Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 56, Issue 1, 2006, Pages 7-36

  Cai, Hongbin ^a   Wang, Joseph Tao Yi ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Communication games; Overcommunication

Indexed keywords

EID: 33646759600     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2005.04.001     Document Type: Article

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