When are arms races dangerous? Rational versus suboptimal arming

International Security

Volumn 28, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 44-84

  Glaser, Charles L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

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EID: 2542599204     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/0162288041588313     Document Type: Review

References (266)

1. The pioneering study is Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," Public Policy, Vol. 8 (1958), pp. 41-86. Historical treatments include Paul Kennedy, "Arms-Races and the Causes of War, 1850-1945," in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983); and Grant T. Hammond, Plowshares into Swords: Arms Races in International Politics, 1840-1991 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). Reviews of the literature include George Downs, "Arms Races and War," in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 82-84; and Charles L. Glaser, "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races," in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 (2000), pp. 251-276.
2. The pioneering study is Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," Public Policy, Vol. 8 (1958), pp. 41-86. Historical treatments include Paul Kennedy, "Arms-Races and the Causes of War, 1850-1945," in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983); and Grant T. Hammond, Plowshares into Swords: Arms Races in International Politics, 1840-1991 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). Reviews of the literature include George Downs, "Arms Races and War," in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 82-84; and Charles L. Glaser, "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races," in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 (2000), pp. 251-276.
3. The pioneering study is Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," Public Policy, Vol. 8 (1958), pp. 41-86. Historical treatments include Paul Kennedy, "Arms-Races and the Causes of War, 1850-1945," in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983); and Grant T. Hammond, Plowshares into Swords: Arms Races in International Politics, 1840-1991 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). Reviews of the literature include George Downs, "Arms Races and War," in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 82-84; and Charles L. Glaser, "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races," in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 (2000), pp. 251-276.
4. The pioneering study is Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," Public Policy, Vol. 8 (1958), pp. 41-86. Historical treatments include Paul Kennedy, "Arms-Races and the Causes of War, 1850-1945," in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983); and Grant T. Hammond, Plowshares into Swords: Arms Races in International Politics, 1840-1991 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). Reviews of the literature include George Downs, "Arms Races and War," in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 82-84; and Charles L. Glaser, "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races," in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 (2000), pp. 251-276.
5. The pioneering study is Samuel P. Huntington, "Arms Races: Prerequisites and Results," Public Policy, Vol. 8 (1958), pp. 41-86. Historical treatments include Paul Kennedy, "Arms-Races and the Causes of War, 1850-1945," in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1983); and Grant T. Hammond, Plowshares into Swords: Arms Races in International Politics, 1840-1991 (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1993). Reviews of the literature include George Downs, "Arms Races and War," in Philip E. Tetlock, Jo L. Husbands, Robert Jervis, Paul C. Stern, and Charles Tilly, eds., Behavior, Society, and Nuclear War, Vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 82-84; and Charles L. Glaser, "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races," in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 (2000), pp. 251-276.
6. See, for example, Susan G. Sample, "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 7-22; Michael D. Wallace, "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 3-16; Michael D. Wallace, "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (March 1982), pp. 37-56; Paul F. Diehl, "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 1983), pp. 205-212; Paul F. Diehl and Jean Kingston, "Messenger or Message? Military Buildups and the Initiation of Conflict," Journal of Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (August 1987), pp. 801-813; and Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler, "Power Transitions and Military Buildups: Resolving the Relationship between Arms Buildups and War," in Kugler and Douglas Lemke, Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
7. See, for example, Susan G. Sample, "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 7-22; Michael D. Wallace, "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 3-16; Michael D. Wallace, "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (March 1982), pp. 37-56; Paul F. Diehl, "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 1983), pp. 205-212; Paul F. Diehl and Jean Kingston, "Messenger or Message? Military Buildups and the Initiation of Conflict," Journal of Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (August 1987), pp. 801-813; and Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler, "Power Transitions and Military Buildups: Resolving the Relationship between Arms Buildups and War," in Kugler and Douglas Lemke, Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
8. See, for example, Susan G. Sample, "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 7-22; Michael D. Wallace, "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 3-16; Michael D. Wallace, "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (March 1982), pp. 37-56; Paul F. Diehl, "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 1983), pp. 205-212; Paul F. Diehl and Jean Kingston, "Messenger or Message? Military Buildups and the Initiation of Conflict," Journal of Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (August 1987), pp. 801-813; and Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler, "Power Transitions and Military Buildups: Resolving the Relationship between Arms Buildups and War," in Kugler and Douglas Lemke, Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
9. See, for example, Susan G. Sample, "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 7-22; Michael D. Wallace, "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 3-16; Michael D. Wallace, "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (March 1982), pp. 37-56; Paul F. Diehl, "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 1983), pp. 205212; Paul F. Diehl and Jean Kingston, "Messenger or Message? Military Buildups and the Initiation of Conflict," Journal of Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (August 1987), pp. 801-813; and Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler, "Power Transitions and Military Buildups: Resolving the Relationship between Arms Buildups and War," in Kugler and Douglas Lemke, Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
10. See, for example, Susan G. Sample, "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 7-22; Michael D. Wallace, "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 3-16; Michael D. Wallace, "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (March 1982), pp. 37-56; Paul F. Diehl, "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 1983), pp. 205212; Paul F. Diehl and Jean Kingston, "Messenger or Message? Military Buildups and the Initiation of Conflict," Journal of Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (August 1987), pp. 801-813; and Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler, "Power Transitions and Military Buildups: Resolving the Relationship between Arms Buildups and War," in Kugler and Douglas Lemke, Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
11. See, for example, Susan G. Sample, "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation: Resolving the Debate," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 34, No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 7-22; Michael D. Wallace, "Arms Races and Escalation: Some New Evidence," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 23, No. 1 (March 1979), pp. 3-16; Michael D. Wallace, "Armaments and Escalation: Two Competing Hypotheses," International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (March 1982), pp. 37-56; Paul F. Diehl, "Arms Races and Escalation: A Closer Look," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 20, No. 3 (September 1983), pp. 205212; Paul F. Diehl and Jean Kingston, "Messenger or Message? Military Buildups and the Initiation of Conflict," Journal of Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (August 1987), pp. 801-813; and Suzanne Werner and Jacek Kugler, "Power Transitions and Military Buildups: Resolving the Relationship between Arms Buildups and War," in Kugler and Douglas Lemke, Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
12. On these models, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3; and Charles L. Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538. Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 3-12, identifies both types of causes.
13. On these models, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3; and Charles L. Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538. Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 3-12, identifies both types of causes.
14. On these models, see Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3; and Charles L. Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy: Expanding and Refining the Spiral and Deterrence Models," World Politics, Vol. 44, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 497-538. Hedley Bull, The Control of the Arms Race: Disarmament and Arms Control in the Missile Age (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 3-12, identifies both types of causes.
15. See, for example, Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961); George W. Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," Scientific American, No. 220 (April 1969), pp. 15-25; and Colin S. Gray, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
16. See, for example, Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961); George W. Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," Scientific American, No. 220 (April 1969), pp. 15-25; and Colin S. Gray, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
17. See, for example, Thomas C. Schelling and Morton H. Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961); George W. Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," Scientific American, No. 220 (April 1969), pp. 15-25; and Colin S. Gray, House of Cards: Why Arms Control Must Fail (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992).
18. The term "arms race" is itself controversial; for a helpful discussion, see Barry Buzan, Introduction to Strategic Studies: Military Technology and International Relations (New York: St. Martin's, 1987), pp. 69-75.
19. President George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: White House, September 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/html, pp. 29-30.
20. Arms races may, however, have an independent causal effect that is not captured in this formulation: if they change the state by influencing its domestic politics by, for example, increasing militarism. See Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), pp. 144-145.
