Social framing effects: Preferences or beliefs?

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 76, Issue 1, 2012, Pages 117-130

  Ellingsen, Tore ^a   Johannesson, Magnus ^a   Mollerstrom, Johanna ^b   Munkhammar, Sara ^c  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c Trygg Hansa   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Framing; Labels; Social preferences

Indexed keywords

EID: 84864312378     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.007     Document Type: Article

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