Appointing central bankers: The politics of monetary policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union

Appointing Central Bankers: The Politics of Monetary Policy in the United States and the European Monetary Union

Volumn , Issue , 2003, Pages 1-160

  Chang, Kelly H ^a  

^a UBS Private Banking ^*  (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84929909316     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511510526     Document Type: Book

References (182)

1. Alesina, Alberto. 1987. Macroeconomic Policy in a Two-party System as a Repeated Game. Quarterly Journal of Economics 102: 651-78.
2. Alesina, Alberto and Victor Grilli. 1992. The European Central Bank: Reshaping Monetary Politics in Europe. In Canzoneri, Grilli, and Masson, eds., Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the U.S. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
3. Alesina, Alberto and Howard Rosenthal. 1995. Partisan Politics: Divided Government and the Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
4. Alesina, Alberto and Nouriel Roubini. 1990. Political Cycles in OECD Economies. Review of Economic Studies 59: 663-88.
5. Alesina, Alberto and Lawrence Summers. 1993. Central bank independence and macroeconomic performance: Some comparative evidence. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25: 151-62.
6. Bailey, Michael and Kelly Chang. 1999. Influencing the Court: A Formal and Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Appointments. Paper presented at the 1999 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association.
7. Bailey, Michael and Kelly Chang. 2001. Comparing Presidents, Senators, and Supreme Court Justices: Inter-institutional Preference Estimation. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 17(2): 477-506.
8. Bailey, Michael A. And Kelly H. Chang. 2003. Extremists on the Court: The Inter-Institutional Politics of Supreme Court Appointments. Paper presented at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia.
9. The Banking Act of 1935. Ch. 614, 49 Stat 684.
10. Bank of Japan Law. 1997.
11. Barro, Robert J. And David B. Gordon. 1983. A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate Model. Journal of Political Economy 91: 589-610.
12. Bawn, Kathleen. 1997. Choosing Strategies to Control the Bureaucracy: Statutory Constraints, Oversight, and the Committee System. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 13(1): 101-26.
13. Bayoumi, Tamim and Barry Eichengreen. 1996. Operationalizing the Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. CEPR Discussion Paper Series, International Macroeconomics, No. 1484 October.
14. Beck, Nathaniel. 1982a. Presidential Influence on the Federal Reserve in the 1970s. American Journal of Political Science 26: 415-45.
15. Beck, Nathaniel 1982b. Parties, Administrations and American Macroeconomic Outcomes. American Political Science Review 26: 83-93.
16. Belden, Susan. 1989. Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 21: 432-41.
17. Blinder, Leaving Fed, Says Central Bank Should be More Open. The Wall Street Journal January 18, 1996: A6.
18. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The Federal Reserve Bulletin. Various volumes and issues.
19. Borins, Sanford F. 1972. The Political Economy of the Fed. Public Policy 20: 17598.
20. Broz, J. Lawrence. 1997. The International Origins of the Federal Reserve System. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
21. Calvert, Randall L., Mathew D. McCubbins, and Barry R. Weingast. 1989. A Theory of Political Control and Agency Discretion. American Journal of Political Science 33: 588-611.
22. Cameron, Charles. 2000. Veto Bargaining: Presidents and the Politics of Negative Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
23. Cameron, Charles M., Albert D. Cover, and Jeffrey A. Segal. 1990. Senate Voting on Supreme Court Nominees: A Neoinstitutional Model. American Political Science Review 84(2): 525-34.
24. Cameron, Trudy Ann and Daniel D. Huppert. 1991. Referendum Contingent Valuation Estimates: Sensitivity to the Assignment of Offered Values. Journal of the American Statistical Association 86(416): 910-17.
25. Canterbery, E. R. 1967. A New Look at Federal Open Market Voting. Western Economic Journal 6: 25-38.
26. Canzoneri, Matthew B., Vittorio Grilli, and Paul R. Masson, eds. 1992. Establishing a Central Bank: Issues in Europe and Lessons from the U.S. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
27. Chang, Kelly H. 2001a. The President versus the Senate: Appointments in the American System of Separated Powers and the Federal Reserve. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 17(2): 319-55.
