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Volumn 78, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 195-218

Does Rational Learning Lead to Nash Equilibrium in Finitely Repeated Games?

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EID: 0040086688     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1997.2352     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (7)

References (17)
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.