21. A suboptimal buildup/race, however, might simply result in wasted resources, but not a reduction in security.
22. Van Evera, Causes of War.
23. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 174-185; and Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400.
24. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 174-185; and Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400.
25. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 174-185; and Andrew Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model," World Politics, Vol. 49, No. 3 (April 1997), pp. 371-400.
26. Dale C. Copeland, The Origins of Major War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 56-78. Relatedly, a greedy state that enjoys a power advantage might launch a buildup to acquire military advantages that would make the costs of war acceptable, thereby improving its bargaining position and possibly increasing the probability of war.
27. Robert J. Art, "The Influence of Foreign Policy on Seapower: New Weapons and Weltpolitik in Wilhelmirdan Germany," in Art and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Use of Force, 2d ed. (New York: University Press of America, 1983), p. 186.
28. Sample, "Arms Races and Dispute Escalation."
29. For other criticisms of this literature, including that it lumps together different types of rational arms races, see Downs, "Arms Races and War," pp. 82-84; and Glaser, "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races." See also Paul F. Diehl and Mack J.C. Crescenzi, "Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate," and Susan G. Sample, "Furthering the Investigation of the Effects of Arms Buildups," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1998), pp. 111-118 and pp. 122-126, respectively.
30. For other criticisms of this literature, including that it lumps together different types of rational arms races, see Downs, "Arms Races and War," pp. 82-84; and Glaser, "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races." See also Paul F. Diehl and Mack J.C. Crescenzi, "Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate," and Susan G. Sample, "Furthering the Investigation of the Effects of Arms Buildups," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1998), pp. 111-118 and pp. 122-126, respectively.
31. For other criticisms of this literature, including that it lumps together different types of rational arms races, see Downs, "Arms Races and War," pp. 82-84; and Glaser, "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races." See also Paul F. Diehl and Mack J.C. Crescenzi, "Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate," and Susan G. Sample, "Furthering the Investigation of the Effects of Arms Buildups," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1998), pp. 111-118 and pp. 122-126, respectively.
32. For other criticisms of this literature, including that it lumps together different types of rational arms races, see Downs, "Arms Races and War," pp. 82-84; and Glaser, "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races." See also Paul F. Diehl and Mack J.C. Crescenzi, "Reconfiguring the Arms Race-War Debate," and Susan G. Sample, "Furthering the Investigation of the Effects of Arms Buildups," Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 35, No. 1 (1998), pp. 111-118 and pp. 122-126, respectively.
33. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, chap. 3; Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
34. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, chap. 3; Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
35. Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, chap. 3; Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy; and Kydd, "Game Theory and the Spiral Model."
36. Glaser, "The Causes and Consequences of Arms Races."
37. Other analyses of when states should arm include George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990); George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 2 (October 1985), pp. 118-146; Robert Powell, In The Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 2; and Ido Oren, "A Theory of Armament," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 1-29.
38. Other analyses of when states should arm include George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990); George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 2 (October 1985), pp. 118-146; Robert Powell, In The Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 2; and Ido Oren, "A Theory of Armament," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 1-29.
39. Other analyses of when states should arm include George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990); George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 2 (October 1985), pp. 118-146; Robert Powell, In The Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 2; and Ido Oren, "A Theory of Armament," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 1-29.
40. Other analyses of when states should arm include George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, Tacit Bargaining, Arms Races, and Arms Control (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1990); George W. Downs, David M. Rocke, and Randolph Siverson, "Arms Races and Cooperation," World Politics, Vol. 38, No. 2 (October 1985), pp. 118-146; Robert Powell, In The Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1999), chap. 2; and Ido Oren, "A Theory of Armament," Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 1998), pp. 1-29.
41. James D. Fearon, "Domestic Politics, Foreign Policy, and Theories of International Relations," in Nelson W. Polsby, ed., Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 289-313.
42. Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Van Evera, Causes of War; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128-161.
43. Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Van Evera, Causes of War; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128-161.
44. Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Van Evera, Causes of War; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128-161.
45. Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Van Evera, Causes of War; Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128-161.
46. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
47. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); and John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
48. For analysis that focuses on binary choices about specific types of weapons, see Thomas C. Schelling, "A Framework for Evaluation of Arms-Control Proposals," Dædulus, Vol. 104, No. 3 (Summer 1975), pp. 187-200.
49. Other variables can be important, including the forces deployed before the potential race; polarity, which influences a state's alternatives to arming (James D. Morrow, "Arms versus Allies: Tradeoffs in the Search for Security," International Organization, Vol. 47, No. 2 [Spring 1993], pp. 207-233) and the reactions its arming is likely to generate; and the quality of the adversary's evaluative capabilities. Although incomplete, the discussion in the text indicates how to proceed analytically.
50. To keep the analysis reasonably simple, the following discussion assumes that power is constant. When power is shifting, the declining state will have additional incentives to launch a buildup. On preventive war, see Copeland, The Origins of Major War; and Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 4.
51. To keep the analysis reasonably simple, the following discussion assumes that power is constant. When power is shifting, the declining state will have additional incentives to launch a buildup. On preventive war, see Copeland, The Origins of Major War; and Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 4.
52. On defining and measuring power, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 3.
53. This consideration also generates incentives for cooperation between equally powerful states, but these political/signaling benefits are then smaller, while the military benefits of cooperation are larger.
54. On offense-defense theory, see Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 6; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82; Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 71-104; Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," Journal of Politics, Vol. 63, No. 3 (August 2001), pp. 741-774; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1995), pp. 660-691.
55. On offense-defense theory, see Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 6; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82; Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 71-104; Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," Journal of Politics, Vol. 63, No. 3 (August 2001), pp. 741-774; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1995), pp. 660-691.
56. On offense-defense theory, see Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 6; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82; Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 71-104; Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," Journal of Politics, Vol. 63, No. 3 (August 2001), pp. 741-774; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1995), pp. 660-691.
57. On offense-defense theory, see Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 6; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82; Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 71-104; Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," Journal of Politics, Vol. 63, No. 3 (August 2001), pp. 741-774; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1995), pp. 660-691.
58. On offense-defense theory, see Van Evera, Causes of War, chap. 6; Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82; Keir A. Lieber, "Grasping the Technological Peace: The Offense-Defense Balance and International Security," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000), pp. 71-104; Stephen Biddle, "Rebuilding the Foundations of Offense-Defense Theory," Journal of Politics, Vol. 63, No. 3 (August 2001), pp. 741-774; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (1995), pp. 660-691.
59. On when offensive doctrines cause peace, see Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 152-160.
60. Charles L. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 63-67, 240-242.
61. For the case in favor, see Samuel P. Huntington, "Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe," International Security, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Winter 1983/84), pp. 32-56.
62. Another reason that the weaker state might engage in an arms competition instead of simply accepting military inferiority is that the states disagree about their power, although this is less likely when the difference is large. On this type of interaction, see Andrew Kydd, "Arms Races and Arms Control: Modeling the Hawk Perspective," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 44, No. 2 (April 2000), pp. 222-238.
63. If states knew the value of the balance with certainty, they might require an advantage in force size only under offense advantage. In practice, however, states face uncertainty about the offense-defense balance. In addition, uncertainty about the quality of forces and the scenario that leads to war further support the case for superiority.
64. If the advantage of offense is large, however, neither country can achieve its security with a defensive doctrine. As a result, both will adopt offensive doctrines, and the key to success will lie in fighting on the offense. Relative force size will matter relatively little, so arms races should not be intense, but war will be likely.
65. In addition, if the long-term economic consequences of an arms race promise to create domestic political instability or to undermine the state's ability to compete, the state should accept still greater risks in the military status quo.