28. Chang, Kelly H. 2001b. Estimating Monetary Policy Preferences: Controlling for Economic Conditions in Preference Estimation. Unpublished working paper.
29. Chang, Kelly H. 2001c. Forecasting Fed Behavior. Unpublished working paper.
30. Chappell, Henry W., Thomas M. Havrilesky, and Rob Roy McGregor. 1993. Partisan Monetary Policies: Presidential Influence Through Power of Appointment. Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: 185-218.
31. Chappell, Henry W., Thomas M. Havrilesky, and Rob Roy McGregor. 1995. Policymakers, Institutions, and Central Bank Decisions. Journal of Economics and Business 47: 113-36.
32. Chappell, Henry W., Rob Roy McGregor, and Todd Vermilyea. 1998. Models of Monetary Policy Decision-Making: Arthur Burns and the Federal Open Market Committee. Paper presented at the 1998 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association. March 30, 1998.
33. Chubb, John E. And Paul E. Peterson, eds. 1989. Can the Government Govern? Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
34. Coase, Ronald. 1937. The Nature of the Firm. Economica 4: 386-405.
35. Coleman, Brian. 1998. Italy's Admission to the EMU Clique Depends on Overcoming German Fears. The Wall Street Journal February 17, 1998.
36. Congressional Record. 1908. 60th Congress, 1st Session.
37. Congressional Record. 1935. 73rd Congress, 1st Session.
38. Cukierman, Alex. 1992. Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
39. Davidson, Russell and James G. Mackinnon. 1993. Estimation and Inference in Econometrics. NY: Oxford University Press.
40. A Diary for 1998. The Economist January 3, 1998: 20-1.
41. Dodd, Lawrence C. And Bruce I. Oppenheimer, eds. Congress Reconsidered. 4th ed. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
42. Dodd, Lawrence C. And Richard L. Schott. 1979. Congress and the Administrative State. NY: John Wiley and Sons.
43. Epstein, David L. And Sharyn O'Halloran. 1999. Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
44. Erikson, Robert. 1990. Economic Conditions and the Presidential Vote: A Review of the Macrolevel Evidence. American Journal of Political Science 34: 373-99.
45. Eskridge, William and John Ferejohn. 1992. Making the Deal Stick: Enforcing the Original Constitutional Structure of Lawmaking in the Modern Regulatory States. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 8: 165-89.
46. European Commission. 1998. Convergence Report: Prepared in Accordance with Article i09j(i) of the Treaty. Brussels: European Commission, March 25, 1998.
47. Fair, Ray C. 1978. The Effect of Economic Events on Votes for President. The Review of Political Science 60: 159-73.
48. Faust, Jon. 1996. Whom Can We Trust to Run the Fed? Theoretical Support for the Founders'Views. Journal of Monetary Economics 37: 267-83.
49. Federal Reserve Act. 12 U.S.C.; ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251.
50. Ferejohn, John and Charles Shipan. 1990. Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6: 1-43.
51. Ferejohn, John A. And Charles R. Shipan. 1989. Congressional Influence on Administrative Agencies: A Case Study of Telecommunications Policy. In Congress Reconsidered, 4th ed., L.C. Dodd and B.I. Oppenheimer, eds. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly Press.
52. Frey, Bruno S. And Friedrich Schneider. 1981. Central Bank Behavior: A Positive Empirical Analysis. Journal of Monetary Economics 7: 291-315.
53. Friedman, Milton and Anna J. Schwartz. 1963. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
54. Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978. 92 Stat. 1897.
55. Gildea, John. 1990. A Theory of Open Market Committee Voting Behavior. In The Political Economy ofAmerican Monetary Policy, Thomas Mayer, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
56. Greene, William H. 1993. Econometric Analysis. 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan.
57. Greider, William. 1987. Secrets of the Temple: How the Federal Reserve Runs the Country. New York: Simon and Schuster.
58. Grier, Kevin B. 1987. Presidential Elections and Federal Reserve Policy: An Empirical Test. Southern Economic Journal 54 (2): 475-86.
