Reputation is valuable within and outside one's own social group

Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology

Volumn 57, Issue 6, 2005, Pages 611-616

  Semmann, Dirk ^a   Krambeck, Hans Jürgen ^a   Milinski, Manfred ^a  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR EVOLUTIONARY BIOLOGY   (Germany)

Author keywords

Cooperative behavior; Human society; Social group

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; HONEST SIGNALING; HUMAN BEHAVIOR; SOCIAL BEHAVIOR;

EID: 17644401789     PISSN: 03405443     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00265-004-0885-3     Document Type: Article

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