Fully informed and on the road to ruin: The perfect failure of asymmetric deterrence

International Studies Quarterly

Volumn 49, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 503-528

  Langlois, Jean Pierre P ^a   Langlois, Catherine G ^b  

^a SAN FRANCISCO STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT; THEORETICAL STUDY; WAR;

EID: 28244455326     PISSN: 00208833     EISSN: 14682478     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2478.2005.00375.x     Document Type: Review

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