The new governance of markets and non-majoritarian regulators

Governance

Volumn 18, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 329-346

  Coen, David ^a   Thatcher, Mark ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON   (United Kingdom)

^b LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 22544435254     PISSN: 09521895     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0491.2005.00279.x     Document Type: Review

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