The competition of assessment rules for indirect reciprocity

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 263, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 13-19

  Uchida, Satoshi ^a,b   Sigmund, Karl ^b,c  

^a RINRI Institute   (Japan)

^b UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

^c INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR APPLIED SYSTEMS ANALYSIS   (Austria)

Author keywords

Leading eight; Prisoner's dilemma game; Replicator dynamics; Second order assessment

Indexed keywords

GAME THEORY; POLYMORPHISM; RECIPROCITY;

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; COOPERATION; INTERMETHOD COMPARISON; MATHEMATICAL ANALYSIS; MATHEMATICAL MODEL; MORALITY; PRIORITY JOURNAL; PSYCHOLOGIC ASSESSMENT; SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY;

ALTRUISM; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; GROUP PROCESSES; HUMANS; INTERPERSONAL RELATIONS; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL; MODELS, STATISTICAL; MORALS; SYSTEMS BIOLOGY;

EID: 77649342184     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2009.11.013     Document Type: Article

References (46)

1. Alexander, R.D., 1987. The Biology of Moral Systems. Aldine de Gruyter, New York.
2. Bolton G., Katok E., Ockenfels A. How effective are on-line reputation mechanisms? An experimental investigation. Manage. Sci. 2004, 50:1587-1602.
3. Bolton G., Katok E., Ockenfels A. Cooperation among strangers with limited information about reputation. J. Public Econ. 2005, 89:1457-1468.
4. Brandt H., Sigmund K. The logic of reprobation: assessment and action rules for indirect reciprocation. J. Theor. Biol. 2004, 231:475-486. 10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.032.
5. Brandt H., Sigmund K. The good, the bad and the discriminator-errors in direct and indirect reciprocity. J. Theor. Biol. 2006, 239:183-194. 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.045.
6. Bshary R., Grutter A.S. Image scoring and cooperation in a cleaner fish mutualism. Nature 2006, 441:975-978.
7. Camerer C., Fehr E. When does "economic man" dominate social behaviour?. Science 2006, 311:47-52.
8. Chalub F., Santos F.C., Pacheco J.M. The evolution of norms. J. Theor. Biol. 2006, 241:233-240. 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.11.028.
9. Dufwenberg M., Gneezy U., Gueth W., van Damme E. Direct vs indirect reciprocation-an experiment. Homo Oeconomicus 2001, 18:19-30.
10. Ellison G. Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with anonymous random matching. Rev. Econ. Stud. 1994, 61:567-588.
11. Fishman M.A. Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals. J. Theor. Biol. 2003, 225:285-292. 10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00246-7.
12. Fishman M.A., Lotem A., Stone L. Heterogeneity stabilises reciprocal altruism interaction. J. Theor. Biol. 2001, 209:87-95. 10.1006/jtbi.2000.2248.
13. Hofbauer, J., Sigmund, K., 1998. Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p. 87.
14. Kandori M. Social norms and community enforcement. Rev. Econ. Stud. 1992, 59:63-80.
15. Keser C. Experimental games for the design of reputation management systems. IBM Syst. J. 2002, 43:498-503.
16. Leimar O., Hammerstein P. Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocation. Proc. R. Soc. London B 2001, 268:745-753.
17. Lotem A., Fishman M.A., Stone L. Evolution of cooperation between individuals. Nature 1999, 400:226-227.
18. Masuda N., Ohtsuki H. Tag-based indirect reciprocity by incomplete social information. Proc. R. Soc. London B 2007, 274:689-695.
19. Milinski M., Semmann D., Bakker T.C.M., Krambeck H.J. Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: image scoring or standing strategy?. Proc. R. Soc. London B 2001, 268:2495-2501.
20. Milinski M., Semmann D., Krambeck H.J. Donors to charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation. Proc. R. Soc. London B 2002, 269:881-883.
21. Milinski M., Semmann D., Krambeck H.J. Reputation helps solve the 'Tragedy of the Commons'. Nature 2002, 415:424-426.
22. Mohtashemi M., Mui L. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism. J. Theor. Biol. 2003, 223:523-531. 10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00143-7.
23. Nowak M.A., Sigmund K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring. Nature 1998, 282:462-466.
24. Nowak M.A., Sigmund K. The dynamics of indirect reciprocity. J. Theor. Biol. 1998, 194:561-574. 10.1006/jtbi.1998.0775.
25. Nowak M.A., Sigmund K. Evolution of indirect reciprocity. Nature 2005, 437:1292-1298.
26. Ohtsuki H., Iwasa Y. How should we define goodness?-Reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity. J. Theor. Biol. 2004, 231:107-120. 10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.06.005.
27. Ohtsuki H., Iwasa Y. The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity. J. Theor. Biol. 2006, 239:435-444. 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.008.
28. Ohtsuki H., Iwasa Y. Global analyses of evolutionary dynamics and exhaustive search for social norms that maintain cooperation by reputation. J. Theor. Biol. 2007, 244:518-531. 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.08.018.
29. Okuno-Fujiwara M., Postlewaite A. Social norms and random matching games. Games Econ. Behav. 1995, 9:79-109.
30. Panchanathan K., Boyd R. A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity. J. Theor. Biol. 2003, 224:115-126. 10.1016/S0022-5193(03)00154-1.
31. Panchanathan K., Boyd R. Indirect reciprocity can stabilise cooperation without the second-order free-rider problem. Nature 2004, 432:499-502.
32. Pacheco J., Santos F., Chalub F. Stern-judging: a simple, successful norm which promotes cooperation under indirect reciprocity. PLOS Comput. Biol. 2006, 2:178.
33. Pollock G.B., Dugatkin L.A. Reciprocity and the evolution of reputation. J. Theor. Biol. 1992, 159:25-37. 10.1016/S0022-5193(05)80765-9.
34. Roberts G. Evolution of direct and indirect reciprocity. Proc. R. Soc. London B 2008, 275:173-179.
35. Rosenthal R.W. Sequences of games with varying opponents. Econometrica 1979, 47:1353-1366.
36. Semmann D., Krambeck H.J., Milinski M. Strategic investment in reputation. J. Behav. Ecol. Sociobiol. 2004, 56:248-252.
37. Seinen I., Schram A. Social status and group norms: indirect reciprocity in a repeated helping experiment. Eur. Econ. Rev. 2001, 50:581-602.
38. Sommerfeld R., Krambeck H.J., Semmann D., Milinski M. Gossip as an alternative for direct observation in games of indirect reciprocity. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. 2007, 104:17435-17440.
39. Sugden R. The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare 1986, Basil Blackwell, Oxford.
40. Suzuki S., Akiyama E. Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity. J. Theor. Biol. 2007, 245:539-552. 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.11.002.
41. Suzuki S., Akiyama E. Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring. J. Theor. Biol. 2007, 249:93-100. 10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.07.017.
42. Takahashi N., Mashima R. The importance of subjectivity in perceptual errors on the emergence of indirect reciprocity. J. Theor. Biol. 2006, 243:418-436. 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.05.014.
43. Trivers R. The evolution of reciprocal altruism. Quart. Rev. Biol. 1971, 46:35-57.
44. Wedekind C., Braithwaite V.A. The long-term benefits of human generosity in indirect reciprocity. Curr. Biol. 2002, 12:1012-1015.
45. Wedekind C., Milinski M. Cooperation through image scoring in humans. Science 2000, 288:850-852.
46. Yamagishi T., Jin N., Kiyonari T. Bounded generalized reciprocity: ingroup boasting and ingroup favouritism. Adv. Group Processes 1999, 16:161-197.