maj. Gen. Clayton Bissell to Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, 6 July 1946, "Reminder on decisions taken during London visit July 4 to 6, 1946," RG 341, box 4, entry 334.
89. John T. Greenwood, "The Emergence of the Postwar Strategic Air Force, 1945-1953," in Air Power and Warfare: The Proceedings of the 8th Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 18-20 October 1978, ed. Col. Alfred F. Hurley and Maj. Robert C. Ehrhard (Washington, 1979), 226. The size of early atomic bombs dictated a cumbersome loading procedure: The weapon had to be placed into a pit in order to be winched into the bomd bay of the receiving aircraft. The bombs, moreover, had to be shipped disassembled to the forward bases from which the attack would be staged. Facilities and equipment had to be in place, lest time be lost in beginning the strategic air offensive. It is indicative of the urgency with which planners viewed the Turkish crisis that the Joint Staff finished the plan for the defense of Turkey, Griddle, in August 1946. Other regional plans pursuant to Picher such as Drumbeat (the defense of Iberia), Moonrise (for war in the Far East), and Deerland (defense of North America), did not reach completion until mid-1947. This series of plans is located in RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1948-1950, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46).
90. John T. Greenwood, "The Emergence of the Postwar Strategic Air Force, 1945-1953," in Air Power and Warfare: The Proceedings of the 8th Military History Symposium, United States Air Force Academy, 18-20 October 1978, ed. Col. Alfred F. Hurley and Maj. Robert C. Ehrhard (Washington, 1979), 226. The size of early atomic bombs dictated a cumbersome loading procedure: The weapon had to be placed into a pit in order to be winched into the bomd bay of the receiving aircraft. The bombs, moreover, had to be shipped disassembled to the forward bases from which the attack would be staged. Facilities and equipment had to be in place, lest time be lost in beginning the strategic air offensive. It is indicative of the urgency with which planners viewed the Turkish crisis that the Joint Staff finished the plan for the defense of Turkey, Griddle, in August 1946. Other regional plans pursuant to Picher such as Drumbeat (the defense of Iberia), Moonrise (for war in the Far East), and Deerland (defense of North America), did not reach completion until mid-1947. This series of plans is located in RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1948-1950, CCS 381 USSR (3-2-46).
91. The Central Intelligence Group, the immediate predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency, was founded on 22 January 1946. Throughout 1946 it expanded its responsibilities and took over the assets of the SSU, which was formally disbanded on 31 October 1946. Ira Hamilton, the OSO's first representative in Romania, later recalled that when he returned to Washington he was asked to brief elements of the Joint Staff on his experiences in Romania and then learned of the relation of his activities in Romania to the war plans. But Ioana Bujoiu (now Lady Roderic Gordon), who took notes for the leaders of the Romanian underground when they met with Hamilton in September 1946, recalls that the American intelligence officer outlined for them American strategy in the event of war with Russia. Her recollection of Hamilton's presentation suggests that Hamilton was already aware of the relation of his mission to the war plans and acquainted the Romanians in a general way with Pincher. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, the American representative to the Allied Control Commission in Romania, also confirmed the relation of Hamilton's activities to the war plans. As we shall see below, his protests at what he considered Hamilton's reckless mission brought a letter of explanation from Washington. General Schuyler learned more of the background when he returned in Washington in 1947 to become the army planner on the Joint Strategic Plans Committee. Charles W. Hostler, the CIG's station chief in Bucharest, has provided an account of the Hall/Hamilton affair essentially identical to that I received from Hamilton and Schuyler. Memorandum of conversation with Ira C. Hamilton by the author, 13 March 1990; interview of Ioana Bujoiu by the author, 26-27 July 1991; interview of Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler by the author, 26 March 1993; Charles W. Hostler to the author, 22 May 1995; acting chief, PBM and DR-136 to CO, SSU Mission to Austria, attention DD-111, 5 August 1946, "Ukrainian activities in Austria," RG 226, box 21, entry 108C.
92. Briefing by Colonel McCormack on the meeting of 14 August 1946, RG 165, ABC Files, ABC 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), box 102, sec. 1-B (emphasis in original).
93. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 357-59. With the benefit of the information on intelligence and planning provided in this essay, readers may find it profitable to reread the entries in James Forrestal's diary for August and September 1946, Millis, ed., Forrestal Diaries, esp. 191-93, 195-97, 198. Also useful is the description of the crisis that Dean Acheson gave to the Turkish foreign minister in 1949: Memorandum of conversation by Dean Acheson, 12 April 1949, FRUS, 1946 6:1649. Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 15 August 1946, RG 165, ABC Files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), sec. 1-B; memorandum of conversation, Lincoln/John Hickerson, 20 August 1946, "Strait," RG 165, ABC Files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), sec. 1-B; State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, "Political Estimate of Soviet Policy for Use in Connection with Military Studies: Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee," 6 April 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 6.
94. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 357-59. With the benefit of the information on intelligence and planning provided in this essay, readers may find it profitable to reread the entries in James Forrestal's diary for August and September 1946, Millis, ed., Forrestal Diaries, esp. 191-93, 195-97, 198. Also useful is the description of the crisis that Dean Acheson gave to the Turkish foreign minister in 1949: Memorandum of conversation by Dean Acheson, 12 April 1949, FRUS, 1946 6:1649. Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 15 August 1946, RG 165, ABC Files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), sec. 1-B; memorandum of conversation, Lincoln/John Hickerson, 20 August 1946, "Strait," RG 165, ABC Files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), sec. 1-B; State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, "Political Estimate of Soviet Policy for Use in Connection with Military Studies: Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee," 6 April 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 6.
95. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 357-59. With the benefit of the information on intelligence and planning provided in this essay, readers may find it profitable to reread the entries in James Forrestal's diary for August and September 1946, Millis, ed., Forrestal Diaries, esp. 191-93, 195-97, 198. Also useful is the description of the crisis that Dean Acheson gave to the Turkish foreign minister in 1949: Memorandum of conversation by Dean Acheson, 12 April 1949, FRUS, 1946 6:1649. Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 15 August 1946, RG 165, ABC Files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), sec. 1-B; memorandum of conversation, Lincoln/John Hickerson, 20 August 1946, "Strait," RG 165, ABC Files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), sec. 1-B; State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, "Political Estimate of Soviet Policy for Use in Connection with Military Studies: Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee," 6 April 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 6.
96. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 357-59. With the benefit of the information on intelligence and planning provided in this essay, readers may find it profitable to reread the entries in James Forrestal's diary for August and September 1946, Millis, ed., Forrestal Diaries, esp. 191-93, 195-97, 198. Also useful is the description of the crisis that Dean Acheson gave to the Turkish foreign minister in 1949: Memorandum of conversation by Dean Acheson, 12 April 1949, FRUS, 1946 6:1649. Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 15 August 1946, RG 165, ABC Files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), sec. 1-B; memorandum of conversation, Lincoln/John Hickerson, 20 August 1946, "Strait," RG 165, ABC Files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), sec. 1-B; State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, "Political Estimate of Soviet Policy for Use in Connection with Military Studies: Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee," 6 April 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 6.
97. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 357-59. With the benefit of the information on intelligence and planning provided in this essay, readers may find it profitable to reread the entries in James Forrestal's diary for August and September 1946, Millis, ed., Forrestal Diaries, esp. 191-93, 195-97, 198. Also useful is the description of the crisis that Dean Acheson gave to the Turkish foreign minister in 1949: Memorandum of conversation by Dean Acheson, 12 April 1949, FRUS, 1946 6:1649. Lt. Gen. Thomas T. Handy to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 15 August 1946, RG 165, ABC Files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), sec. 1-B; memorandum of conversation, Lincoln/John Hickerson, 20 August 1946, "Strait," RG 165, ABC Files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945), sec. 1-B; State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, "Political Estimate of Soviet Policy for Use in Connection with Military Studies: Memorandum by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee," 6 April 1946, RG 218, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 6.
98. Lord Inverchapel to the Foreign Office, 19 August 1946, and various minutes appended thereto, FO 371/59227, Public Record Office, Kew, England (hereafter PRO); memorandum of conversation by Dean Acheson, 20 August 1946, RG 59, 767.681/8-2046. Maclean's role in this affair is discussed below.
99. In separate notes of 21 and 22 August, Britain and Turkey also stated that they were willing to revise the convention but categorically rejected the introduction of Soviet forces into the Dardanelles. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 359-62, 373-74. Richard A. Best, Jr., "Cooperation with Like-Minded Peoples": British Influences on American Security Policy, 1945-1949 (Westport, CT, 1986), 97.
100. In separate notes of 21 and 22 August, Britain and Turkey also stated that they were willing to revise the convention but categorically rejected the introduction of Soviet forces into the Dardanelles. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 359-62, 373-74. Richard A. Best, Jr., "Cooperation with Like-Minded Peoples": British Influences on American Security Policy, 1945-1949 (Westport, CT, 1986), 97.
101. SSU dissemination report A-68030, 8 August 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A. See also FRUS, 1946 7:879. SSU dissemination report A-69973, 13 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 1193. SSU dissemination Report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, entry 108A, box 64. These reports came from the SSU's London station, where American intelligence officers merely put their own cover sheets on documents shown by their spelling and typefaces to be British. MI-6 was the probable originator. Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg to President Harry S. Truman, 24 August 1946, Truman Papers, PSF, box 249. For the full text of the report see The CIA under Harry Truman, ed. Michael Warner (Washington, 1994), 81-83.
102. SSU dissemination report A-68030, 8 August 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A. See also FRUS, 1946 7:879. SSU dissemination report A-69973, 13 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 1193. SSU dissemination Report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, entry 108A, box 64. These reports came from the SSU's London station, where American intelligence officers merely put their own cover sheets on documents shown by their spelling and typefaces to be British. MI-6 was the probable originator. Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg to President Harry S. Truman, 24 August 1946, Truman Papers, PSF, box 249. For the full text of the report see The CIA under Harry Truman, ed. Michael Warner (Washington, 1994), 81-83.
103. SSU dissemination report A-68030, 8 August 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A. See also FRUS, 1946 7:879. SSU dissemination report A-69973, 13 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 1193. SSU dissemination Report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, entry 108A, box 64. These reports came from the SSU's London station, where American intelligence officers merely put their own cover sheets on documents shown by their spelling and typefaces to be British. MI-6 was the probable originator. Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg to President Harry S. Truman, 24 August 1946, Truman Papers, PSF, box 249. For the full text of the report see The CIA under Harry Truman, ed. Michael Warner (Washington, 1994), 81-83.
104. SSU dissemination report A-68030, 8 August 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A. See also FRUS, 1946 7:879. SSU dissemination report A-69973, 13 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 1193. SSU dissemination Report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, entry 108A, box 64. These reports came from the SSU's London station, where American intelligence officers merely put their own cover sheets on documents shown by their spelling and typefaces to be British. MI-6 was the probable originator. Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg to President Harry S. Truman, 24 August 1946, Truman Papers, PSF, box 249. For the full text of the report see The CIA under Harry Truman, ed. Michael Warner (Washington, 1994), 81-83.
105. SSU dissemination report A-68030, 8 August 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A. See also FRUS, 1946 7:879. SSU dissemination report A-69973, 13 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 1193. SSU dissemination Report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, entry 108A, box 64. These reports came from the SSU's London station, where American intelligence officers merely put their own cover sheets on documents shown by their spelling and typefaces to be British. MI-6 was the probable originator. Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg to President Harry S. Truman, 24 August 1946, Truman Papers, PSF, box 249. For the full text of the report see The CIA under Harry Truman, ed. Michael Warner (Washington, 1994), 81-83.
106. SSU dissemination report A-68030, 8 August 1946, RG 226, box 4, entry 108A. See also FRUS, 1946 7:879. SSU dissemination report A-69973, 13 August 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 3, frame 1193. SSU dissemination Report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, entry 108A, box 64. These reports came from the SSU's London station, where American intelligence officers merely put their own cover sheets on documents shown by their spelling and typefaces to be British. MI-6 was the probable originator. Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg to President Harry S. Truman, 24 August 1946, Truman Papers, PSF, box 249. For the full text of the report see The CIA under Harry Truman, ed. Michael Warner (Washington, 1994), 81-83.
107. Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg to Adm. William D. Leahy, 27 August 1946, RG 218, Chairman's File (Admiral Leahy), box 11. Vandenberg stated that the report came from a reliable source in Denmark. The source was perhaps a Soviet naval officer of high rank who furnished valuable military information to the SSU - including the order of battle for the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Interview of Lt. Gen. William W. Quinn by the author, 19 October 1993. (General Quinn headed the SSU through most of its brief history.) SSU Vienna to SSE Washington, 5 September 1946, RG 226, box 371, entry 134. See also Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," No. 14 (13 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, no. 925415; Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 365.
108. Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg to Adm. William D. Leahy, 27 August 1946, RG 218, Chairman's File (Admiral Leahy), box 11. Vandenberg stated that the report came from a reliable source in Denmark. The source was perhaps a Soviet naval officer of high rank who furnished valuable military information to the SSU - including the order of battle for the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Interview of Lt. Gen. William W. Quinn by the author, 19 October 1993. (General Quinn headed the SSU through most of its brief history.) SSU Vienna to SSE Washington, 5 September 1946, RG 226, box 371, entry 134. See also Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," No. 14 (13 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, no. 925415; Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 365.
109. Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg to Adm. William D. Leahy, 27 August 1946, RG 218, Chairman's File (Admiral Leahy), box 11. Vandenberg stated that the report came from a reliable source in Denmark. The source was perhaps a Soviet naval officer of high rank who furnished valuable military information to the SSU - including the order of battle for the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Interview of Lt. Gen. William W. Quinn by the author, 19 October 1993. (General Quinn headed the SSU through most of its brief history.) SSU Vienna to SSE Washington, 5 September 1946, RG 226, box 371, entry 134. See also Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," No. 14 (13 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, no. 925415; Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 365.
110. Lt. Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg to Adm. William D. Leahy, 27 August 1946, RG 218, Chairman's File (Admiral Leahy), box 11. Vandenberg stated that the report came from a reliable source in Denmark. The source was perhaps a Soviet naval officer of high rank who furnished valuable military information to the SSU - including the order of battle for the Soviet Baltic Fleet. Interview of Lt. Gen. William W. Quinn by the author, 19 October 1993. (General Quinn headed the SSU through most of its brief history.) SSU Vienna to SSE Washington, 5 September 1946, RG 226, box 371, entry 134. See also Military Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," No. 14 (13 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, no. 925415; Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 365.
111. Intelligence operations in Bulgaria had for some time been at a standstill, and the CIG's 3-man team in Romania was thoroughly occupied in Bucharest, as recounted below. For the background on intelligence operations in Bulgaria see Maj. Gen. W. M. Robertson to Lt. Gen. John E. Hull, 13 April 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30.
