Partisan and electoral motivations and the choice of monetary institutions under fully mobile capital

International Organization

Volumn 56, Issue 4, 2002, Pages

  Clark, William Roberts ^a  

^a NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 18744394032     PISSN: 00208183     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/002081802760403757     Document Type: Review

References (23)

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