66. This insight guides modern arms control theory, as in Schelling and Halperin, Strategy and Arms Control.
67. This argument is developed more fully in Charles L. Glaser, "Anarchy, Information about Motives, and International Politics," University of Chicago, July 2003. The state's decision also depends on its information about the adversary's information about the state's motives.
68. On policy under uncertainty, see David M. Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers," Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Autumn 2002), pp. 1-40; and Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 111-112. On states with mixed motives, see Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy."
69. On policy under uncertainty, see David M. Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers," Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Autumn 2002), pp. 1-40; and Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 111-112. On states with mixed motives, see Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy."
70. On policy under uncertainty, see David M. Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs about Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers," Security Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2 (Autumn 2002), pp. 1-40; and Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics, pp. 111-112. On states with mixed motives, see Glaser, "The Political Consequences of Military Strategy."
71. Similarly, the slower the rate at which the adversary could build, the smaller the danger posed by its first move.
72. For lists of these races, see Huntington, "Arms Races"; Kennedy, "Arms-Races and the Causes of War, 1850-1945"; and Hammond, Plowshares into Swords.
73. For lists of these races, see Huntington, "Arms Races"; Kennedy, "Arms-Races and the Causes of War, 1850-1945"; and Hammond, Plowshares into Swords.
74. For lists of these races, see Huntington, "Arms Races"; Kennedy, "Arms-Races and the Causes of War, 1850-1945"; and Hammond, Plowshares into Swords.
75. A likely example of the latter, which space limitations do not permit evaluating here, is the British failure to build up its army before World War II. See Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Elizabeth Keir, Imagining War: French and British Doctrine between the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Stephen R. Rock, Appeasement in International Politics (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000), chap. 3.
76. A likely example of the latter, which space limitations do not permit evaluating here, is the British failure to build up its army before World War II. See Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Elizabeth Keir, Imagining War: French and British Doctrine between the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Stephen R. Rock, Appeasement in International Politics (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000), chap. 3.
77. A likely example of the latter, which space limitations do not permit evaluating here, is the British failure to build up its army before World War II. See Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Elizabeth Keir, Imagining War: French and British Doctrine between the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Stephen R. Rock, Appeasement in International Politics (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000), chap. 3.
78. A likely example of the latter, which space limitations do not permit evaluating here, is the British failure to build up its army before World War II. See Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980); Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); Elizabeth Keir, Imagining War: French and British Doctrine between the Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); and Stephen R. Rock, Appeasement in International Politics (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2000), chap. 3.
79. On this use of a rational model, instead of testing a model, see Terry Moe, "On the Scientific Status of Rational Models," American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 23, No. 1 (February 1979), pp. 236-237.
80. On the stages of the naval buildup, see Holger H. Herwig, "Luxury Fleet": The Imperial German Navy, 1888-1918 (London: George Allen and Unwin), especially pp. 33-92 and appendixes. On the early stages, see Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (New York: Macmillan, 1965).
81. On the stages of the naval buildup, see Holger H. Herwig, "Luxury Fleet": The Imperial German Navy, 1888-1918 (London: George Allen and Unwin), especially pp. 33-92 and appendixes. On the early stages, see Jonathan Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent: Tirpitz and the Birth of the German Battle Fleet (New York: Macmillan, 1965).
82. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Ashfield, 1980), pp. 421-423 on the security dilemma, and pp. 428-430 on its negative impact; Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, Vol. 2 (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1970), pp. 140-147; Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, p. 18; and Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 119-123.
83. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Ashfield, 1980), pp. 421-423 on the security dilemma, and pp. 428-430 on its negative impact; Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, Vol. 2 (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1970), pp. 140-147; Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, p. 18; and Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 119-123.
84. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Ashfield, 1980), pp. 421-423 on the security dilemma, and pp. 428-430 on its negative impact; Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, Vol. 2 (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1970), pp. 140-147; Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, p. 18; and Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 119-123.
85. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914 (London: Ashfield, 1980), pp. 421-423 on the security dilemma, and pp. 428-430 on its negative impact; Gerhard Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter: The Problem of Militarism in Germany, Vol. 2 (Coral Gables, Fla.: University of Miami Press, 1970), pp. 140-147; Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, p. 18; and Arthur Marder, From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era, 1904-1919 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1961), pp. 119-123.
86. On the role of the German threat, see A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 403-417, 442-446; and Samuel R. Williamson Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 1-25, who give it relatively little weight. Two works that give the German threat greater weight are Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 266-267, 428, 441; and V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), p. 60.
87. On the role of the German threat, see A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 403-417, 442-446; and Samuel R. Williamson Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 1-25, who give it relatively little weight. Two works that give the German threat greater weight are Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 266-267, 428, 441; and V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), p. 60.
88. On the role of the German threat, see A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 403-417, 442-446; and Samuel R. Williamson Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 1-25, who give it relatively little weight. Two works that give the German threat greater weight are Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 266-267, 428, 441; and V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), p. 60.
89. On the role of the German threat, see A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for the Mastery of Europe, 1848-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press), pp. 403-417, 442-446; and Samuel R. Williamson Jr., The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1969), pp. 1-25, who give it relatively little weight. Two works that give the German threat greater weight are Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism, pp. 266-267, 428, 441; and V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, 2d ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1993), p. 60.
90. Snyder, Myths of Empire, p. 33.
91. Germany's strategy, however, did vary over these years; see P.M. Kennedy, "The Development of German Naval Operations Plans against England, 1896-1914," in Kennedy, ed., The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914 (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1979), pp. 171-198.
92. This ratio was widely accepted at the time. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, p. 50; and Herwig, "Luxury Fleet," pp. 36-39. If instead Britain decided to impose a distant blockade, which it did during the war and some in the Germany navy started worrying about by the mid-1900s, Germany would require more than a 2:3 ratio. Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter, pp. 149154.
93. This ratio was widely accepted at the time. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, p. 50; and Herwig, "Luxury Fleet," pp. 36-39. If instead Britain decided to impose a distant blockade, which it did during the war and some in the Germany navy started worrying about by the mid-1900s, Germany would require more than a 2:3 ratio. Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter, pp. 149154.
94. This ratio was widely accepted at the time. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, p. 50; and Herwig, "Luxury Fleet," pp. 36-39. If instead Britain decided to impose a distant blockade, which it did during the war and some in the Germany navy started worrying about by the mid-1900s, Germany would require more than a 2:3 ratio. Ritter, The Sword and the Scepter, pp. 149154.
95. Assessing available power under multipolarity is complicated because a state that must plan to defend against multiple adversaries can allocate only a fraction of its total resources against each adversary.
96. Britain enjoyed approximately a 20 percent advantage at the beginning of this period, and Germany enjoyed approximately a 5 percent advantage by the end. See John M. Hobson, "The Military-Extraction Gap and the Wary Titan: The Fiscal Sociology of British Defense Policy, 1870-1913," Journal of European Economic History, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1993), pp. 461-506, especially pp. 503, 505. In addition, Germany's population was larger than Britain's, which made it more difficult to extract a percentage of national income equal to the British percentage, and political divisions within the German federal system further reduced its potential for extracting revenues. Ibid., p. 496.
97. Britain enjoyed approximately a 20 percent advantage at the beginning of this period, and Germany enjoyed approximately a 5 percent advantage by the end. See John M. Hobson, "The Military-Extraction Gap and the Wary Titan: The Fiscal Sociology of British Defense Policy, 1870-1913," Journal of European Economic History, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1993), pp. 461-506, especially pp. 503, 505. In addition, Germany's population was larger than Britain's, which made it more difficult to extract a percentage of national income equal to the British percentage, and political divisions within the German federal system further reduced its potential for extracting revenues. Ibid., p. 496.
