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Economics Letters
Volumn 101, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 148-150
Rewards in an experimental sender-receiver game
Author keywords

Experiment; Rewards; Strategic information transmission
Indexed keywords

EID: 51749086358     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2008.07.016     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (11)
References (14)
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  • 5
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    • Strategic information transmission
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  • 7
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    • The effect of rewards and sanctions in provision of public goods
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* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.