Political parties and monetary commitments

International Organization

Volumn 56, Issue 4, 2002, Pages

  Bernhard, William ^a   Leblang, David ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA CHAMPAIGN   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036409432     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002081802760403784     Document Type: Review

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