A unified statistical model of conflict onset and escalation

American Journal of Political Science

Volumn 44, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 84-93

  Reed, William ^a  

^a MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034341251     PISSN: 00925853     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2669294     Document Type: Article

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