Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Convergence to Nash Equilibrium: The Almost Absolute Continuity Hypothesis

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 22, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 121-147

  Sandroni, Alvaro ^a  

^a NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039065255     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1997.0572     Document Type: Article

References (7)

1. Blackwell D., Dubins L. Merging of Opinions with Increasing Information. Ann. Math. Stat. 38:1962;882-886.
2. Kalai E., Lehrer E. Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium. Econometrica. 61:1993a;1021-1045.
3. Kalai E., Lehrer E. Subjective Equilibrium in Repeated Games. Econometrica. 61:1993b;1231-1240.
4. Kalai E., Lehrer E. Weak and Strong Merging of Opinions. J. Math. Econ. 23:1994;73-100.
5. Lehrer E., Smorodinsky R. Repeated Large Games with Incomplete Information. Games Econ. Behav. 1997.
6. Lehrer E., Smorodinsky R. Compatible Measures and Merging. Math. Oper. Res. 21-23:1996;697-706.
7. Sandroni, A. 1994, Does Rational Learning Lead To Nash Equilibrium in Finitely Repeated Games?, University of Pennsylvania.