Bundesbank-government relations in Germany in the 1990s: From GEMU to EMU

West European Politics

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 87-108

  Duckenfield, Mark ^a  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CENTRAL BANK; ECONOMIC POLICY; MONETARY POLICY; MONETARY UNION;

GERMANY;

EID: 0032750981     PISSN: 01402382     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/01402389908425317     Document Type: Article

References (75)

1. Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers, 'Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25/2 (1993) pp.151-63; Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence (Cambridge: MIT Press 1992); Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro and Guido Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries', Economic Policy 13 (1991) pp.341-92.
2. Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers, 'Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25/2 (1993) pp.151-63; Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence (Cambridge: MIT Press 1992); Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro and Guido Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries', Economic Policy 13 (1991) pp.341-92.
3. Alberto Alesina and Lawrence Summers, 'Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: Some Comparative Evidence', Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 25/2 (1993) pp.151-63; Alex Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility, and Independence (Cambridge: MIT Press 1992); Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro and Guido Tabellini, 'Political and Monetary Institutions and Public Financial Policies in the Industrialized Countries', Economic Policy 13 (1991) pp.341-92.
4. Compare Deutsche Bundesbank, The Deutsche Bundesbank: Its Monetary Policy Instruments and Function (Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bundesbank 1989) pp.110-35 with The Maastricht Treaty in Perspective: Consolidated Treaty on European Union (London: British Management Data Fdn 1996) pp.89-98.
5. Compare Deutsche Bundesbank, The Deutsche Bundesbank: Its Monetary Policy Instruments and Function (Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bundesbank 1989) pp.110-35 with The Maastricht Treaty in Perspective: Consolidated Treaty on European Union (London: British Management Data Fdn 1996) pp.89-98.
6. Bericht der Expen-gruppe 'Reform der Währungsordnung' (Bern: Federal Finance Ministry 1997) pp.38-45.
7. Bundesbankgesetz, Articles 3, 6 and 13.
8. Peter A. Hall and Robert J. Franzese, Jr, 'Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union', International Organization 52/3 (Autumn 1998) pp.505-36; Erik Jones and Kathleen R. McNamara, 'Germany's Monetary Role in Europe', European Studies Seminar Series, The Johns Hopkins Univ. Bologna Center, Occassional Paper No. 2 (April 1996); Peter A. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe', German Politics and Society 31 (1994) pp.1-23.
9. Peter A. Hall and Robert J. Franzese, Jr, 'Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union', International Organization 52/3 (Autumn 1998) pp.505-36; Erik Jones and Kathleen R. McNamara, 'Germany's Monetary Role in Europe', European Studies Seminar Series, The Johns Hopkins Univ. Bologna Center, Occassional Paper No. 2 (April 1996); Peter A. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe', German Politics and Society 31 (1994) pp.1-23.
10. Peter A. Hall and Robert J. Franzese, Jr, 'Mixed Signals: Central Bank Independence, Coordinated Wage Bargaining, and European Monetary Union', International Organization 52/3 (Autumn 1998) pp.505-36; Erik Jones and Kathleen R. McNamara, 'Germany's Monetary Role in Europe', European Studies Seminar Series, The Johns Hopkins Univ. Bologna Center, Occassional Paper No. 2 (April 1996); Peter A. Hall, 'Central Bank Independence and Coordinated Wage Bargaining: Their Interaction in Germany and Europe', German Politics and Society 31 (1994) pp.1-23.
11. Susanne Lohmann, 'Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957-1992', World Politics 50/3 (1998) pp.401-46; Roland Sturm, 'How Independent is the Bundesbank?', German Politics 4/1 (April 1995) pp.27-41.
12. Susanne Lohmann, 'Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957-1992', World Politics 50/3 (1998) pp.401-46; Roland Sturm, 'How Independent is the Bundesbank?', German Politics 4/1 (April 1995) pp.27-41.
