Powering up with indirect reciprocity in a large-scale field experiment

Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America

Volumn 110, Issue SUPPL2, 2013, Pages 10424-10429

  Yoelia, Erez ^a   Hoffmanbc, Moshe ^b,c   Randcd, David G ^c,d   Nowak, Martin A ^c,e  

^a FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^d YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^e HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolutionary game theory; Experimental economics

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COOPERATION; EVOLUTION; FIELD STUDY; GAME; HUMAN; LABORATORY TEST; LARGE SCALE PRODUCTION; PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; POLICY; PREDICTION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SOCIAL PARTICIPATION;

EVOLUTIONARY GAME THEORY; EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS;

ADULT; BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; FEMALE; GAMES, EXPERIMENTAL; HUMANS; MALE; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL;

EID: 84879288621     PISSN: 00278424     EISSN: 10916490     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1301210110     Document Type: Article

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