98. At its peak (in 1911), the German navy's budget was 55 percent of the army's; in 1898 it was 20 percent, and had dropped to 33 percent by 1913. Herwig, "Luxury Fleet," pp. 78, 90; see also tables in David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 4-8.
99. At its peak (in 1911), the German navy's budget was 55 percent of the army's; in 1898 it was 20 percent, and had dropped to 33 percent by 1913. Herwig, "Luxury Fleet," pp. 78, 90; see also tables in David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904-1914 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), pp. 4-8.
100. Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, p. 21; and Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, pp. 136-137. Hans-Ulrick Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918 (New York: Berg, 1985), notes that Germany almost reached the desired ratio in 1914.
101. Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, p. 21; and Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, pp. 136-137. Hans-Ulrick Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918 (New York: Berg, 1985), notes that Germany almost reached the desired ratio in 1914.
102. Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, p. 21; and Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of War in 1914, pp. 136-137. Hans-Ulrick Wehler, The German Empire, 1871-1918 (New York: Berg, 1985), notes that Germany almost reached the desired ratio in 1914.
103. For a powerful criticism of Tirpitz's strategy, which identifies many problems not addressed here, see Paul Kennedy, "Strategic Aspects of the Anglo-German Naval Race," in Kennedy, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1870-1945.
104. In fact, Britain began redistributing its navy before Germany became its principal challenger, because of the growth of other European navies; the German buildup added to these pressures. See Aaron L. Friedberg, The Weary Titan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), chap. 4.
105. Kennedy, "Strategic Aspects of the Anglo-German Naval Race," p. 140, finds the assumption "was strategically and politically so wide off the mark that it seems incredible that Tirpitz should have based his hopes on it."
106. In 1903 Britain announced plans to build a new North Sea naval base; in 1904 it started redistributing its fleet; and in 1905 it made public a memorandum that emphasized that changes in the international environment would result in the redistribution of its fleet. Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (London: Ashfield, 1976), pp. 216-229.
107. Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, pp. 83-84; and Kennedy, "Strategic Aspects of the Anglo-German Naval Race," pp. 132-133.
108. Steinberg, Yesterday's Deterrent, pp. 83-84; and Kennedy, "Strategic Aspects of the Anglo-German Naval Race," pp. 132-133.
109. Art, "The Influence of Foreign Policy on Seapower," p. 185.
110. Kennedy, The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860-1914, pp. 224, 419.
111. The 1912 bill provided for roughly a 5 percent increase in manpower and more than a 10 percent increase in the army's budget. For somewhat different estimates, see David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the first World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 233-235; and Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, pp. 8, 210. On the reasons for this decision, see Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 161-172. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 146, suggests that the start of the race may be better attributed to Russia's decisions in 1910.
112. The 1912 bill provided for roughly a 5 percent increase in manpower and more than a 10 percent increase in the army's budget. For somewhat different estimates, see David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the first World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 233-235; and Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, pp. 8, 210. On the reasons for this decision, see Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 161-172. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 146, suggests that the start of the race may be better attributed to Russia's decisions in 1910.
113. The 1912 bill provided for roughly a 5 percent increase in manpower and more than a 10 percent increase in the army's budget. For somewhat different estimates, see David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the first World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 233-235; and Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, pp. 8, 210. On the reasons for this decision, see Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 161-172. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 146, suggests that the start of the race may be better attributed to Russia's decisions in 1910.
114. The 1912 bill provided for roughly a 5 percent increase in manpower and more than a 10 percent increase in the army's budget. For somewhat different estimates, see David G. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the first World War (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), pp. 233-235; and Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, pp. 8, 210. On the reasons for this decision, see Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 161-172. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 146, suggests that the start of the race may be better attributed to Russia's decisions in 1910.
115. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 174-176; with some-what different emphasis, Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, pp. 216-224, who sees the French reaction as quite limited.
116. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 174-176; with some-what different emphasis, Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, pp. 216-224, who sees the French reaction as quite limited.
117. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 173-198; and Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, pp. 285-323. Germany planned to increase its manpower by roughly a sixth, over two years.
118. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 173-198; and Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, pp. 285-323. Germany planned to increase its manpower by roughly a sixth, over two years.
119. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 44-45; see also Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 109-110.
120. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 44-45; see also Jack Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 109-110.
121. Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1979), p. 66. Agreeing with this assessment is B.H. Liddell Hart, "Forward," in ibid. Schlieffen did little, however, to use this conclusion to support increases in German forces (ibid., p. 67), which suggests that he was not exaggerating his concerns for this purpose; but see also Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, p. 184.
122. Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1979), p. 66. Agreeing with this assessment is B.H. Liddell Hart, "Forward," in ibid. Schlieffen did little, however, to use this conclusion to support increases in German forces (ibid., p. 67), which suggests that he was not exaggerating his concerns for this purpose; but see also Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, p. 184.
123. Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1979), p. 66. Agreeing with this assessment is B.H. Liddell Hart, "Forward," in ibid. Schlieffen did little, however, to use this conclusion to support increases in German forces (ibid., p. 67), which suggests that he was not exaggerating his concerns for this purpose; but see also Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, p. 184.
124. Gerhard Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan: Critique of a Myth (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1979), p. 66. Agreeing with this assessment is B.H. Liddell Hart, "Forward," in ibid. Schlieffen did little, however, to use this conclusion to support increases in German forces (ibid., p. 67), which suggests that he was not exaggerating his concerns for this purpose; but see also Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, p. 184.
125. It is still further biased because Schlieffen's assessment overlooked a number of knowable factors that worked against his strategy. Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan; Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 113-141; and Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, pp. 112-113. Cutting in the other direction, however, were the French reserves that might have influenced the battle's outcome, but were not included in the ratio of initial frontline forces.
126. It is still further biased because Schlieffen's assessment overlooked a number of knowable factors that worked against his strategy. Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan; Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 113-141; and Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, pp. 112-113. Cutting in the other direction, however, were the French reserves that might have influenced the
127. It is still further biased because Schlieffen's assessment overlooked a number of knowable factors that worked against his strategy. Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan; Martin Van Creveld, Supplying War: Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 113-141; and Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, pp. 112-113. Cutting in the other direction, however, were the French reserves that might have influenced the battle's outcome, but were not included in the ratio of initial frontline forces.
128. See Copeland, The Origins of Major War, p. 50, Table A2; and Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, p. 234, Table A.1. The German general staff stressed this point-Germany inducted 52-54 percent of eligible men, whereas France inducted 85 percent - in calling for large increases in German manpower in the 1913 buildup. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 184-185; and Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 292.
129. See Copeland, The Origins of Major War, p. 50, Table A2; and Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, p. 234, Table A.1. The German general staff stressed this point-Germany inducted 52-54 percent of eligible men, whereas France inducted 85 percent - in calling for large increases in German manpower in the 1913 buildup. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 184-185; and Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 292.
130. See Copeland, The Origins of Major War, p. 50, Table A2; and Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, p. 234, Table A.1. The German general staff stressed this point-Germany inducted 52-54 percent of eligible men, whereas France inducted 85 percent - in calling for large increases in German manpower in the 1913 buildup. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 184-185; and Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 292.
131. See Copeland, The Origins of Major War, p. 50, Table A2; and Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, p. 234, Table A.1. The German general staff stressed this point-Germany inducted 52-54 percent of eligible men, whereas France inducted 85 percent - in calling for large increases in German manpower in the 1913 buildup. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 184-185; and Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 292.
132. Some German leaders, however, doubted that an arms race would benefit Germany. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 294.
