Prediction, optimization, and learning in repeated games

Econometrica

Volumn 65, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 275-309

  Nachbar, John H ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Bayesian learning; Rational learning; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000927072     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2171894     Document Type: Article

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