112. SSU dissemination report A-71005, 27 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71084, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71125, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71325, 14 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 561; SSU dissemination report A-71341, 15 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 580; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71344. 16 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 583.
113. SSU dissemination report A-71005, 27 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71084, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71125, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71325, 14 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 561; SSU dissemination report A-71341, 15 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 580; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71344. 16 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 583.
114. SSU dissemination report A-71005, 27 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71084, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71125, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71325, 14 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 561; SSU dissemination report A-71341, 15 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 580; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71344. 16 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 583.
115. SSU dissemination report A-71005, 27 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71084, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71125, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71325, 14 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 561; SSU dissemination report A-71341, 15 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 580; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71344. 16 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 583.
116. SSU dissemination report A-71005, 27 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71084, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71125, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71325, 14 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 561; SSU dissemination report A-71341, 15 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 580; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71344. 16 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 583.
117. SSU dissemination report A-71005, 27 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71084, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71125, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71325, 14 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 561; SSU dissemination report A-71341, 15 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 580; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71344. 16 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 583.
118. SSU dissemination report A-71005, 27 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71084, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71125, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71325, 14 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 561; SSU dissemination report A-71341, 15 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 580; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71344. 16 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 583.
119. SSU dissemination report A-71005, 27 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71084, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71125, 2 October 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71325, 14 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 561; SSU dissemination report A-71341, 15 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 580; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-70998, 26 September 1946, RG 226, box 64, entry 108A; SSU dissemination report A-71344. 16 October 1946, RG 226, entry 153A, roll 5, frame 583.
120. Chiefs of Staff Committee to British Joint Services Mission, 16 September 1946, PRO, CAB 121/64; COS (46), 144th meeting, 23 September 1946, CAB 121/64, PRO.
121. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, "The General Military Situation in Europe with Particular Reference to a Possible Threat to Turkey," 6 September 1946, RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925404. The British original is to be found in CAB 121/64.
122. Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 15 (20 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925375; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 17 (4 October 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925399; ACC delegation Bulgaria to War Department G-2, report no. 899, 8 October 1945, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925353; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces" 14 (13 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925415; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 18 (11 October 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925360.
123. Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 15 (20 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925375; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 17 (4 October 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925399; ACC delegation Bulgaria to War Department G-2, report no. 899, 8 October 1945, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925353; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces" 14 (13 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925415; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 18 (11 October 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925360.
124. Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 15 (20 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925375; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 17 (4 October 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925399; ACC delegation Bulgaria to War Department G-2, report no. 899, 8 October 1945, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925353; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces" 14 (13 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925415; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 18 (11 October 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925360.
125. Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 15 (20 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925375; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 17 (4 October 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925399; ACC delegation Bulgaria to War Department G-2, report no. 899, 8 October 1945, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925353; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces" 14 (13 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925415; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 18 (11 October 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925360.
126. Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 15 (20 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925375; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 17 (4 October 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925399; ACC delegation Bulgaria to War Department G-2, report no. 899, 8 October 1945, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925353; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces" 14 (13 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925415; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 18 (11 October 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925360.
127. Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 15 (20 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925375; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 17 (4 October 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925399; ACC delegation Bulgaria to War Department G-2, report no. 899, 8 October 1945, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925353; SSU dissemination report A-70801, 18 September 1946, RG 226, box 63, entry 108A; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces" 14 (13 September 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925415; Intelligence Division, WDGS, "Notes on Soviet Armed Forces," 18 (11 October 1946), RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 925360.
128. Major General Lauris Norstad to Lt. General Clarence R. Huebner, 11 September 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 333 TS, box 66; New York Times, 1 October 1946.
129. Major General Lauris Norstad to Lt. General Clarence R. Huebner, 11 September 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 333 TS, box 66; New York Times, 1 October 1946.
130. Pincher, it will be recalled, was a concept on which planning was to be based. Joint War Plans Committee, JWPC 467/1, 15 August 1946, "GRIDDLE," RG 341, box 992, entry 335; Preparation of Joint Plan Griddle (JWPC 467/1), RG 34, box 992, entry 335. The administration concluded that for the moment, military aid from Britain would be less provocative, though it did undertake economic aid. FRUS, 1946 7:856-58, 894-97, 910-11, 913-17.
131. Pincher, it will be recalled, was a concept on which planning was to be based. Joint War Plans Committee, JWPC 467/1, 15 August 1946, "GRIDDLE," RG 341, box 992, entry 335; Preparation of Joint Plan Griddle (JWPC 467/1), RG 34, box 992, entry 335. The administration concluded that for the moment, military aid from Britain would be less provocative, though it did undertake economic aid. FRUS, 1946 7:856-58, 894-97, 910-11, 913-17.
132. Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln to Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad, 17 August 1946, RG 165, ABC Files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945) sec. 1-B; Brig. Gen. to Rear-Adm Mathias B. Gardner, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 333 TS, box 66; Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln to Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, 10 September 1946, tab A to Strategy Branch, War Plans Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, Air Staff 5, 1 October 1946, "Outline Air Plan for Makefast," RG 341, box 380, entry 335.
133. Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln to Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad, 17 August 1946, RG 165, ABC Files, box 102, 093 Kiel (6 July 1945) sec. 1-B; Brig. Gen. to Rear-Adm Mathias B. Gardner, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 333 TS, box 66; Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln to Gen. Carl A. Spaatz, 10 September 1946, tab A to Strategy Branch, War Plans Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, Air Staff 5, 1 October 1946, "Outline Air Plan for Makefast," RG 341, box 380, entry 335.
134. Strategy Branch, War Plans Division, Assistant Chief of Staff, Air Staff 5, 1 October 1946, "Outline Air Plan for Makefast," RG 541, box 380, entry 335.
135. Unsigned and untitled memo, 10 September 1946, RG 341, box 280, entry 335; Maj. Gen. O.P. Weyland to General Carl A. Spaatz, 28 May 1947, RG 341, box 280, entry 335. This first atomic plan had no name and appears not to have survived. In March 1947 the Air Staff revised Makefast and renamed it Earshot. The atomic plan was also revised and became Earshot, Jr.
136. Adrian Holman to the Foreign Office, 11 November 1946, PRO, FO 371/59107. Hamilton provided some details to me in 1987. Three years later he told me more
137. Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad to Gen. Huebner (draft), 11 September 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 344 TS, box 66; "Notes of Air Planner on European Trip," n.d., Tab P to "File on Planning Trip to Europe, September 1946," RG 341, box 379, entry 335; "Itinerary of Generals Lincoln and Everest," n.d., Tab O to "File on Planning Trip to Europe, September 1946," "Planning Memorandum," 28 September 1946, Tab A to "File on Planning Trip to Europe," September 1946, RG 341, box 379, entry 335. So secret was the mission to London that Lincoln even misled the assistant military attaché (an old friend) about the reason for his visit. Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln to Colonel Paul D. Caraway, 10 September 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal file, 1946-1948, 333 TS, box 66.
138. Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad to Gen. Huebner (draft), 11 September 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 344 TS, box 66; "Notes of Air Planner on European Trip," n.d., Tab P to "File on Planning Trip to Europe, September 1946," RG 341, box 379, entry 335; "Itinerary of Generals Lincoln and Everest," n.d., Tab O to "File on Planning Trip to Europe, September 1946," "Planning Memorandum," 28 September 1946, Tab A to "File on Planning Trip to Europe," September 1946, RG 341, box 379, entry 335. So secret was the mission to London that Lincoln even misled the assistant military attaché (an old friend) about the reason for his visit. Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln to Colonel Paul D. Caraway, 10 September 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal file, 1946-1948, 333 TS, box 66.
139. Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad to Gen. Huebner (draft), 11 September 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 344 TS, box 66; "Notes of Air Planner on European Trip," n.d., Tab P to "File on Planning Trip to Europe, September 1946," RG 341, box 379, entry 335; "Itinerary of Generals Lincoln and Everest," n.d., Tab O to "File on Planning Trip to Europe, September 1946," "Planning Memorandum," 28 September 1946, Tab A to "File on Planning Trip to Europe," September 1946, RG 341, box 379, entry 335. So secret was the mission to London that Lincoln even misled the assistant military attaché (an old friend) about the reason for his visit. Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln to Colonel Paul D. Caraway, 10 September 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal file, 1946-1948, 333 TS, box 66.
140. Maj. Gen. Lauris Norstad to Gen. Huebner (draft), 11 September 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 344 TS, box 66; "Notes of Air Planner on European Trip," n.d., Tab P to "File on Planning Trip to Europe, September 1946," RG 341, box 379, entry 335; "Itinerary of Generals Lincoln and Everest," n.d., Tab O to "File on Planning Trip to Europe, September 1946," "Planning Memorandum," 28 September 1946, Tab A to "File on Planning Trip to Europe," September 1946, RG 341, box 379, entry 335. So secret was the mission to London that Lincoln even misled the assistant military attaché (an old friend) about the reason for his visit. Brig. Gen. George A. Lincoln to Colonel Paul D. Caraway, 10 September 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal file, 1946-1948, 333 TS, box 66.
141. "Notes of Air Planner on European Trip," n.d. Tab P to "File on Planning Trip to Europe, September 1946"; Field Marshal Hastings Ismay to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 17 October 1946, enclosing "Aide memoir for General of the Army Eisenhower on the Private Discussion with the British Joint Chiefs at Princes Gate, on 10th October 1946," RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 091 Great Britain TS, box 13. Eisenhower confirmed the accuracy of the aide memoir: Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Field Marshal Sir Hastings Ismay, 28 October 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 334 TS, box 73.
142. "Notes of Air Planner on European Trip," n.d. Tab P to "File on Planning Trip to Europe, September 1946"; Field Marshal Hastings Ismay to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 17 October 1946, enclosing "Aide memoir for General of the Army Eisenhower on the Private Discussion with the British Joint Chiefs at Princes Gate, on 10th October 1946," RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 091 Great Britain TS, box 13. Eisenhower confirmed the accuracy of the aide memoir: Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Field Marshal Sir Hastings Ismay, 28 October 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 334 TS, box 73.
143. "Notes of Air Planner on European Trip," n.d. Tab P to "File on Planning Trip to Europe, September 1946"; Field Marshal Hastings Ismay to Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, 17 October 1946, enclosing "Aide memoir for General of the Army Eisenhower on the Private Discussion with the British Joint Chiefs at Princes Gate, on 10th October 1946," RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 091 Great Britain TS, box 13. Eisenhower confirmed the accuracy of the aide memoir: Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower to Field Marshal Sir Hastings Ismay, 28 October 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 334 TS, box 73.
144. New York Times, 25 September 1944. For the note of 24 September and British, American, and Turkish assessment of it see FRUS, 1946 7:860-66, 867-68, 869-71. That Stalin, contrary to his usual practice, had answered Werth at all - and the speed with which he did so (Werth had written only on 17 September 1946) - suggest that the dictator was anxious to cool off the Turkish crisis. So too does the urgency with which the mild note was sent to the Turks - it was delivered to the Turkish embassy in Moscow in the middle of the night. The pro-Soviet Werth was a natural vehicle for Stalin's message. For Werth's account of this episode and a characteristic defense of the USSR in the Turkish crisis see Alexander Werth, Russia: The Postwar Years (New York, 1971), 129-33, 142-47. Yuri Modin with Jean-Charles Deniau and Aguieszka Ziarek, My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt, and Cairncross by their KGB Controller, trans. Anthony Roberts (New York, 1994), 119-21. In 1946 Modin had not yet become the control officer for the Cambridge Ring, but he did process their reports in Moscow. He was, accordingly, in a perfect position to know of their activities.
145. New York Times, 25 September 1944. For the note of 24 September and British, American, and Turkish assessment of it see FRUS, 1946 7:860-66, 867-68, 869-71. That Stalin, contrary to his usual practice, had answered Werth at all - and the speed with which he did so (Werth had written only on 17 September 1946) - suggest that the dictator was anxious to cool off the Turkish crisis. So too does the urgency with which the mild note was sent to the Turks - it was delivered to the Turkish embassy in Moscow in the middle of the night. The pro-Soviet Werth was a natural vehicle for Stalin's message. For Werth's account of this episode and a characteristic defense of the USSR in the Turkish crisis see Alexander Werth, Russia: The Postwar Years (New York, 1971), 129-33, 142-47. Yuri Modin with Jean-Charles Deniau and Aguieszka Ziarek, My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt, and Cairncross by their KGB Controller, trans. Anthony Roberts (New York, 1994), 119-21. In 1946 Modin had not yet become the control officer for the Cambridge Ring, but he did process their reports in Moscow. He was, accordingly, in a perfect position to know of their activities.
146. New York Times, 25 September 1944. For the note of 24 September and British, American, and Turkish assessment of it see FRUS, 1946 7:860-66, 867-68, 869-71. That Stalin, contrary to his usual practice, had answered Werth at all - and the speed with which he did so (Werth had written only on 17 September 1946) - suggest that the dictator was anxious to cool off the Turkish crisis. So too does the urgency with which the mild note was sent to the Turks - it was delivered to the Turkish embassy in Moscow in the middle of the night. The pro-Soviet Werth was a natural vehicle for Stalin's message. For Werth's account of this episode and a characteristic defense of the USSR in the Turkish crisis see Alexander Werth, Russia: The Postwar Years (New York, 1971), 129-33, 142-47. Yuri Modin with Jean-Charles Deniau and Aguieszka Ziarek, My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt, and Cairncross by their KGB Controller, trans. Anthony Roberts (New York, 1994), 119-21. In 1946 Modin had not yet become the control officer for the Cambridge Ring, but he did process their reports in Moscow. He was, accordingly, in a perfect position to know of their activities.
147. New York Times, 25 September 1944. For the note of 24 September and British, American, and Turkish assessment of it see FRUS, 1946 7:860-66, 867-68, 869-71. That Stalin, contrary to his usual practice, had answered Werth at all - and the speed with which he did so (Werth had written only on 17 September 1946) - suggest that the dictator was anxious to cool off the Turkish crisis. So too does the urgency with which the mild note was sent to the Turks - it was delivered to the Turkish embassy in Moscow in the middle of the night. The pro-Soviet Werth was a natural vehicle for Stalin's message. For Werth's account of this episode and a characteristic defense of the USSR in the Turkish crisis see Alexander Werth, Russia: The Postwar Years (New York, 1971), 129-33, 142-47. Yuri Modin with Jean-Charles Deniau and Aguieszka Ziarek, My Five Cambridge Friends: Burgess, Maclean, Philby, Blunt, and Cairncross by their KGB Controller, trans. Anthony Roberts (New York, 1994), 119-21. In 1946 Modin had not yet become the control officer for the Cambridge Ring, but he did process their reports in Moscow. He was, accordingly, in a perfect position to know of their activities.
148. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 372-73, 393-95. Moscow never replied to the American note. I read this as an implicit and peevish acknowledgment that the firm stand of the Truman administration had thwarted its designs on the Turkish Strait. For a comprehensive if skeptical look at the conciliatory trend of Soviet diplomacy in late 1946 see Francis B. Stevens to H. Freeman Matthews and Dean Acheson, 23 December 1946, "Some Recent Soviet 'Concessions,'" RG 59, Records of Charles E. Bohlen, box 4.
149. Kuniholm, The Origins of the Cold War in the Near East, 372-73, 393-95. Moscow never replied to the American note. I read this as an implicit and peevish acknowledgment that the firm stand of the Truman administration had thwarted its designs on the Turkish Strait. For a comprehensive if skeptical look at the conciliatory trend of Soviet diplomacy in late 1946 see Francis B. Stevens to H. Freeman Matthews and Dean Acheson, 23 December 1946, "Some Recent Soviet 'Concessions,'" RG 59, Records of Charles E. Bohlen, box 4.
150. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, 26 October 1946, "The General Military situation in Europe with Particular Reference to a Possible Threat to Turkey," RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926027; report no. 915, American representation to the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria, 30 October 1946, RG 319, War Department Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926040.
151. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, 26 October 1946, "The General Military situation in Europe with Particular Reference to a Possible Threat to Turkey," RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926027; report no. 915, American representation to the Allied Control Commission for Bulgaria, 30 October 1946, RG 319, War Department Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926040.
152. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, 26 October 1946, "The General Military Situation in Europe with Particular Reference to a Possible Threat to Turkey," RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926027; War Office to British Military Mission (Bulgaria), 14 December 1946, FO 371/58529; British Military Mission (Bulgaria) to War Office, 19 December 1946, FO 371/58529. For order-of-battle estimates on Soviet forces in Europe see Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Project No. 3532, "Soviet Capabilities in Germany and West Europe," 26 December 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 350.05 TS, box 75; Joint Intelligence Committee, Memorandum for Information Number 237, "The General Military Situation in Europe with Particular Reference to a Possible Threat to Turkey," 17 January 1947, with enclosure, "Movements of Russian Troops Outside the USSR Except in the Far East," 31 December 1946, RG 219, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 16; MID, War Department General Staff, "The World In Review," Intelligence Review 48 (16 January 1947), Naval Aide Files, box 18.
153. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, 26 October 1946, "The General Military Situation in Europe with Particular Reference to a Possible Threat to Turkey," RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926027; War Office to British Military Mission (Bulgaria), 14 December 1946, FO 371/58529; British Military Mission (Bulgaria) to War Office, 19 December 1946, FO 371/58529. For order-of-battle estimates on Soviet forces in Europe see Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Project No. 3532, "Soviet Capabilities in Germany and West Europe," 26 December 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 350.05 TS, box 75; Joint Intelligence Committee, Memorandum for Information Number 237, "The General Military Situation in Europe with Particular Reference to a Possible Threat to Turkey," 17 January 1947, with enclosure, "Movements of Russian Troops Outside the USSR Except in the Far East," 31 December 1946, RG 219, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 16; MID, War Department General Staff, "The World In Review," Intelligence Review 48 (16 January 1947), Naval Aide Files, box 18.
154. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, 26 October 1946, "The General Military Situation in Europe with Particular Reference to a Possible Threat to Turkey," RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926027; War Office to British Military Mission (Bulgaria), 14 December 1946, FO 371/58529; British Military Mission (Bulgaria) to War Office, 19 December 1946, FO 371/58529. For order-of-battle estimates on Soviet forces in Europe see Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Project No. 3532, "Soviet Capabilities in Germany and West Europe," 26 December 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 350.05 TS, box 75; Joint Intelligence Committee, Memorandum for Information Number 237, "The General Military Situation in Europe with Particular Reference to a Possible Threat to Turkey," 17 January 1947, with enclosure, "Movements of Russian Troops Outside the USSR Except in the Far East," 31 December 1946, RG 219, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 16; MID, War Department General Staff, "The World In Review," Intelligence Review 48 (16 January 1947), Naval Aide Files, box 18.
155. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, 26 October 1946, "The General Military Situation in Europe with Particular Reference to a Possible Threat to Turkey," RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926027; War Office to British Military Mission (Bulgaria), 14 December 1946, FO 371/58529; British Military Mission (Bulgaria) to War Office, 19 December 1946, FO 371/58529. For order-of-battle estimates on Soviet forces in Europe see Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Project No. 3532, "Soviet Capabilities in Germany and West Europe," 26 December 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 350.05 TS, box 75; Joint Intelligence Committee, Memorandum for Information Number 237, "The General Military Situation in Europe with Particular Reference to a Possible Threat to Turkey," 17 January 1947, with enclosure, "Movements of Russian Troops Outside the USSR Except in the Far East," 31 December 1946, RG 219, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 16; MID, War Department General Staff, "The World In Review," Intelligence Review 48 (16 January 1947), Naval Aide Files, box 18.
156. Joint Intelligence Subcommittee, 26 October 1946, "The General Military Situation in Europe with Particular Reference to a Possible Threat to Turkey," RG 319, War Department G-2 Intelligence Document File, doc. no. 926027; War Office to British Military Mission (Bulgaria), 14 December 1946, FO 371/58529; British Military Mission (Bulgaria) to War Office, 19 December 1946, FO 371/58529. For order-of-battle estimates on Soviet forces in Europe see Military Intelligence Division, War Department General Staff, Project No. 3532, "Soviet Capabilities in Germany and West Europe," 26 December 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 350.05 TS, box 75; Joint Intelligence Committee, Memorandum for Information Number 237, "The General Military Situation in Europe with Particular Reference to a Possible Threat to Turkey," 17 January 1947, with enclosure, "Movements of Russian Troops Outside the USSR Except in the Far East," 31 December 1946, RG 219, JCS Geographic File, 1946-1947, CCS 092 USSR (3-27-45) sec. 16; MID, War Department General Staff, "The World In Review," Intelligence Review 48 (16 January 1947), Naval Aide Files, box 18.
157. "Presentation Given to President by Major General Lauris Norstad on 29 October 1945, 'Postwar Military Establishment,'" RG 341, box 9, entry 337.
158. Interview of Ira C. Hamilton by the author, 13 October 1987, and Hamilton's written supplement thereto; interview of General Schuyler by the author, 26 March 1992; interview of Ioana Bujoiu (Lady Roderic Gordon) by the author, 26-27 July 1991; diary of Ioana Bujoiu for 1946 (copy in the author's possession); Plans and Operations Division, War Department General Staff, note for record, 8 November 1945, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30.