133. Quoted in Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 167-168.
134. In assessing the overall quality of German decisionmaking, it is important to recognize that some of these factors - for example, the insecurity generated by the tightening of alliances opposing Germany - were largely the result of Germany's own policies. Other factors - shifts in the Balkan balance of power and improvements in Russian army capabilities - were not the result of Germany policies, but their significance may have been exaggerated by Germany's evaluation of its military environment.
135. Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," both in International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 108-146 and pp. 58-107, respectively; and Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-175. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, does not focus on doctrine, but his argument that Germany preferred a preventive war leads to a requirement for an offensive doctrine.
136. Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," both in International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 108-146 and pp. 58-107, respectively; and Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-175. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, does not focus on doctrine, but his argument that Germany preferred a preventive war leads to a requirement for an offensive doctrine.
137. Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," both in International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 108-146 and pp. 58-107, respectively; and Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-175. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, does not focus on doctrine, but his argument that Germany preferred a preventive war leads to a requirement for an offensive doctrine.
138. Jack Snyder, "Civil-Military Relations and the Cult of the Offensive, 1914 and 1984," and Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," both in International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984), pp. 108-146 and pp. 58-107, respectively; and Scott D. Sagan, "1914 Revisited: Allies, Offense, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 11, No. 2 (Fall 1986), pp. 151-175. Copeland, The Origins of Major War, does not focus on doctrine, but his argument that Germany preferred a preventive war leads to a requirement for an offensive doctrine.
139. However, there are reasons to believe that the plan's logistical problems limited the value of additional troops. See Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan; Van Creveld, Supplying War; and Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive.
140. However, there are reasons to believe that the plan's logistical problems limited the value of additional troops. See Ritter, The Schlieffen Plan; Van Creveld, Supplying War; and Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive.
141. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 296. The German war minister, who favored the 1912 bill, warned that a major army buildup would be the prelude to war and therefore "a step to be taken only if such a struggle seemed inevitable and imminent." Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, p. 165. Both France and Russia appreciated Germany's security requirements and therefore did not impute more malign motives. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 174, 191-192. War became more likely, however, because they understood the German buildup as an indication of the high probability that Germany placed on war, which in turn required them to intensify preparations.
142. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 296. The German war minister, who favored the 1912 bill, warned that a major army buildup would be the prelude to war and therefore "a step to be taken only if such a struggle seemed inevitable and imminent." Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, p. 165. Both France and Russia appreciated Germany's security requirements and therefore did not impute more malign motives. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 174, 191-192. War became more likely, however, because they understood the German buildup as an indication of the high probability that Germany placed on war, which in turn required them to intensify preparations.
143. Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War, p. 296. The German war minister, who favored the 1912 bill, warned that a major army buildup would be the prelude to war and therefore "a step to be taken only if such a struggle seemed inevitable and imminent." Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, p. 165. Both France and Russia appreciated Germany's security requirements and therefore did not impute more malign motives. Herrmann, The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War, pp. 174, 191-192. War became more likely, however, because they understood the German buildup as an indication of the high probability that Germany placed on war, which in turn required them to intensify preparations.
144. Snyder, The Ideology of the Offensive, p. 119.
145. John H. Maurer, "Arms Control and the Washington Conference," in Erik Goldstein and Maurer, eds., The Washington Conference, 1921-22 (Essex, U.K.: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 268-274; and Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914-1922 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
146. John H. Maurer, "Arms Control and the Washington Conference," in Erik Goldstein and Maurer, eds., The Washington Conference, 1921-22 (Essex, U.K.: Frank Cass, 1994), pp. 268-274; and Roger Dingman, Power in the Pacific: The Origins of Naval Arms Limitation, 1914-1922 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976).
147. On the origins of the 70 percent requirement, see David C. Evans and Mark R. Peattie, Kaigun: Strategy, Tactics, and Technology in the Imperial Japanese Navy, 1887-1941 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), pp. 141-144.
148. Correlates of War data, http://www.umich.edu/cowproj.
149. The countries also agreed to qualitative limits on the size of ships and their guns, because otherwise a country could gain an advantage by building larger ships, while meeting the limitations on total tonnage. Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 1. Emphasizing the political dimension of the agreements is Emily O. Goldman, Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control between the Wars (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).
150. The countries also agreed to qualitative limits on the size of ships and their guns, because otherwise a country could gain an advantage by building larger ships, while meeting the limitations on total tonnage. Stephen E. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor: The Failure of the Second London Naval Conference and the Onset of World War II (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), p. 1. Emphasizing the political dimension of the agreements is Emily O. Goldman, Sunken Treaties: Naval Arms Control between the Wars (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994).
151. James B. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy: National Security and Foreign Policy, 1930-1938 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 46.
152. Asada Sadao, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitations: Kato Tomosaburo vs. Kato Kanji," in Gerald Jordan, ed., Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1945 (London: Croom Helm, 1977), pp. 151-152; and Robert Gordon Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitation between the Two World Wars (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 61. For a related argument, see Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, p. 27.
153. Asada Sadao, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitations: Kato Tomosaburo vs. Kato Kanji," in Gerald Jordan, ed., Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1945 (London: Croom Helm, 1977), pp. 151-152; and Robert Gordon Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitation between the Two World Wars (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 61. For a related argument, see Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, p. 27.
154. Asada Sadao, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitations: Kato Tomosaburo vs. Kato Kanji," in Gerald Jordan, ed., Naval Warfare in the Twentieth Century, 1900-1945 (London: Croom Helm, 1977), pp. 151-152; and Robert Gordon Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era: The United States and Naval Limitation between the Two World Wars (New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), p. 61. For a related argument, see Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, p. 27.
155. Carl Boyd, "Japanese Military Effectiveness: The Interwar Period," in Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 2: The Interwar Period (London: Allen and Unwin, 1988), pp. 142-148. In addition, the treaty did not limit cruisers, destroyers, or submarines, which Japan believed would increase its ability to wear down U.S. forces as they crossed the Pacific, thereby helping to make up for the undesirable battleship ratio. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, p. 3.
156. Carl Boyd, "Japanese Military Effectiveness: The Interwar Period," in Allan R. Millett and Williamson Murray, eds., Military Effectiveness, Vol. 2: The Interwar Period (London: Allen and Unwin, 1988), pp. 142-148. In addition, the treaty did not limit cruisers, destroyers, or submarines, which Japan believed would increase its ability to wear down U.S. forces as they crossed the Pacific, thereby helping to make up for the undesirable battleship ratio. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, p. 3.
157. An influential faction in the Japanese navy believed that the arrangement did not meet Japan's minimum security requirements. Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era, pp. 59-60, 71; Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 226-228; and Asada, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitations," pp. 149, 152.
158. An influential faction in the Japanese navy believed that the arrangement did not meet Japan's minimum security requirements. Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era, pp. 59-60, 71; Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 226-228; and Asada, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitations," pp. 149, 152.
159. An influential faction in the Japanese navy believed that the arrangement did not meet Japan's minimum security requirements. Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era, pp. 59-60, 71; Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," in Dorothy Borg and Shumpei Okamoto, eds., Pearl Harbor as History: Japanese-American Relations, 1931-1941 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 226-228; and Asada, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitations," pp. 149, 152.
160. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, pp. 29-31; and Maurer, "Arms Control and the Washington Conference," p. 283.
161. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, pp. 29-31; and Maurer, "Arms Control and the Washington Conference," p. 283.
162. Asada Sadao, "From Washington to London: The Imperial Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitations, 1921-1930," in Goldstein and Maurer, The Washington Conference, 1921-22, p. 153; see also Asada, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitations," pp. 146-147. For similar views held by the prime minister and foreign minister, see Dingman, Power in the Pacific, pp. 184, 202.
