Rational fictions: Central bank independence and the social logic of delegation

West European Politics

Volumn 25, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 47-76

  McNamara, Kathleen R ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; DEMOCRACY; POLICY MAKING; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

EID: 0036167859     PISSN: 01402382     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/713601585     Document Type: Article

References (59)

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