Adaptive Dynamics in Games Played by Heterogeneous Populations

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 31, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 50-96

  Kaniovski, Yuri M ^a   Kryazhimskii, Arkadii V ^b   Young, Peyton H ^c  

^a INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

^b STEKLOV MATHEMATICAL INSTITUTE   (Russian Federation)

^c JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Best response dynamics; Heterogeneous populations; Imitation; Nash equilibria; Stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002944842     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/game.1999.0736     Document Type: Article

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