The good, the bad and the discriminator - Errors in direct and indirect reciprocity

Journal of Theoretical Biology

Volumn 239, Issue 2, 2006, Pages 183-194

  Brandt, Hannelore ^a   Sigmund, Karl ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIENNA   (Austria)

Author keywords

Cooperation; Evolutionary game theory; Prisoner's Dilemma; Replicator dynamics; Reputation

Indexed keywords

RECIPROCITY;

ALTRUISM; ARTICLE; COOPERATION; DISCRIMINANT ANALYSIS; DONOR; ECOLOGY; HUMAN; POPULATION; PRIORITY JOURNAL; RECIPIENT; SOCIAL INTERACTION;

ALTRUISM; ANIMALS; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; ECOSYSTEM; GAME THEORY; GROUP PROCESSES; HELPING BEHAVIOR; HUMANS; MODELS, PSYCHOLOGICAL;

EID: 33644628525     PISSN: 00225193     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.045     Document Type: Article

References (47)

1. R.D. Alexander The Biology of Moral Systems 1987 Aldine de Gruyter New York
2. R. Axelrod, and W.D. Hamilton The evolution of cooperation Science 211 1981 1390 1396
3. M.C. Boerlijst, M.A. Nowak, and K. Sigmund The logic of contrition J. Theor. Biol. 185 1997 281 294
4. R. Boyd, and P.J. Richerson The evolution of indirect reciprocity Soc. Networks 11 1989 213 236
5. H. Brandt, and K. Sigmund The logic of reprobation: action and assessment rules in indirect reciprocity J. Theor. Biol. 231 2004 475 486
6. H. Brandt, and K. Sigmund Indirect reciprocity, image scoring, and moral hazard Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 102 2005 2666 2670
7. M. Dufenberg, U. Gneezy, W. Gueth, and E. van Damme Direct vs indirect reciprocation - an experiment Homo Oeconomicus 18 2001 19 30
8. L.A. Dugatkin Cooperation among Animals: an Evolutionary Perspective 1997 Oxford University Press Oxford
9. G. Ellison Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma with anonymous random matching Rev. Econ. Stud. 61 1994 567 588
10. Engelmann, D., Fischbacher, U., 2002. Indirect reciprocity and strategic reputation-building in an experimental helping game, Working paper, University of Zürich, Zürich.
11. E. Fehr, and U. Fischbacher The nature of human altruism Nature 425 2003 785 791
12. M.A. Fishman Indirect reciprocity among imperfect individuals J. Theor. Biol. 225 2003 285 292
13. M.R. Frean The Prisoner's Dilemma without synchrony Proc. R. Soc. London (B) 257 1994 75 79
14. D. Fudenberg, and E. Maskin The folk theorem in repeated games with discounting or with incomplete information Econometrica 50 1986 533 554
15. D. Fudenberg, and E. Maskin Evolution and cooperation in noisy repeated games New Dev. Econ. Theory 80 1990 274 279
16. H. Gintis, S. Bowles, R. Boyd, and E. Fehr Explaining altruistic behavior in humans Evolution Hum. Behav. 24 2003 153 172
17. P. Hammerstein Genetic and Cultural Evolution of Cooperation 2003 MIT Press Cambridge
18. J. Hofbauer, and K. Sigmund Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics 1998 Cambridge University Press Cambridge
19. Imhof, L., Fudenberg, D., Nowak, M.A., 2005. Evolutionary cycles of cooperation and defection. PNAS USA 102, 10797-10800.
20. M. Kandori Social norms and community enforcement Rev. Econ. Stud. 59 1992 63 80
21. O. Leimar, and P. Hammerstein Evolution of cooperation through indirect reciprocation Proc. R. Soc. London B 268 2001 745 753
22. A. Lotem, M.A. Fishman, and L. Stone Evolution of cooperation between individuals Nature 400 1999 226 227
23. J. Maynard Smith Evolution and the Theory of Games 1982 Cambridge University Press Cambridge
24. J. Maynard Smith Game theory and the evolution of behaviour Behavioural Brain Sci. 7 1984 95 125
25. J. Maynard Smith Games Sex and Evolution 1988 Harvester-Wheatsheaf London
26. J. Maynard Smith, and E. Szathmary The Major Transitions in Evolution 1997 Oxford University Press Oxford
27. M. Milinski, D. Semmann, T.C.M. Bakker, and H.J. Krambeck Cooperation through indirect reciprocity: image scoring or standing strategy? Proc. R. Soc. London B 268 2001 2495 2501
28. M. Milinski, D. Semmann, and H.J. Krambeck Donors in charity gain in both indirect reciprocity and political reputation Proc. R. Soc. London B 269 2002 881 883
29. M. Milinski, D. Semmann, and H.J. Krambeck Reputation helps solve the 'Tragedy of the commons' Nature 415 2002 424 426
30. M.A. Nowak, and K. Sigmund The evolution of stochastic strategies in iterated games Acta Applicandae Math. 20 1990 247 265
31. M.A. Nowak, and K. Sigmund Win-stay, lose-shift outperforms tit-for-tat Nature 364 1993 56 58
32. M.A. Nowak, and K. Sigmund The alternating Prisoner's Dilemma J. Theor. Biol. 168 1994 219 226
33. M.A. Nowak, and K. Sigmund Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring Nature 282 1998 462 466
34. M.A. Nowak, and K. Sigmund The dynamics of indirect reciprocity J. Theor. Biol. 194 1998 561 574
35. H. Ohtsuki, and Y. Iwasa How should we define goodness? Reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity J. Theor. Biol. 231 2004 107 120
36. K. Panchanathan, and R. Boyd A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity J. Theor. Biol. 224 2003 115 126
37. K. Panchanathan, and R. Boyd Indirect reciprocity can stabilise cooperation without the second-order free-rider problem Nature 432 2004 499 502
38. G.B. Pollock, and L.A. Dugatkin Reciprocity and the evolution of reputation J. Theor. Biol. 159 1992 25 37
39. R.W. Rosenthal Sequences of games with varying opponents Econometrica 47 1979 1353 1366
40. P. Seabright The Company of Strangers 2004 Princeton University Press Princeton, NJ
41. R. Selten, and P. Hammerstein Gaps in Harley's argument on evolutionarily stable learning rules and in the logic of tit for tat Behavioural Brain Sci. 7 1984 115 116
42. K. Sigmund, C. Hauert, and M.A. Nowak Reward and punishment Proc. Natl Acad. Sci. USA 98 2001 10757 10763
43. R. Sugden The Economics of Rights, Cooperation and Welfare 1986 Basil Blackwell Oxford
44. R. Trivers The evolution of reciprocal altruism Q. Rev. Biol. 46 1971 35 57
45. C. Wedekind, and V.A. Braithwaite The long-term benefits of human generosity in indirect reciprocity Curr. Biol. 12 2002 1012 1015
46. C. Wedekind, and M. Milinski Cooperation through image scoring in humans Science 288 2000 850 852
47. Zeeman, E.C., 1980. Population dynamics from game theory. In: Global Theory of Dynamical Systems. Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 819. Springer, New York.