Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 245, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 539-552

  Suzuki, Shinsuke ^a   Akiyama, Eizo ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF TSUKUBA   (Japan)

Author keywords

Evolution of cooperation; Indirect reciprocity; Prisoner's dilemma; Reciprocity; Reputation

Indexed keywords

COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GROUP SIZE; PRISONER DILEMMA; RECIPROCITY;

ARTICLE; COMPARATIVE STUDY; EVOLUTION; EVOLUTIONARY ALGORITHM; ORGANISM GROUP SIZE; PRIORITY JOURNAL;

ALTRUISM; ANIMALS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; EVOLUTION; GAME THEORY; MODELS, BIOLOGICAL; POPULATION DENSITY;

EID: 33847631314     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: 10958541     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2006.11.002     Document Type: Article

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