163. Asada Sadao, "From Washington to London: The Imperial Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitations, 1921-1930," in Goldstein and Maurer, The Washington Conference, 1921-22, p. 153; see also Asada, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitations," pp. 146-147. For similar views held by the prime minister and foreign minister, see Dingman, Power in the Pacific, pp. 184, 202.
164. Asada Sadao, "From Washington to London: The Imperial Navy and the Politics of Naval Limitations, 1921-1930," in Goldstein and Maurer, The Washington Conference, 1921-22, p. 153; see also Asada, "Japanese Admirals and the Politics of Naval Limitations," pp. 146-147. For similar views held by the prime minister and foreign minister, see Dingman, Power in the Pacific, pp. 184, 202.
165. The U.S. Navy believed that a 2:1 advantage and fortified bases were necessary; it would have been satisfied with a somewhat less favorable ratio, because the U.S. fleet would have been more modern than Japan's. W.R. Braisted, The United States Navy in the Pacific, 1909-1922 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1971).
166. Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922 (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1970), p. 127.
167. Other factors included doubts in President Warren Harding's administration about whether Congress would fund the U.S. naval buildup (which partly reflected these security dilemma views) and doubts among some that the United States would go to war to protect its interests in China. On the latter point, see Braisted, The United States Navy, in the Pacific, 1909-1922, p. 595.
168. Quoted in Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922, p. 54; and ibid., p. 15 on President Harding's expression of views that in broad terms are consistent with a security dilemma worldview. See also Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era, pp. 30-31, 43-53, who stresses the importance of Hughes's view of the negative impact of arms races; and Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 28-29, more generally on the U.S. belief that arms races were potentially dangerous.
169. Quoted in Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922, p. 54; and ibid., p. 15 on President Harding's expression of views that in broad terms are consistent with a security dilemma worldview. See also Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era, pp. 30-31, 43-53, who stresses the importance of Hughes's view of the negative impact of arms races; and Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 28-29, more generally on the U.S. belief that arms races were potentially dangerous.
170. Quoted in Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922, p. 54; and ibid., p. 15 on President Harding's expression of views that in broad terms are consistent with a security dilemma worldview. See also Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era, pp. 30-31, 43-53, who stresses the importance of Hughes's view of the negative impact of arms races; and Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 28-29, more generally on the U.S. belief that arms races were potentially dangerous.
171. Quoted in Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922, p. 54; and ibid., p. 15 on President Harding's expression of views that in broad terms are consistent with a security dilemma worldview. See also Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era, pp. 30-31, 43-53, who stresses the importance of Hughes's view of the negative impact of arms races; and Robert H. Ferrell, American Diplomacy in the Great Depression: Hoover-Stimson Foreign Policy, 1929-1933 (London: Oxford University Press, 1957), pp. 28-29, more generally on the U.S. belief that arms races were potentially dangerous.
172. Warren I. Cohen, Empire without Tears: America's Foreign Relations, 1921-1933 (New York: Knopf, 1987), pp. 53-55; and Thomas H. Buckley, "The Icarus Factor," in Goldstein and Maurer, The Washington Conference, 1921-22, pp. 144-145.
173. Warren I. Cohen, Empire without Tears: America's Foreign Relations, 1921-1933 (New York: Knopf, 1987), pp. 53-55; and Thomas H. Buckley, "The Icarus Factor," in Goldstein and Maurer, The Washington Conference, 1921-22, pp. 144-145.
174. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, pp. 27-28, 53-55, 62; and Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, pp. 196-200.
175. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, pp. 27-28, 53-55, 62; and Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, pp. 196-200.
176. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, pp. 196-211, 224. In 1941 the naval forces deployed in the Pacific were essentially equal in size. Ibid., p. 221.
177. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, pp. 196-211, 224. In 1941 the naval forces deployed in the Pacific were essentially equal in size. Ibid., p. 221.
178. On the emotional and ideological arguments that were used to support the requirement for parity, see Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," pp. 234-235; and Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, p. 27. The changes in technology that were potentially important were largely overlooked and did not influence this change in requirements. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 212.
179. On the emotional and ideological arguments that were used to support the requirement for parity, see Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," pp. 234-235; and Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, p. 27. The changes in technology that were potentially important were largely overlooked and did not influence this change in requirements. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 212.
180. On the emotional and ideological arguments that were used to support the requirement for parity, see Asada Sadao, "The Japanese Navy and the United States," pp. 234-235; and Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, p. 27. The changes in technology that were potentially important were largely overlooked and did not influence this change in requirements. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 212.
181. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, p. 19, 45-46.
182. Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, p. 364, and more broadly, pp. 363-370.
183. Evans and Peattie conclude, "These treaties provided Japan with a security1 vis-à-vis the United States that the navy could not provide by its own efforts." Ibid., p. 463.
184. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, pp. 173-174; also p. 82.
185. Crowley, Japan's Quest for Autonomy, pp. 191-200.
186. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, chap. 12.; and Van Evera, Causes of War, pp. 89-94.
187. Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964); and Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, chaps. 5, 6.
188. Dorothy Borg, The United States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933-1938 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964); and Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, chaps. 5, 6.
189. Secretary of State Henry Hull, quoted in ibid., p. 142; see also p. 85.
190. Ibid., pp. 83-85, 140, 142; and Meredith W. Berg, "Protecting National Interests by Treaty: The Second London Naval Conference, 1934-36," in B.J.C. McKercher, ed., Arms Limitation and Disarmament (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992), pp. 214-215.
191. Ibid., pp. 83-85, 140, 142; and Meredith W. Berg, "Protecting National Interests by Treaty: The Second London Naval Conference, 1934-36," in B.J.C. McKercher, ed., Arms Limitation and Disarmament (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1992), pp. 214-215.
192. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, pp. 126-129; for a somewhat different emphasis, see Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era, pp. 176-177.
193. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, pp. 126-129; for a somewhat different emphasis, see Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era, pp. 176-177.
194. The United States did recognize that it could win a long war and developed plans for this possibility. Pelz, Race to Pearl Harbor, p. 76, 199. Nevertheless, basic requirements for the core U.S. war plan went unmet.
195. Ibid.; and more sharply, Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era.
196. Ibid.; and more sharply, Kaufman, Arms Control during the Pre-Nuclear Era.
197. Albert Wohlstetter questioned whether there was a nuclear arms race. See Wohlstetter, "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" Foreign Policy, No. 15 (Summer 1974), pp. 3-20; Wohlstetter, "Rivals, But No 'Race'," Foreign Policy, No. 16 (Fall 1974), pp. 48-81, and responses in the same issue; and Michael Nacht, "The Delicate Balance of Error," Foreign Policy, No. 19 (Summer 1975), pp. 163-177.
198. Albert Wohlstetter questioned whether there was a nuclear arms race. See Wohlstetter, "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" Foreign Policy, No. 15 (Summer 1974), pp. 3-20; Wohlstetter, "Rivals, But No 'Race'," Foreign Policy, No. 16 (Fall 1974), pp. 48-81, and responses in the same issue; and Michael Nacht, "The Delicate Balance of Error," Foreign Policy, No. 19 (Summer 1975), pp. 163-177.
199. Albert Wohlstetter questioned whether there was a nuclear arms race. See Wohlstetter, "Is There a Strategic Arms Race?" Foreign Policy, No. 15 (Summer 1974), pp. 3-20; Wohlstetter, "Rivals, But No 'Race'," Foreign Policy, No. 16 (Fall 1974), pp. 48-81, and responses in the same issue; and Michael Nacht, "The Delicate Balance of Error," Foreign Policy, No. 19 (Summer 1975), pp. 163-177.