159. This odd situation arose as follows: Hamilton, like Hall and Hostler, went to Romania as a member of the SSU. Schuyler, of course, knew this, but thought that Hamilton was working for him and reported to Washington only through War Department channels. This was the case until about July 1946, when Hamilton learned, upon being called to Vienna, that he now worked for the OSO and had the mission of establishing contact with the NPP. Hall and Hostler were both subsequently drawn into the CIG, but only Hall learned of Hamilton's mission. Further to confound the confusion, in matters dealing with the Romanian opposition, Hall (a major) followed the lead of Hamilton (a lieutenant). (This, perhaps, was due to the fact that during the war Hamilton had written the Yugoslavian section of the OSS's publication Situation Report: Balkans and passed, so to speak, as a sort of mail-order expert on guerrilla warfare.) Schuyler, meanwhile, had not a clue about all the changes. Memorandum of conversation with Ira C. Hamilton by the author, 13 March 1990; interview of General Schuyler by the author, 26 March 1992; memorandum of telephone conversation with Charles W. Hostler by the author, 30 September 1993; Charles W. Hostler to the author, 22 May 1995. In sum, this was a case of the right hand's not knowing what the left hand was about. In Romania, at least, there was considerable precedent for this sort of thing in American intelligence operations. See Eduard Mark, "The OSS in Romania, 1944-1945: An Intelligence Operation of the Early Cold War," Intelligence and National Security 9 (April 1994): 320-44. Note for record, Plans and Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 8 November 1945, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30; Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad to Brig. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, 8 November 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30; interview of General Schuyler by the author, 26 March 1992; Trial of the Former National Peasant Party Leaders, 9-10; Adrian Holman to the Foreign Office, 7 November 1947, FO 371/67244; Adrian Holman to the Foreign Office, 3 November 1947, FO 371/67243.
160. This odd situation arose as follows: Hamilton, like Hall and Hostler, went to Romania as a member of the SSU. Schuyler, of course, knew this, but thought that Hamilton was working for him and reported to Washington only through War Department channels. This was the case until about July 1946, when Hamilton learned, upon being called to Vienna, that he now worked for the OSO and had the mission of establishing contact with the NPP. Hall and Hostler were both subsequently drawn into the CIG, but only Hall learned of Hamilton's mission. Further to confound the confusion, in matters dealing with the Romanian opposition, Hall (a major) followed the lead of Hamilton (a lieutenant). (This, perhaps, was due to the fact that during the war Hamilton had written the Yugoslavian section of the OSS's publication Situation Report: Balkans and passed, so to speak, as a sort of mail-order expert on guerrilla warfare.) Schuyler, meanwhile, had not a clue about all the changes. Memorandum of conversation with Ira C. Hamilton by the author, 13 March 1990; interview of General Schuyler by the author, 26 March 1992; memorandum of telephone conversation with Charles W. Hostler by the author, 30 September 1993; Charles W. Hostler to the author, 22 May 1995. In sum, this was a case of the right hand's not knowing what the left hand was about. In Romania, at least, there was considerable precedent for this sort of thing in American intelligence operations. See Eduard Mark, "The OSS in Romania, 1944-1945: An Intelligence Operation of the Early Cold War," Intelligence and National Security 9 (April 1994): 320-44. Note for record, Plans and Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 8 November 1945, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30; Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad to Brig. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, 8 November 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30; interview of General Schuyler by the author, 26 March 1992; Trial of the Former National Peasant Party Leaders, 9-10; Adrian Holman to the Foreign Office, 7 November 1947, FO 371/67244; Adrian Holman to the Foreign Office, 3 November 1947, FO 371/67243.
161. This odd situation arose as follows: Hamilton, like Hall and Hostler, went to Romania as a member of the SSU. Schuyler, of course, knew this, but thought that Hamilton was working for him and reported to Washington only through War Department channels. This was the case until about July 1946, when Hamilton learned, upon being called to Vienna, that he now worked for the OSO and had the mission of establishing contact with the NPP. Hall and Hostler were both subsequently drawn into the CIG, but only Hall learned of Hamilton's mission. Further to confound the confusion, in matters dealing with the Romanian opposition, Hall (a major) followed the lead of Hamilton (a lieutenant). (This, perhaps, was due to the fact that during the war Hamilton had written the Yugoslavian section of the OSS's publication Situation Report: Balkans and passed, so to speak, as a sort of mail-order expert on guerrilla warfare.) Schuyler, meanwhile, had not a clue about all the changes. Memorandum of conversation with Ira C. Hamilton by the author, 13 March 1990; interview of General Schuyler by the author, 26 March 1992; memorandum of telephone conversation with Charles W. Hostler by the author, 30 September 1993; Charles W. Hostler to the author, 22 May 1995. In sum, this was a case of the right hand's not knowing what the left hand was about. In Romania, at least, there was considerable precedent for this sort of thing in American intelligence operations. See Eduard Mark, "The OSS in Romania, 1944-1945: An Intelligence Operation of the Early Cold War," Intelligence and National Security 9 (April 1994): 320-44. Note for record, Plans and Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 8 November 1945, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30; Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad to Brig. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, 8 November 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30; interview of General Schuyler by the author, 26 March 1992; Trial of the Former National Peasant Party Leaders, 9-10; Adrian Holman to the Foreign Office, 7 November 1947, FO 371/67244; Adrian Holman to the Foreign Office, 3 November 1947, FO 371/67243.
162. This odd situation arose as follows: Hamilton, like Hall and Hostler, went to Romania as a member of the SSU. Schuyler, of course, knew this, but thought that Hamilton was working for him and reported to Washington only through War Department channels. This was the case until about July 1946, when Hamilton learned, upon being called to Vienna, that he now worked for the OSO and had the mission of establishing contact with the NPP. Hall and Hostler were both subsequently drawn into the CIG, but only Hall learned of Hamilton's mission. Further to confound the confusion, in matters dealing with the Romanian opposition, Hall (a major) followed the lead of Hamilton (a lieutenant). (This, perhaps, was due to the fact that during the war Hamilton had written the Yugoslavian section of the OSS's publication Situation Report: Balkans and passed, so to speak, as a sort of mail-order expert on guerrilla warfare.) Schuyler, meanwhile, had not a clue about all the changes. Memorandum of conversation with Ira C. Hamilton by the author, 13 March 1990; interview of General Schuyler by the author, 26 March 1992; memorandum of telephone conversation with Charles W. Hostler by the author, 30 September 1993; Charles W. Hostler to the author, 22 May 1995. In sum, this was a case of the right hand's not knowing what the left hand was about. In Romania, at least, there was considerable precedent for this sort of thing in American intelligence operations. See Eduard Mark, "The OSS in Romania, 1944-1945: An Intelligence Operation of the Early Cold War," Intelligence and National Security 9 (April 1994): 320-44. Note for record, Plans and Operations Division, War Department General Staff, 8 November 1945, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30; Lt. Gen. Lauris Norstad to Brig. Gen. Cortlandt Van R. Schuyler, 8 November 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 30; interview of General Schuyler by the author, 26 March 1992; Trial of the Former National Peasant Party Leaders, 9-10; Adrian Holman to the Foreign Office, 7 November 1947, FO 371/67244; Adrian Holman to the Foreign Office, 3 November 1947, FO 371/67243.
163. Lt. Gen. S. J. Chamberlin to Gen. Omar Bradley, 14 March 1948, "Estimate of World Situation," RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 33. For similar observations in the immediate aftermath of the Middle Eastern crisis see Central Intelligence Group, ORE 1/1, 6 January 1947, "Revised Soviet tactics in International Affairs," Truman Papers, PSF, box 254; "Military Implications of Soviet Foreign Policy during 1946," Intelligence Review, 47 (9 January 1947), Naval Aide Files, box 18. This same point of view found a powerful public expression in George F. Kennan's famous "X" article that appeared in Foreign Affairs in March 1947. "This fear to deal openly with the Russian question has permeated down to all levels of the government to a degree that it is now considered poor taste and an infraction of some ephemeral rule to speak out specifically or concretely on matters dealing with Russia." Unaddressed memorandum by Beurt R. SerVaas, 18 March 1946, "Personal Opinions re Intelligence Penetration of Russia," 18 March 1946, RG 226, reel 57, entry 190.
