Strategic communication with lying costs

Review of Economic Studies

Volumn 76, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 1359-1395

  Kartik, Navin ^a,b  

^a Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMMUNICATION; COST; LANGUAGE; MODELING; STRATEGIC APPROACH;

EID: 70149122609     PISSN: 00346527     EISSN: 1467937X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-937X.2009.00559.x     Document Type: Article

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