Do voluntary payments to advisors improve the quality of financial advice? An experimental deception game

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 93, Issue , 2013, Pages 205-218

  Angelova, Vera ^a   Regner, Tobias ^b  

^a TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

^b Growth and Public Policy   (Germany)

Author keywords

Asymmetric information; Deception; Experiments; Financial advisors; Principal agent; Reciprocity; Sender receiver game; Voluntary payment

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884416107     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.022     Document Type: Article

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