164. Lt. Gen. S. J. Chamberlin to Gen. Omar Bradley, 14 March 1948, "Estimate of World Situation," RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 33. For similar observations in the immediate aftermath of the Middle Eastern crisis see Central Intelligence Group, ORE 1/1, 6 January 1947, "Revised Soviet tactics in International Affairs," Truman Papers, PSF, box 254; "Military Implications of Soviet Foreign Policy during 1946," Intelligence Review, 47 (9 January 1947), Naval Aide Files, box 18. This same point of view found a powerful public expression in George F. Kennan's famous "X" article that appeared in Foreign Affairs in March 1947. "This fear to deal openly with the Russian question has permeated down to all levels of the government to a degree that it is now considered poor taste and an infraction of some ephemeral rule to speak out specifically or concretely on matters dealing with Russia." Unaddressed memorandum by Beurt R. SerVaas, 18 March 1946, "Personal Opinions re Intelligence Penetration of Russia," 18 March 1946, RG 226, reel 57, entry 190.
165. Lt. Gen. S. J. Chamberlin to Gen. Omar Bradley, 14 March 1948, "Estimate of World Situation," RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 33. For similar observations in the immediate aftermath of the Middle Eastern crisis see Central Intelligence Group, ORE 1/1, 6 January 1947, "Revised Soviet tactics in International Affairs," Truman Papers, PSF, box 254; "Military Implications of Soviet Foreign Policy during 1946," Intelligence Review, 47 (9 January 1947), Naval Aide Files, box 18. This same point of view found a powerful public expression in George F. Kennan's famous "X" article that appeared in Foreign Affairs in March 1947. "This fear to deal openly with the Russian question has permeated down to all levels of the government to a degree that it is now considered poor taste and an infraction of some ephemeral rule to speak out specifically or concretely on matters dealing with Russia." Unaddressed memorandum by Beurt R. SerVaas, 18 March 1946, "Personal Opinions re Intelligence Penetration of Russia," 18 March 1946, RG 226, reel 57, entry 190.
166. Lt. Gen. S. J. Chamberlin to Gen. Omar Bradley, 14 March 1948, "Estimate of World Situation," RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 33. For similar observations in the immediate aftermath of the Middle Eastern crisis see Central Intelligence Group, ORE 1/1, 6 January 1947, "Revised Soviet tactics in International Affairs," Truman Papers, PSF, box 254; "Military Implications of Soviet Foreign Policy during 1946," Intelligence Review, 47 (9 January 1947), Naval Aide Files, box 18. This same point of view found a powerful public expression in George F. Kennan's famous "X" article that appeared in Foreign Affairs in March 1947. "This fear to deal openly with the Russian question has permeated down to all levels of the government to a degree that it is now considered poor taste and an infraction of some ephemeral rule to speak out specifically or concretely on matters dealing with Russia." Unaddressed memorandum by Beurt R. SerVaas, 18 March 1946, "Personal Opinions re Intelligence Penetration of Russia," 18 March 1946, RG 226, reel 57, entry 190.
167. Lt. Gen. S. J. Chamberlin to Gen. Omar Bradley, 14 March 1948, "Estimate of World Situation," RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 33. For similar observations in the immediate aftermath of the Middle Eastern crisis see Central Intelligence Group, ORE 1/1, 6 January 1947, "Revised Soviet tactics in International Affairs," Truman Papers, PSF, box 254; "Military Implications of Soviet Foreign Policy during 1946," Intelligence Review, 47 (9 January 1947), Naval Aide Files, box 18. This same point of view found a powerful public expression in George F. Kennan's famous "X" article that appeared in Foreign Affairs in March 1947. "This fear to deal openly with the Russian question has permeated down to all levels of the government to a degree that it is now considered poor taste and an infraction of some ephemeral rule to speak out specifically or concretely on matters dealing with Russia." Unaddressed memorandum by Beurt R. SerVaas, 18 March 1946, "Personal Opinions re Intelligence Penetration of Russia," 18 March 1946, RG 226, reel 57, entry 190.
168. Some officials feared that Congress might object to the sale of military equipment to Turkey, even if it was surplus. See, for example, Will Clayton to James Patterson, 13 September 1946, enclosing Will Clayton to James F. Byrnes, 12 September 1946, RG 319, P&O Decimal File, 1946-1948, 092 TS, box 31.
169. On 27 September 1946, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Nikolai Novikov, wrote that "the current relations between England and the United States, despite the temporary attainment of agreements on very important questions, are plagued with great internal contradictions and cannot be lasting." Novikov follows the passage quoted in the text with an orthodox Marxist-Leninist exposition of the inevitability of imperialist rivalry between the United States and Britain. Nikolai Novikov, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Postwar Period," 27 September 1946, Diplomatic History 15 (Fall 1991): 532, 535. Novikov would not have had access to the highly sensitive information from Maclean, which was reserved exclusively for Stalin, Molotov, and Lavrentii Beria. Modin, My Three Cambridge Friends, 122. Russian diplomat and historian Vladimir O. Pechatnov has traced the influence on Soviet diplomacy of the idea of inevitable British-American rivalry in a study of exceptional importance about the wartime writings of Ivan Maisky, Maxim Litvinov, and Andrei Gromyko on postwar relations with the Western powers. Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Big Three after World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Postwar Relations with the United States and Great Britain," Working Paper No. 13 of the Cold War International History Project (June 1995), 4-5, 11, 13, 17-18. For percipient treatments of Soviet Middle Eastern policy see William O. McCagg, Jr., Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948 (Detroit, 1978), 191-92, 201-2; Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986), 212-14; William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (New York, 1982), 82-83.
170. On 27 September 1946, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Nikolai Novikov, wrote that "the current relations between England and the United States, despite the temporary attainment of agreements on very important questions, are plagued with great internal contradictions and cannot be lasting." Novikov follows the passage quoted in the text with an orthodox Marxist- Leninist exposition of the inevitability of imperialist rivalry between the United States and Britain. Nikolai Novikov, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Postwar Period," 27 September 1946, Diplomatic History 15 (Fall 1991): 532, 535. Novikov would not have had access to the highly sensitive information from Maclean, which was reserved exclusively for Stalin, Molotov, and Lavrentii Beria. Modin, My Three Cambridge Friends, 122. Russian diplomat and historian Vladimir O. Pechatnov has traced the influence on Soviet diplomacy of the idea of inevitable British-American rivalry in a study of exceptional importance about the wartime writings of Ivan Maisky, Maxim Litvinov, and Andrei Gromyko on postwar relations with the Western powers. Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Big Three after World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Postwar Relations with the United States and Great Britain," Working Paper No. 13 of the Cold War International History Project (June 1995), 4-5, 11, 13, 17-18. For percipient treatments of Soviet Middle Eastern policy see William O. McCagg, Jr., Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948 (Detroit, 1978), 191-92, 201-2; Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986), 212-14; William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (New York, 1982), 82-83.
171. On 27 September 1946, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Nikolai Novikov, wrote that "the current relations between England and the United States, despite the temporary attainment of agreements on very important questions, are plagued with great internal contradictions and cannot be lasting." Novikov follows the passage quoted in the text with an orthodox Marxist- Leninist exposition of the inevitability of imperialist rivalry between the United States and Britain. Nikolai Novikov, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Postwar Period," 27 September 1946, Diplomatic History 15 (Fall 1991): 532, 535. Novikov would not have had access to the highly sensitive information from Maclean, which was reserved exclusively for Stalin, Molotov, and Lavrentii Beria. Modin, My Three Cambridge Friends, 122. Russian diplomat and historian Vladimir O. Pechatnov has traced the influence on Soviet diplomacy of the idea of inevitable British-American rivalry in a study of exceptional importance about the wartime writings of Ivan Maisky, Maxim Litvinov, and Andrei Gromyko on postwar relations with the Western powers. Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Big Three after World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Postwar Relations with the United States and Great Britain," Working Paper No. 13 of the Cold War International History Project (June 1995), 4-5, 11, 13, 17-18. For percipient treatments of Soviet Middle Eastern policy see William O. McCagg, Jr., Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948 (Detroit, 1978), 191-92, 201-2; Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986), 212-14; William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (New York, 1982), 82-83.