200. Overviews of U.S. forces and planning include William Burr, "Essay: U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy, 1955-1968; An Overview," in Burr, ed., U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Arms and Politics in the Missile Age, 1955-1968 (Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, 1997); and Jerome Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975).
201. Overviews of U.S. forces and planning include William Burr, "Essay: U.S. Strategic Nuclear Policy, 1955-1968; An Overview," in Burr, ed., U.S. Nuclear History: Nuclear Arms and Politics in the Missile Age, 1955-1968 (Washington, D.C.: National Security Archive, 1997); and Jerome Kahan, Security in the Nuclear Age (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1975).
202. Richard L. Kugler, "The Politics of Restraint: Robert McNamara and the Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1963-1968," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1975, especially chaps. 2, 3; and Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). Some members of the White House staff believed that the force should be much smaller than planned. Ball, Politics and Force Levels, pp. 84-87. It is important to note, however, that at the time these decisions were made, the United States enjoyed a large lead in missiles and, at least rhetorically, the need for superiority was widely accepted. Ibid., pp. 179-211.
203. Richard L. Kugler, "The Politics of Restraint: Robert McNamara and the Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1963-1968," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1975, especially chaps. 2, 3; and Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). Some members of the White House staff believed that the force should be much smaller than planned. Ball, Politics and Force Levels, pp. 84-87. It is important to note, however, that at the time these decisions were made, the United States enjoyed a large lead in missiles and, at least rhetorically, the need for superiority was widely accepted. Ibid., pp. 179-211.
204. Richard L. Kugler, "The Politics of Restraint: Robert McNamara and the Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1963-1968," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1975, especially chaps. 2, 3; and Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). Some members of the White House staff believed that the force should be much smaller than planned. Ball, Politics and Force Levels, pp. 84-87. It is important to note, however, that at the time these decisions were made, the United States enjoyed a large lead in missiles and, at least rhetorically, the need for superiority was widely accepted. Ibid., pp. 179-211.
205. Richard L. Kugler, "The Politics of Restraint: Robert McNamara and the Strategic Nuclear Forces, 1963-1968," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1975, especially chaps. 2, 3; and Desmond Ball, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program of the Kennedy Administration (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). Some members of the White House staff believed that the force should be much smaller than planned. Ball, Politics and Force Levels, pp. 84-87. It is important to note, however, that at the time these decisions were made, the United States enjoyed a large lead in missiles and, at least rhetorically, the need for superiority was widely accepted. Ibid., pp. 179-211.
206. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (London: Macmillan, 1989).
207. This is a controversial assumption. See Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On how different views of nuclear deterrence influence the offense-defense balance, see Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, pp. 94-99.
208. This is a controversial assumption. See Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984). On how different views of nuclear deterrence influence the offense-defense balance, see Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, pp. 94-99.
209. For example, in 1950 U.S. gross domestic product was almost three times the Soviet Union's, and in 1973 it was more than two times as large; in addition, the U.S. advantage was somewhat larger in per capita GDP. Angus Maddison, The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2001), pp. 261, 264.
210. The other key option was preventive war. See George H. Quester, Nuclear Monopoly (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2000); and Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 5-49. Another possibility was a cooperative transition to MAD; however, this faced many of the political and technical barriers that prevented disarmament, albeit to a lesser degree.
211. The other key option was preventive war. See George H. Quester, Nuclear Monopoly (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction, 2000); and Marc Trachtenberg, "A 'Wasting Asset': American Strategy and the Shifting Nuclear Balance, 1949-1954," International Security, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Winter 1988/89), pp. 5-49. Another possibility was a cooperative transition to MAD; however, this faced many of the political and technical barriers that prevented disarmament, albeit to a lesser degree.
212. Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, chap. 5.
213. McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years (New York: Random House, 1988), pp. 168-169, 175-176.
214. Bernhard G. Bechhoefer, Postwar Negotiations for Arms Control (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1961), pp. 27-82.
215. Quester, Nuclear Monopoly, pp. 140-144.
216. Bundy, Danger and Survival, pp. 192-196.
217. See Desmond Ball, "Development of the SIOP, 1960-1983," in Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy.
218. See Desmond Ball, "Development of the SIOP, 1960-1983," in Ball and Jeffrey Richelson, eds., Strategic Nuclear Targeting (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986); and Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy.
219. This characterization does, however, underplay the importance of survivability for retaliation.
220. On SALT, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973); Gerard Smith, Double Talk The Story of SALT I (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980); Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds., SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (New York: Free Press, 1974); and Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Cooperation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985), chap. 5.
221. On SALT, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973); Gerard Smith, Double Talk The Story of SALT I (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980); Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds., SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (New York: Free Press, 1974); and Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Cooperation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985), chap. 5.
222. On SALT, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973); Gerard Smith, Double Talk The Story of SALT I (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980); Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds., SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (New York: Free Press, 1974); and Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Cooperation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985), chap. 5.
223. On SALT, see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973); Gerard Smith, Double Talk The Story of SALT I (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1980); Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinelander, eds., SALT: The Moscow Agreements and Beyond (New York: Free Press, 1974); and Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and Cooperation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985), chap. 5.
224. The danger, however, was exaggerated. See Albert Carnesale and Charles L. Glaser, "ICBM Vulnerability: The Cures Are Worse Than the Disease," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 70-85.
225. Kugler, "The Politics of Restraint," pp. 94-108.
226. Ted Greenwood, Making the MIRV: A Study of Defense Decision Making (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1975), pp. 40, 44, 76-77.
227. A related argument - that MIRV was required to hedge against Soviet upgrading of its Tallinn air defense - was not directly affected by the 1972 ABM treaty. Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Threat (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 90-96; Greenwood, Making the MIRV, pp. 116, 124, 173-176; and Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 11-12, 72-73, 122.
228. A related argument - that MIRV was required to hedge against Soviet upgrading of its Tallinn air defense - was not directly affected by the 1972 ABM treaty. Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Threat (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 90-96; Greenwood, Making the MIRV, pp. 116, 124, 173-176; and Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 11-12, 72-73, 122.
229. A related argument - that MIRV was required to hedge against Soviet upgrading of its Tallinn air defense - was not directly affected by the 1972 ABM treaty. Lawrence Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Threat (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1986), pp. 90-96; Greenwood, Making the MIRV, pp. 116, 124, 173-176; and Newhouse, Cold Dawn, pp. 11-12, 72-73, 122.
230. On these missions, as well as damage limitation, see Greenwood, Making the MIRV; Kugler, "The Politics of Restraint," especially chap. 4; and Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 181-183.
231. On these missions, as well as damage limitation, see Greenwood, Making the MIRV; Kugler, "The Politics of Restraint," especially chap. 4; and Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 181-183.
232. On these missions, as well as damage limitation, see Greenwood, Making the MIRV; Kugler, "The Politics of Restraint," especially chap. 4; and Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969 (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), pp. 181-183.
233. Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy; and Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, chap. 7.
234. Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy; and Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, chap. 7.
235. Douglas Seay, "What Are the Soviet's Objectives in Their Foreign, Military, and Arms Control Policies?" in Lynn Eden and Steven E. Miller, Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1989), pp. 47-108, analyzes the spectrum of influential beliefs.
236. Greenwood, Making the MIRV, pp. 111-112, 123-128; and Smith, Double Talk, pp. 158-165.
237. Greenwood, Making the MIRV, pp. 111-112, 123-128; and Smith, Double Talk, pp. 158-165.
238. On the controversy, see Smith, Double Talk, pp. 161, 173; and Alton Frye, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 61-62.
