Central Banking Governance in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis

Central Banking Governance in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-194

  Quaglia, Lucia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84917240571     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203932803     Document Type: Book

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