172. On 27 September 1946, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Nikolai Novikov, wrote that "the current relations between England and the United States, despite the temporary attainment of agreements on very important questions, are plagued with great internal contradictions and cannot be lasting." Novikov follows the passage quoted in the text with an orthodox Marxist- Leninist exposition of the inevitability of imperialist rivalry between the United States and Britain. Nikolai Novikov, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Postwar Period," 27 September 1946, Diplomatic History 15 (Fall 1991): 532, 535. Novikov would not have had access to the highly sensitive information from Maclean, which was reserved exclusively for Stalin, Molotov, and Lavrentii Beria. Modin, My Three Cambridge Friends, 122. Russian diplomat and historian Vladimir O. Pechatnov has traced the influence on Soviet diplomacy of the idea of inevitable British-American rivalry in a study of exceptional importance about the wartime writings of Ivan Maisky, Maxim Litvinov, and Andrei Gromyko on postwar relations with the Western powers. Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Big Three after World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Postwar Relations with the United States and Great Britain," Working Paper No. 13 of the Cold War International History Project (June 1995), 4-5, 11, 13, 17-18. For percipient treatments of Soviet Middle Eastern policy see William O. McCagg, Jr., Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948 (Detroit, 1978), 191-92, 201-2; Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986), 212-14; William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (New York, 1982), 82-83.
173. On 27 September 1946, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Nikolai Novikov, wrote that "the current relations between England and the United States, despite the temporary attainment of agreements on very important questions, are plagued with great internal contradictions and cannot be lasting." Novikov follows the passage quoted in the text with an orthodox Marxist- Leninist exposition of the inevitability of imperialist rivalry between the United States and Britain. Nikolai Novikov, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Postwar Period," 27 September 1946, Diplomatic History 15 (Fall 1991): 532, 535. Novikov would not have had access to the highly sensitive information from Maclean, which was reserved exclusively for Stalin, Molotov, and Lavrentii Beria. Modin, My Three Cambridge Friends, 122. Russian diplomat and historian Vladimir O. Pechatnov has traced the influence on Soviet diplomacy of the idea of inevitable British-American rivalry in a study of exceptional importance about the wartime writings of Ivan Maisky, Maxim Litvinov, and Andrei Gromyko on postwar relations with the Western powers. Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Big Three after World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Postwar Relations with the United States and Great Britain," Working Paper No. 13 of the Cold War International History Project (June 1995), 4-5, 11, 13, 17-18. For percipient treatments of Soviet Middle Eastern policy see William O. McCagg, Jr., Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948 (Detroit, 1978), 191-92, 201-2; Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986), 212-14; William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (New York, 1982), 82-83.
174. On 27 September 1946, the Soviet ambassador in Washington, Nikolai Novikov, wrote that "the current relations between England and the United States, despite the temporary attainment of agreements on very important questions, are plagued with great internal contradictions and cannot be lasting." Novikov follows the passage quoted in the text with an orthodox Marxist- Leninist exposition of the inevitability of imperialist rivalry between the United States and Britain. Nikolai Novikov, "U.S. Foreign Policy in the Postwar Period," 27 September 1946, Diplomatic History 15 (Fall 1991): 532, 535. Novikov would not have had access to the highly sensitive information from Maclean, which was reserved exclusively for Stalin, Molotov, and Lavrentii Beria. Modin, My Three Cambridge Friends, 122. Russian diplomat and historian Vladimir O. Pechatnov has traced the influence on Soviet diplomacy of the idea of inevitable British-American rivalry in a study of exceptional importance about the wartime writings of Ivan Maisky, Maxim Litvinov, and Andrei Gromyko on postwar relations with the Western powers. Vladimir O. Pechatnov, "The Big Three after World War II: New Documents on Soviet Thinking about Postwar Relations with the United States and Great Britain," Working Paper No. 13 of the Cold War International History Project (June 1995), 4-5, 11, 13, 17-18. For percipient treatments of Soviet Middle Eastern policy see William O. McCagg, Jr., Stalin Embattled, 1943-1948 (Detroit, 1978), 191-92, 201-2; Fraser J. Harbutt, The Iron Curtain: Churchill, America, and the Origins of the Cold War (New York, 1986), 212-14; William Taubman, Stalin's American Policy: From Entente to Détente to Cold War (New York, 1982), 82-83.
175. On one occasion, Molotov said that Stalin wanted to attain his ends in Turkey "entirely legally, through the UN." On another, however, he declared suggestively, "It was of course necessary to decide the question of the Dardanelles. It is good that we backed down in time. It would have led to united aggression against us." It is difficult to see how a purely diplomatic effort to gain the Strait through the United Nations could have posed the danger of "united aggression" against the Soviet Union. Felix Chuyev, Sto sorok beced c Molotovim: Iz dnyevnika F. Chyeva [One hundred and forty conversations with Molotov: From the diaries of F. Chuyev] (Moscow, 1991), 14, 101-103 . I rely on the extensive research of Vladimir Batyuk of the Institute of the USA and Canada (Moscow) in the files of the Russian Foreign Ministry relating to Turkey. Dr. Batyuk and I are collaborating on an assessment of postwar American intelligence reports on Soviet and Communist activities in Europe and the Near East.
176. Not even Molotov, in his conversations with the sympathetic Chuyev, attempted to argue that the Soviet claims on Turkey had been provoked by foreign powers. On the contrary, he said in their first conversation on the subject that "In this affair we of course overdid it a bit." In later talks he characterized the demands on Turkey as a "mistake," adding that it was well that he and Stalin had "backed down in time." As to why the USSR had made claims against Turkey, Molotov spoke vaguely of Stalin's vaulting amour propre, about honoring the Soviet armed forces, and of the desires of the Soviet Azerbaijanis and Georgians to unify their peoples within the USSR. Whatever the reason for the demands on Turkey, it is clear that the "security dilemma" (a "no-fault" theory of the origins of the Cold War that holds that each side acted defensively but in ways that unintentionally alarmed the other side) does not explain Soviet policy toward Turkey. One suspects, indeed, that Molotov would have had little sympathy for the concept generally: "Now, what was the Cold War? Strained relations. Everything simply depended on that or because we were attacking. They [the Anglo-Americans] of course became embittered, but we had to consolidate what had been conquered. To make from part of Germany our own socialist Germany. As for Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Yugoslavia-they were in a fluid state and it was necessary to bring order everywhere. To press the capitalist order. That was the 'Cold War.'" Chuyev, Sto sorok beced c Molotovim, 15, 86, 102-3.
177. G. A. Tokaev, Stalin Means War (London, 1951), 115. Tokaev was a leading Soviet aeronautical engineer before defecting. At the end of World War II he directed the investigation of several advanced German projects. Tokaev personally briefed Stalin on the so-called Sanger aircraft - a design for a supersonic intercontinental bomber that interested the dictator greatly. During the briefing Stalin referred to Truman as "the gentleman shopkeeper."