Effects of eye images on everyday cooperative behavior: A field experiment

Evolution and Human Behavior

Volumn 32, Issue 3, 2011, Pages 172-178

  Ernest Jones, Max ^a   Nettle, Daniel ^a   Bateson, Melissa ^a  

^a NEWCASTLE UNIVERSITY   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Eyes; Field experiment; Prosocial behaviour

Indexed keywords

EID: 79954630989     PISSN: 10905138     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.10.006     Document Type: Article

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