13. Karl Kaltenthaler, 'Central Bank Independence and the Committment to Monetary Stability: The Case of the German Bundesbank', German Politics 7/2 (Aug. 1998) pp.102-27.
14. This stylised treatment assumes the government either is capable of obtaining the Bundesrat's (upper house of parliament) approval for its legislation or does not require the Bundesrat's consent.
15. Karl Kaltenthaler, 'The Restructuring of the German Bundesbank: The Politics of Institutional Change', German Politics and Society 14/4 ( 1996) pp.23-48.
16. Robert Putnam, 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games' International Organization 42/3 (Summer 1988) pp.427-60.
17. Der Spiegel, No.22 (28 May 1990) p.42.
18. Ibid. No.9 (26 Feb. 1990) p.43.
19. Silke Tober, 'Monetary' Reform and Monetary Union: A Comparison between 1948 and 1990', in Stephen F. Frowen and Jens Holscher (eds.) The German Currency Union of 1990, (NY: St Martin's Press 1997) p.238.
20. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik: Deutsche Einheit, Sonderedition aus den Akten des Bundeskanzleramtes 1989/90 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg 1998) Nr. 137 (Conversation of Chief of the Federal Chancellor's Office Seiters with the Economic Experts) p.691
21. Norbert Kloten, 'The German Currency Union: Challenges for Both Parts of Germany', Discussion Papers in German Studies No.1 (U. of Birmingham, UK 1996) p. 15.
22. Richard R. Moeller, 'The Ambivalence of the SPD and the End of its Ostpolitik', German Politics 5/1 (April 1996) pp.121-36.
23. Der Spiegel, No.21 (19 March 1990) p.21.
24. Ibid. p.20.
25. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Nr.239A (Resolution of the Central Bank Council) pp.1003-4.
26. Ibid. Nr. 239 (Letter from Bundesbank President Pöhl to Federal Chancellor Kohl) pp.1002-3.
27. David Marsh, The Bundesbank: The Bank That Rules Europe (London: Mandarin 1993) p.215. Some well-informed observers have even suggested that Pöhl favoured a conversion rate as high as 5 Ostmarks to the Deutschmark, see Philip Stephens, Politics and the Pound (London: Macmillan 1996) pp.194-5.
28. David Marsh, The Bundesbank: The Bank That Rules Europe (London: Mandarin 1993) p.215. Some well-informed observers have even suggested that Pöhl favoured a conversion rate as high as 5 Ostmarks to the Deutschmark, see Philip Stephens, Politics and the Pound (London: Macmillan 1996) pp.194-5.
29. Hans Tietmeyer, 'Erinnerungen an die Vertragsverhandlungen', in Theo Waigel and Manfred Schell (eds.) Tage, die Deutschland und die Welt veränderten (Munich: Bruckmann 1994) pp.78-85.
30. Dokumente zur Deutschlandpolitik, Nr. 256B (Attachment I: Particulars about the currency union and the currency changeover) p.1051.
31. Frankfurter Rundschau, 24 April 1990.
32. Marsh (note 21) p.214.
33. Kloten (note 15) p.19.
34. Quoted in Irwin L. Collier Jr, 'German Economic Integration: The Case for Optimism', in Michael G. Huelshoff, Andrei S. Markovits, and Simon Reich (eds.) From Bundesrepublik to Deutschland (Ann Arbor: U. of Michigan Press 1993) p.106.
35. Der Spiegel, No. 18 (30 April 1990).
36. Figures cited in Tober (note 13) p.238.
37. For a photograph, see Waigel and Schell (note 22) p.97.
38. Thomas A. Baylis, 'Transforming the East German Economy', in Huelshoff et al. (note 27) p.81.
39. Wayne Sandholtz, 'Monetary Politics and Maastricht', International Organization 47/1 (Winter 1993) pp.27-8.
40. Ibid. pp.31-2.
41. Kenneth Dyson, 'Chancellor Kohl as Strategic Leader: The Case of Economic and Monetary Union', German Politics 7/1 (May 1998) p.58.
42. Ibid. p.50.
43. Ellen Kennedy, The Bundesbank: Germany's Central Bank in the International Monetary System (London: Pinter 1991) p.98; Committee for the Study of Economic and Monetary Union, Report on Economic and Monetary Union in the European Community (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1989).
44. Dyson (note 34) p.51.
45. Andrew Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP 1998) pp.384-5.
46. John T. Woolley, 'Linking Political and Monetary Union: The Maastricht Agenda and German Domestic Polities', in Barry Eichengreen and Jeffry Frieden (eds.) The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification (Boulder, CO: Westview Press 1994) p.83.
47. Treaty of European Union (TEU), Article 105(1).
