Selecting cheap-talk equilibria

Econometrica

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2008, Pages 117-136

  Chen, Ying ^a   Kartik, Navin ^b   Sobel, Joel ^b  

^a ARIZONA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Almost cheap talk; Babbling; Cheap talk; Equilibrium selection

Indexed keywords

EID: 37349092258     PISSN: 00129682     EISSN: 14680262     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.0012-9682.2008.00819.x     Document Type: Article

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