An integrative approach to the politics of central bank independence: Lessons from Britain, Germany and Italy

West European Politics

Volumn 28, Issue 3, 2005, Pages 549-568

  Quaglia, Lucia ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRISTOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; INDEPENDENCE; POLITICAL ECONOMY;

CENTRAL EUROPE; EASTERN HEMISPHERE; EURASIA; EUROPE; GERMANY; ITALY; SOUTHERN EUROPE; UNITED KINGDOM; WESTERN EUROPE; WORLD;

EID: 22144468032     PISSN: 01402382     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402380500085798     Document Type: Article

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