Disclosing advisor's interests neither hurts nor helps

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 93, Issue , 2013, Pages 314-320

  Ismayilov, Huseyn ^a   Potters, Jan ^a  

^a NETSPAR   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Beliefs; Deception; Disclosure; Experimental economics; Moral licensing; Trust

Indexed keywords

EID: 84884416010     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jebo.2013.03.034     Document Type: Article

References (17)

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