The claiming effect: Why players are more generous in social dilemmas than in ultimatum games

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

Volumn 72, Issue 4, 1997, Pages 810-825

  Larrick, Richard P ^a   Blount, Sally ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0031475912     PISSN: 00223514     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1037/0022-3514.72.4.810     Document Type: Article

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