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Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 1998, Pages 274-298

Learning to Play Limited Forecast Equilibria

(1) Jéhiel, Philippe a

a UNIVERSITÉ PARIS EST (France)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 19244371058 PISSN: 08998256 EISSN: None Source Type: Journal
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0589 Document Type: Article

Times cited : (24)

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