The European Central Bank: Independence, accountability and strategy: A review

Public Choice

Volumn 93, Issue 3-4, 1997, Pages 395-426

  De Haan, Jakob ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0042231622     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/a:1004972705141     Document Type: Review

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