Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 249, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 93-100

  Suzuki, Shinsuke ^a   Akiyama, Eizo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TSUKUBA   (Japan)

Author keywords

Evolution of cooperation; Indirect reciprocity; n person game; Prisoner's dilemma game; Reputation

Indexed keywords

ALTRUISM; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; GAME THEORY; PRISONER DILEMMA;

ARTICLE; CONDITIONING; COOPERATION; DECISION MAKING; GAME; IMAGE SCORING; INDIRECT RECIPROCITY; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; NUCLEUS SHIELD; POPULATION DYNAMICS; PRIORITY JOURNAL; SIMULATION; SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT; SOCIAL STATUS;

ALTRUISM; ANIMALS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; HUMANS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; SOCIAL DESIRABILITY;

EID: 35148830741     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.07.017     Document Type: Article

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