239. On the controversy, see Smith, Double Talk, pp. 161, 173; and Alton Frye, A Responsible Congress: The Politics of National Security (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1975), pp. 61-62.
240. Garthoff, Détente and Cooperation, p. 138, focuses on divergent positions on the value of on-site inspection for verifying a MIRV ban, but the point appears to be more general. See Smith, Double Talk, p. 173. For a somewhat different interpretation, see Steve Weber, Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 193-199.
241. Garthoff, Détente and Cooperation, p. 138, focuses on divergent positions on the value of on-site inspection for verifying a MIRV ban, but the point appears to be more general. See Smith, Double Talk, p. 173. For a somewhat different interpretation, see Steve Weber, Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 193-199.
242. Garthoff, Détente and Cooperation, p. 138, focuses on divergent positions on the value of on-site inspection for verifying a MIRV ban, but the point appears to be more general. See Smith, Double Talk, p. 173. For a somewhat different interpretation, see Steve Weber, Cooperation and Discord in U.S.-Soviet Arms Control (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 193-199.
243. This conclusion is supported by the fact that opponents took flawed or exaggerated positions on a number of key issues, including the costs of delaying MIRV testing, whether the Soviets had tested a MIRV or only a maneuverable reentry vehicle, and the value of on-site inspection. See Greenwood, Making the MIRV, pp. 125; Smith, Double Talk, p. 159; Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Threat, pp. 137-144; and Garthoff, Détente and Cooperation, pp. 138-139.
244. This conclusion is supported by the fact that opponents took flawed or exaggerated positions on a number of key issues, including the costs of delaying MIRV testing, whether the Soviets had tested a MIRV or only a maneuverable reentry vehicle, and the value of on-site inspection. See Greenwood, Making the MIRV, pp. 125; Smith, Double Talk, p. 159; Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Threat, pp. 137-144; and Garthoff, Détente and Cooperation, pp. 138-139.
245. This conclusion is supported by the fact that opponents took flawed or exaggerated positions on a number of key issues, including the costs of delaying MIRV testing, whether the Soviets had tested a MIRV or only a maneuverable reentry vehicle, and the value of on-site inspection. See Greenwood, Making the MIRV, pp. 125; Smith, Double Talk, p. 159; Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Threat, pp. 137-144; and Garthoff, Détente and Cooperation, pp. 138-139.
246. This conclusion is supported by the fact that opponents took flawed or exaggerated positions on a number of key issues, including the costs of delaying MIRV testing, whether the Soviets had tested a MIRV or only a maneuverable reentry vehicle, and the value of on-site inspection. See Greenwood, Making the MIRV, pp. 125; Smith, Double Talk, p. 159; Freedman, U.S. Intelligence and the Soviet Threat, pp. 137-144; and Garthoff, Détente and Cooperation, pp. 138-139.
247. Histories include Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1977); Edward Randolph Jayne, "The ABM Debate: Strategic Defense and National Security," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969; and David N. Schwartz, "Past and Present: The Historical Legacy," pp. 339-342, in Ashton B. Carter and Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1984).
248. Histories include Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1977); Edward Randolph Jayne, "The ABM Debate: Strategic Defense and National Security," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969; and David N. Schwartz, "Past and Present: The Historical Legacy," pp. 339-342, in Ashton B. Carter and Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1984).
249. Histories include Ernest J. Yanarella, The Missile Defense Controversy: Strategy, Technology, and Politics, 1955-1972 (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1977); Edward Randolph Jayne, "The ABM Debate: Strategic Defense and National Security," Ph.D. dissertation, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1969; and David N. Schwartz, "Past and Present: The Historical Legacy," pp. 339-342, in Ashton B. Carter and Schwartz, eds., Ballistic Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1984).
250. Jayne, "The ABM Debate," pp. 231-233, 267-268; but see David Goldfischer, The Best Defense: Policy Alternatives for U.S. Nuclear Security from the 1950s to the 1980s (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 168-171.
251. Jayne, "The ABM Debate," pp. 231-233, 267-268; but see David Goldfischer, The Best Defense: Policy Alternatives for U.S. Nuclear Security from the 1950s to the 1980s (Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 168-171.
252. This competition might have been more intense than suggested simply by the offense-defense balance, because both countries were inclined to base their strategic programs on worst-case assessments of the adversary's military programs. Robert S. McNamara, "The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy," Department of State bulletin, October 9, 1967; and Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race."
253. This competition might have been more intense than suggested simply by the offense-defense balance, because both countries were inclined to base their strategic programs on worst-case assessments of the adversary's military programs. Robert S. McNamara, "The Dynamics of Nuclear Strategy," Department of State bulletin, October 9, 1967; and Rathjens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race."
254. A related challenge held that ABM could be combined with limits on offensive forces, thereby reducing the importance of cost-exchange ratios. Donald G. Brennan, "Post-Deployment Policy Issues in BMD, in Ballistic Missile Defense: Two Views, Adelphi Paper No. 43 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967); more recently, see Goldfischer, The Best Defense. For critiques of this argument see Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, pp. 177-180, 297-301.
255. A related challenge held that ABM could be combined with limits on offensive forces, thereby reducing the importance of cost-exchange ratios. Donald G. Brennan, "Post-Deployment Policy Issues in BMD, in Ballistic Missile Defense: Two Views, Adelphi Paper No. 43 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967); more recently, see Goldfischer, The Best Defense. For critiques of this argument see Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, pp. 177-180, 297-301.
256. A related challenge held that ABM could be combined with limits on offensive forces, thereby reducing the importance of cost-exchange ratios. Donald G. Brennan, "Post-Deployment Policy Issues in BMD, in Ballistic Missile Defense: Two Views, Adelphi Paper No. 43 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1967); more recently, see Goldfischer, The Best Defense. For critiques of this argument see Glaser, Analyzing Strategic Nuclear Policy, pp. 177-180, 297-301.
257. Proponents made this point as well. Jayne, "The ABM Debate," pp. 329, 332, 357.
258. See, for example, Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Snyder, Myths of Empire; and Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1988.
259. See, for example, Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Snyder, Myths of Empire; and Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1988.
260. See, for example, Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Snyder, Myths of Empire; and Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1988.
261. See, for example, Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine; Deborah Welch Larson, Anatomy of Mistrust: U.S.-Soviet Relations during the Cold War (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997); Snyder, Myths of Empire; and Stephen Van Evera, "Why States Believe Foolish Ideas: Non-Self-Evaluation by Government and Society," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washington, D.C., September 1988.
262. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, pp. 29-30.
263. For a recent assessment of China's future military capabilities, see Harold Brown, chair of Task Force, Chinese Military Power: Report of an Independent Task Force (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, May 2003), http://www.cfr.org/pdf/China_TF.pdf.
264. Joanne Tompkins, "How U.S. Strategic Policy Is Changing China's Nuclear Plans," Arms Control Today, Vol. 33, No. 1 (January/February 2003), pp. 11-15.
265. For example, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara believed that, in MAD, strategic superiority was not valuable; however, he used the concept when it supported his policy preferences. When he later explicitly rejected its significance, his earlier use of the concept reduced his effectiveness. Kugler, "The Politics of Restraint," pp. 177-78, 202. On the more general phenomenon of "blowback," see Snyder, Myths of Empire, pp. 41-42.
266. For example, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara believed that, in MAD, strategic superiority was not valuable; however, he used the concept when it supported his policy preferences. When he later explicitly rejected its significance, his earlier use of the concept reduced his effectiveness. Kugler, "The Politics of Restraint," pp. 177-78, 202. On the more general phenomenon of "blowback," see Snyder, Myths of Empire, pp. 41-42.