The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 93, Issue , 2013, Pages 266-272

  Danilov, Anastasia ^a   Biemann, Torsten ^b   Kring, Thorn ^c   Sliwka, Dirk ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF MANNHEIM   (Germany)

^c HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Deception; Experiment; Financial advice; Misadvising; Sender receiver game; Team incentives

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884411946     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.012     Document Type: Article

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