59. Grier, Kevin B. 1991. Congressional Influence on U.S. Monetary Policy: An Empirical Test. Journal of Monetary Economics 28: 201-20.
60. Grilli, Vittorio, Donato Masciandro, and Guido Tabellini. 1991. Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries. Economic Policy October: 342-92.
61. Groseclose, Tim, Steven D. Levitt, and James M. Snyder, Jr. 1999. Comparing Interest Group Scores across Time and Chambers: Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress. American Political Science Review 93(1): 33-5¼.
62. Hammond. Thomas H. And Jeffrey S. Hill. 1993. Deference of Preference? Explaining Senate Confirmation of Presidential Nominees to Administrative Agencies. Journal of Theoretical Politics 5: 23-59.
63. Hammond, Thomas H. And Jack H. Knott. 1996. Who Controls the Bureaucracy?: Presidential Power, Congressional Dominance, Legal Constraints, and Bureaucratic Autonomy in a Model of Multi-Institutional Policymaking. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 12(1): 119-66.
64. Hastings, Delbert C. And Ross M. Robertson. 1962. The Mysterious World of the Fed. Business Horizons Spring.
65. Havrilesky, Thomas. 1988. Monetary Policy Signaling from the Administration to the Federal Reserve. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 20(1): 83-101.
66. Havrilesky, Thomas. 1991. The Frequency of Monetary Policy Signaling from the Administration to the Federal Reserve. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 23: 423-8.
67. Havrilesky, Thomas. 1993. The Pressures on Monetary Policy. New York: Kluwer.
68. Havrilesky, Thomas. 1995. The Pressures on Monetary Policy. 2nd ed. New York: Kluwer.
69. Havrilesky, Thomas and John Gildea. 1991. The Policy Preferences of FOMC Members as Revealed by Dissenting Votes. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 23(1): 130-8.
70. Havrilesky, Thomas and John Gildea. 1992. Reliable and Unreliable Partisan Appointees to the Board of Governors. Public Choice 73(4): 397-417.
71. Havrilesky, Thomas and Robert Schweitzer. 1990. A Theory of FOMC Dissent Voting with Evidence from the Time Series. In The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy, Thomas Mayer, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
72. Heckman, James J. And James M. Snyder. 1997. Linear Probability Models of the Demand for Attributes with an Empirical Application to Estimating the Preferences of Legislators. The Rand Journal of Economics 28(0) Special Issue: S142-89.
73. Hibbs, Douglas A. 1977. Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy. American Political Science Review 71: 1467-87.
74. Horn, Murray J. 1995. The Political Economy of Public Administration: Institutional Choice in the Public Sector. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
75. Hsiao, Cheng. 1986. Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
76. International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics. International Monetary Fund: Washington, DC, various years.
77. Jones, David M. 1995. The Buck Starts Here. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
78. Kane, Edward J. 1974. The Re-politicization of the Fed. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 9: 743-52.
79. Kane, Edward J. 1975. New Congressional Restraints and Federal Reserve Independence. Challenge 18: 37-44.
80. Kane, Edward J. 1980. Politics and Fed Policymaking: The More Things Change the More They Remain the Same. Journal of Monetary Economics 6: 199-211.
81. Keech, William R. And Irwin L. Morris. 1996. Appointments, Presidential Power, and the Federal Reserve. Journal of Macroeconomics 19(2): 253-67.
82. Kenen, Peter B. 1995. Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. New York: Cambridge University Press.
83. Keohane, Robert. 1984. After Hegemony. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
84. Kettl, Donald F. 1986. Leadership at the Fed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
85. Khoury, Salwa S. 1990. The Federal Reserve Reaction Function: A Specification Search. In The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy, Thomas Mayer, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
86. Kolko, Gabriel. 1967. Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History 1900-1916. Chicago: Quadrangle Books.
87. Kosters, Wim, Manfred J. M. Neumann, Renate Ohr, Roland Vaubel, et al. 1998. German Economics Professors Convinced 'Orderly Postponement' of Euro Essential. Letters to the Editor. Financial Times February 9, 1998.