48. TEU, Protocol 3 (Constitution of the European System of Central Banks), Article 11.2. The appointment crisis of May 1998 where the French refused to accept the nomination of Wim Duisenberg for an eight-year term of office until he agreed that he would step aside after four years casts some doubt on the effectiveness of this guarantee. However, should Duisenberg not honour his promise to the French, there is no legal mechanism for removing him from his office as President of the ECB.
49. TEU, Protocol 3, Article 14.2.
50. Ibid. Article 7.
51. Convergence criteria referenced in: TEU, Protocol 6; TEU, Article 104c(2); TEU, Protocol 5, Article 1.
52. Bundesverfassungsgericht, 'Die Maastricht-Entscheidung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts', 2. Senat, 12 Oct. 1993.
53. European Commission, Eurobarometer: Public Opinion in the European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, various years) Nos.37-48.
54. See Bild, 22 March 1997 where 65 per cent of respondents opposed introduction of the euro.
55. Hans D. Barbier, 'Drei heißt drei - oder was?' Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22 Nov. 1996, p.1.
56. European Monetary Institute, Convergence Report (Frankfurt: European Monetary Institute 1998) p.83.
57. Reimut Jochimsen, Current Issues in Germany's Monetary and Currency Policy in the Light of European Economic and Monetary Union (Düsseldorf: Land Central Bank of North Rhine-Westphalia 1996) pp.5-6; Karl Kaltenthaler, Germany and the Politics of Europe's Money (Durham: Duke UP 1998) pp.87-8.
58. Reimut Jochimsen, Current Issues in Germany's Monetary and Currency Policy in the Light of European Economic and Monetary Union (Düsseldorf: Land Central Bank of North Rhine-Westphalia 1996) pp.5-6; Karl Kaltenthaler, Germany and the Politics of Europe's Money (Durham: Duke UP 1998) pp.87-8.
59. European Monetary Institute, Legal Convergence in the Member States of the European Union As at August 1997 (Frankfurt: European Monetary Inst. 1997); European Monetary Institute, Convergence Report; European Commission, Euro 1999, Part 1: Recommendation (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1998); European Commission, Euro 1999, Part 2: Report (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1998).
60. European Monetary Institute, Legal Convergence in the Member States of the European Union As at August 1997 (Frankfurt: European Monetary Inst. 1997); European Monetary Institute, Convergence Report; European Commission, Euro 1999, Part 1: Recommendation (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1998); European Commission, Euro 1999, Part 2: Report (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1998).
61. European Monetary Institute, Legal Convergence in the Member States of the European Union As at August 1997 (Frankfurt: European Monetary Inst. 1997); European Monetary Institute, Convergence Report; European Commission, Euro 1999, Part 1: Recommendation (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1998); European Commission, Euro 1999, Part 2: Report (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities 1998).
62. Deutsche Bundesbank, Opinion of the Central Bank Council Concerning Convergence in the European Union in View of Stage Three of Economic and Monetary Union (Frankfurt: Deutsche Bundesbank, 26 March 1998).
63. Ibid. p.21.
64. Ibid. p.23.
65. Mark Duckenfield, 'The Goldkrieg: Revaluing the Bundesbank's Reserves and the Politics of EMU', German Politics 8/1 (May 1999) pp.113-37.
66. 'Augen zu und durch', Der Spiegel, No.22 (26 May 1997) pp.22-4.
67. 'Bonner Finanzministerium legt Steuerschätzung für das laufende Jahr vor: Im Haushalt fehlen weitere 18 Milliarden Mark', Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 16 May 1997, p.1.
68. Wolf Kroneberger, Peter H. Combrink and Gerri Hlebain, Accounting and Auditing in Germany (Frankfurt am Main: Treuhand-Vereinigung AG 1987) p.69.
69. Ibid. p.18.
70. International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics 50/5 (Washington DC: IMF 1997) p.305.
71. Rainer Hübner, 'Brennpunkt: Operation Gold', Capital, No.8 (Aug. 1997) pp.9-10.
72. Deutsche Bundesbank, Monthly Report 49/6 (Frankfurt am Main: Deutsche Bundesbank 1997) p.6.
73. EMNID-SOFRES Survey (1998).
74. Petra Huth, The Swiss Cling to their Gold Reserves (Bern: GfS-Forschungsinstitut 1998) p.4.
75. This logic applies to any member, but in this section I use Germany as the primary example.