Mixed signals: Central bank independence, coordinated wage bargaining, and European Monetary Union

International Organization

Volumn 52, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 505-535

  Hall, Peter A ^a   Franzese Jr , Robert J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032368526     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002081898550644     Document Type: Review

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