Central bank independence and credibility: Is there a shred of evidence?

International Finance

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 167-185

  Forder, James ^a  

^a BALLIOL COLLEGE   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000100902     PISSN: 13670271     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2362.00046     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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