88. Krause, George A. 1994. Federal Reserve Policy Decision Making: Political and Bureaucratic Influences. American Journal of Political Science 38(1): 124-44.
89. Krehbiel, Keith. 1990. Are Congressional Committees Composed of Preference Outliers? American Political Science Review 84(1): 149-63.
90. Krehbiel, Keith and Douglas Rivers. 1988. The Analysis of Committee Power: An Application to Senate Voting on the Minimum Wage. American Journal of Political Science 32(4): 1151-74.
91. Kreps, David M. 1990. A Course in Microeconomic Theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
92. Kydland, Finn E. And Edward C. Prescott. 1977. Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans. Journal of Political Economy 85: 473-92.
93. Lemieux, Peter H. And Charles H. Stewart III. 1990. Senate Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations from Washington to Reagan. Working Papers in Political Science P-90-3. The Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
94. Livingston, James. 1986. Origins of the Federal Reserve System: Money, Class and Corporate Capitalism 1890-1913. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
95. Lohmann, Susanne. 1992. Optimal Credibility in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility. American Economic Review 82: 273-86.
96. Lohmann, Susanne. 1997. Partisan Control of the Money Supply and Decentralized Appointment Powers. European Journal of Political Economy 13: 225-46.
97. Lombra, Raymond E. And Nicholas Karamouzis. 1990. A Positive Analysis of the Policy-Making Process at the Federal Reserve. In Political Economy of American Monetary Policy, Thomas Mayer, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
98. Mackenzie, G. Calvin. 1981. The Politics of Presidential Appointments. New York: Free Press.
99. Maisel, Sherman. 1973. Managing the Dollar. New York: Norton.
100. Martin, Justin. 2000. Greenspan: The Man Behind Money. Cambridge, MA: Perseus.
101. Matthews, Steven A. 1989. Veto Threat: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game. Quarterly Journal of Economics 104: 347-69.
102. Mayer, Thomas. 1990. The Political Economy of American Monetary Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
103. McCarty, Nolan M. 1997. Presidential Reputation and the Veto. Economics and Politics 9(1): 1-26.
104. McCarty, Nolan M. And Keith T. Poole. 1995. Veto Power and Legislation: An Empirical Analysis of Executive and Legislative Bargaining from 1961 to 1986. Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 11 (2): 282-312.
105. McCarty, Nolan M. And Rose Razaghian. 1999. Advice and Consent: Senate Responses to Executive Branch Nominations 1885-1996. American Journal of Political Science 43(3): 1122-43.
106. McCubbins, Mathew D. And Thomas Schwartz. 1984. Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols vs. Fire Alarms. American Journal of Political Science 28: 165-79.
107. McCubbins, Mathew D., Roger G. Noll, and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 3: 243-77.
108. Milgrom, Paul and John Roberts. 1992. Economics, Organization and Management. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
109. Moe, Terry. 1984. The New Economics of Organization. American Journal of Political Science 28: 739-77.
110. Moe, Terry. 1985. Control and Feedback in Economic Regulation: The Case of the NLRB. The American Political Science Review 79: 1094-116.
111. Moe, Terry. 1987a. An Assessment of the Positive Theory of Congressional Dominance. Legislative Studies Quarterly 12: 472-520.
112. Moe, Terry. 1987b. Interests, Institutions, and Positive Theory: The Politics of the NLRB. Studies in American Policy Development 2: 236-99.
113. Moe, Terry. 1989. The Politics of Bureaucratic Structure. In Can the Government Govern?, John Chubb and Paul Peterson, eds. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
114. Moe, Terry. 1991. Politics and the Theory of Organization. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 7: 106-29.
115. Moraski, Bryon and Charles Shipan. 1999. The Politics of Supreme Court Nominations: A Theory of Institutional Constraints and Choices. American Journal ofPolitical Science. Forthcoming.
116. Morris, Irwin L. 1991. Appointment Power. Federal Reserve Governors, and Monetary Policy: On the Trail of Presidential Influence. M.A. Thesis: Political Science. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
117. Morris, Irwin L. 1994. Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve: The Politics of American Monetary Policy. Ph.D. Thesis: Political Science. University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
118. Morris, Irwin L. 2000. Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve: The Politics of American Monetary Policy-Making. Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press.
