Shame and honour drive cooperation

Biology Letters

Volumn 7, Issue 6, 2011, Pages 899-901

  Jacquet, Jennifer ^a   Hauert, Christoph ^a   Traulsen, Arne ^b   Milinski, Manfred ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BRITISH COLUMBIA   (Canada)

^b MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Honour; Public goods game; Shame; Tragedy of the commons

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EXPERIMENTAL STUDY; HYPOTHESIS TESTING; PUBLIC GOODS;

EID: 80053303051     PISSN: 17449561     EISSN: 1744957X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1098/rsbl.2011.0367     Document Type: Article

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