Bayesian learning in repeated games of incomplete information

Social Choice and Welfare

Volumn 18, Issue 2, 2001, Pages 303-326

  Nachbar, John H ^a  

^a WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 23044525979     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/PL00007181     Document Type: Conference Paper

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