119. Morris, Irwin L. And Michael Munger. 1997. First Branch, or Root? The Congress, the President, and the Federal Reserve. Public Choice 96(3-4): 363-80.
120. Moser, Peter. 1997. Checks and Balances, and the Supply of Central Bank Independence. Unpublished working paper. University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen, Switzerland.
121. Mundell, Robert A. 1961. A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas. American Economic Review 51: 657-65.
122. Niskanen, William. 1971. Bureaucracy and Representative Government. Chicago: Aldineo Atherton.
123. Nokken, Timothy P. And Brian R. Sala. 2000. Confirmation Dynamics: A Model of Presidential Appointments to Independent Agencies. Journal of Theoretical Politics 12: 91-112.
124. Nordhaus, William D. 1975. The Political Business Cycle. Review of Economic Studies 42: 169-90.
125. North, Douglass C. And Barry R. Weingast. 1989. Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice. Journal of Economic History 49(4): 803-32.
126. Olson, Mancur. 1965. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
127. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). 1997. OECD Economic Outlook vol. 61: June.
128. Peltzman, Sam. 1976. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. Journal of Law and Economics 19(2): 211-347.
129. Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 1990. Macroeconomic Policy, Credibility, and Politics. London: Harwood Academic Publishers.
130. Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini, eds. 1994. Monetary and Fiscal Policy. Volume 1: Credibility. Boston: MIT Press.
131. Persson, Torsten and Guido Tabellini. 1999. Political Economics and Macroeconomic Policy. In The Handbook of Macroeconomics, John B. Taylor and Michael Woodford, eds. Oxford: Elsevier Science, North-Holland.
132. Pierce, James. 1978. The Myth of Congressional Supervision of Monetary Policy. Journal of Monetary Economics 4: 363-70.
133. Poole, Keith T. And Howard Rosenthal. 1985. A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis. American Journal of Political Science 29: 357-84.
134. Poole, Keith T. And Howard Rosenthal. 1997. Congress: A Political-Economic History of Roll Call Voting. NY: Oxford University Press.
135. Puckett, Richard. 1984. Federal Open Market Committee Structure. Journal of Monetary Economics 12: 97-104.
136. Reagan, Michael D. 1961. The Political Structure of the Federal Reserve System. American Political Science Review 55: 81-103.
137. Reserve Bank Act of Australia. 1959.
138. Roche, David. 1996. Europe's Faded Photocopy Democracy. Euromoney December: 24-5.
139. Rogoff, Kenneth. 1985. The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Target. Quarterly Journal of Economics 100: 1169-90.
140. Rogoff, Kenneth. 1990. Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles. American Economic Review 80: 21-36.
141. Rogoff, Kenneth and Anne Sibert. 1988. Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles. Review of Economic Studies 55: 1-16.
142. Romer, Thomas and Howard Rosenthal. 1978. Political Resource Allocation, Controlled Agendas, and the Status Quo. Public Choice 33: 27-44.
143. Rose, Sanford. 1974. The Agony of the Fed. Fortune 90: 90-3, 180-90.
144. Rubinstein, Ariel. 1982. Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model. Econometrica 50: 97-109.
145. Schaling, Eric. 1995. Institutions and Monetary Policy: Credibility, Flexibility and Central Bank Independence. Aldershots, Hants, UK: Edward Elgar.
146. Scheffe, Henry. 1959. The Analysis of Variance. NY: John Wiley and Sons, Inc.
147. Segal, Jeffrey A., Charles M. Cameron, and Albert D. Cover. 1992. A Spatial Model of Roll Call Voting: Senators, Constituents, Presidents, and Interest Groups in Supreme Court Confirmations. American Journal of Political Science 36(1): 96-121.
148. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 1975. Monetary Policy Oversight February 25.
149. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 1975-6. First through Fourth Meetings on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, House Concurrent Resolution 133.
150. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 1977-8. First through Third Meetings on the Conduct of Monetary Policy, House Concurrent Resolution 133 and Public Law 95-188.
151. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 1979-95. Federal Reserve's [First or Second] Monetary Policy Report for [Year], Full Employment and Balanced Growth Act of 1978 (Humphrey-Hawkins), Semiannual hearings. February and July of each year.
152. Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcommittee on Production and Stabilization. 1974. Oversight on Economic Stabilization February 6.
153. Snyder, Susan, and Barry Weingast. 2000. The American System of Shared Powers: The President, Congress, and the NLRB. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 16: 269-305.
154. Stigler, George. 1971. The Theory of Economic Regulation. Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science 2: 3-21.
155. Taylor, John. 1993. Discretion versus Policy Rules in Practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39: 195-214.
156. Taylor, John B. And Michael Woodford, eds. 1999. The Handbook of Macroeconomics. Oxford: Elsevier Science, North-Holland.
157. Timberlake, Richard H. 1993. Monetary Policy in the United States. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
158. Treaty on European Union. 1992.
159. Tufte, Edward R. 1975. Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections. American Political Science Review 69: 812-26.
160. U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis. Business Cycle Indicators.
161. U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Economic Analysis. Business Statistics.
162. Waller, Christopher J. 1992. A Bargaining Model of Partisan Appointments to the Central Bank. Journal of Monetary Economics 29(3): 411-28.
163. Waller, Christopher J. And Carl E. Walsh. 1996. Central-Bank Independence, Economic Behavior, and Optimal Term Lengths. American Economic Review 86(5): 1139-53.
164. Weingast, Barry R. 1984. The Congressional-Bureaucratic System: A Principal-Agent Perspective (with applications to the SEC). Public Choice 44: 147-92.
165. Weingast, Barry R. And William J. Marshall. 1988. The Industrial Organization of Congress; or, Why Legislatures, Like Firms, Are Not Organized as Markets. Journal of Political Economy 96(1): 132-63.
166. Weingast, Barry R. And William J. Marshall. 1989. Regulation and the Theory of Legislative Choice: The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. Journal of Law and Economics XXXII: 35-61.
167. Weingast, Barry R. And Mark J. Moran. 1983. Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission. Journal of Political Economy 91: 765-800.
168. Wessel, David. 1996. Rohatyn Considered for No. 2 Fed Post. Wall Street Journal January 19, 1996: A2, A5.
169. Wessel, David. 1997. Fed Funds Rate Left Unchanged One More Time. Wall Street Journal October 1, 1997: A2, A10.
170. West, Robert C. 1977. Banking Reform and the Federal Reserve: 1863-1923. London: Cornell University.
171. White, Eugene Nelson. 1983. The Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System, 1900-1929. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
172. Whittlesey, C. R. 1963. Power and Influence in the Federal Reserve System. Economica 45: 123-35.
173. Wiebe, Robert H. 1962. Businessmen and Reform: A Study of the Progressive Movement. Cambridge, MA: Harvard.
174. Wilke, John R. 1996a. Clinton Names Greenspan to New Term At the Fed, Rivlin and Meyer to Its Board. Wall Street Journal February 23, 1996: A3.
175. Wilke, John R. 1996b. Rohatyn Pulls Out of Consideration for Fed Post. Wall Street Journal February 14, 1996: A2.
176. Wilke, John R. 1996c. Clinton Lists His Choices for Fed Seats. Wall Street Journal February 20, 1996: A3.
177. Wilke, John R. And Michael K. Frisby. 1996. GOP Shakes Hopes to Name Rohatyn to Fed. Wall Street Journal February 13, 1996: A3, A16.
178. Williamson, Oliver E. 1975. Markets and Hierarchies. New York: Free Press.
179. Williamson, Oliver E. 1981. The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost Approach. American Journal of Sociology 87(3): 547-77.
180. Woolley, John T. 1984. The Federal Reserve and the Politics of Monetary Policy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
181. Yohe, William P. 1966. A Study of Federal Open Market Committee Voting 195564. Southern Economic Journal 12: 98-117.
182. Zupan, Mark A. 1992. Measuring the Ideological Preferences of U.S. Presidents: A Proposed (Extremely Simple) Method. Public Choice 73: 351-61.