The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment

Experimental Economics

Volumn 12, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 488-503

  Barr, Abigail ^a   Serra, Danila ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD   (United Kingdom)

^b FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Corruption; Economic experiment; Social preferences

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350704664     PISSN: 13864157     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10683-009-9225-9     Document Type: Article

References (28)

1. Abbink, K. (2005). Fair salaries and the moral costs of corruption. In Proceedings of the conference on cognitive economics, Sofia.
2. Abbink, K., & Hennig Schmidt, H. (2006). Neutral versus loaded instructions in a bribery experiment. Experimental Economics, 9(2), 103-121.
3. Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B., & Renner, E. (2002). An experimental bribery game. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 18(2), 428-454.
4. Alatas, V., Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N., & Gangadharan, L. (2009). Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: a comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students. Experimental Economics, 1, 113-132.
5. Andreoni, J. (1995). Warm-glow versus cold-prickle: the effects of positive and negative framing on cooperation in experiments. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 1-21.
6. Bardsley, N. (2005). Experimental economics and the artificiality of alteration. Journal of Economic Methodology, 12, 239-251.
7. Bilotkach, V. (2006). A tax evasion-bribery game: experimental evidence from Ukraine. European Journal of Comparative Economics, 3(1), 31-49.
8. Brosig, J., Weimann, J., & Yang, C.-L. (2003). The hot versus cold effect in a simple bargaining experiment. Experimental Economics, 6(1), 75-90.
9. Branas-Garza, P. (2007). Promoting helping behavior with framing in dictator games. Journal of Economic Psychology, 28(4), 477-486.
10. Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2000). Hot vs. cold: sequential experimental games. Experimental Economics, 2, 227-238.
11. Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N., & Gangadharan, L. (2009). Propensities to engage in and punish corrupt behavior: experimental evidence from Australia, India, Indonesia and Singapore. Journal of Public Economics, 93(7-8), 843-851.
12. Cason, T., & Mui, V. (1998). Social influence in the sequential dictator game. Journal of Mathematical Psychology, 42, 248-265.
13. Cookson, R. (2000). Framing effects in public goods experiments. Experimental Economics, 3, 55-79.
14. Cooper, D. J., Kagel, J., Lo, W., & Gu, Q. L. (1999). Gaming against managers in incentive systems: experimental results with Chinese students and Chinese managers. American Economics Review, 89(4), 781-804.
15. Eckel, C. C., & Grossman, Ph. J. (1996). Altruism in anonymous dictator games. Games and Economic Behavior, 16, 181-191.
16. Fehr, E., & List, J. (2004). The hidden costs and returns of incentives-trust and trustworthiness among CEOs. Journal of the European Economic Association, 2(5), 743-771.
17. Fehr, E., & Rockenbach, B. (2003). Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism. Nature, 422(13), 137-140.
18. Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868.
19. Fischbacher, U., Gächter, S., & Fehr, E. (2001). Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters, 71, 397-404.
20. Güth, W., Huck, S., & Mueller, W. (2001). The relevance of equal splits in ultimatum games. Games and Economic Behavior, 37, 161-169.
21. Liberman, V., Samuels, S., & Ross, L. (2004). The name of the game: predictive power of reputations vs. situational labels in determining prisoner's dilemma game moves. Personality & Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 1175-1185.
22. Loomes, G. (1999). Some lessons from past experiments and some challenges for the future. Economic Journal, 109, F35-F45.
23. Oxoby, R. J., & McLeish, K. N. (2004). Sequential decision and strategy vector methods in ultimatum bargaining: evidence on the strength of other regarding behaviour. Economic Letters, 84, 399-405.
24. Rege, M., & Telle, K. (2004). The impact of social approval and framing on cooperation in public goods situations. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 1625-1644.
25. Ross, L., & Ward, A. (1996). Naive realism in everyday life: implications for social conflict and misunderstanding. In E.S. Reed, E. Turiel & T. Brown (Eds.), Values and knowledge (pp. 103-135). Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
26. Schotter, A., Weigelt, K., & Wilson, C. (1994). A laboratory investigation of multi-person rationality and presentation effects. Games and Economic Behavior, 6, 445-468.
27. Svensson, J. (2005). Eight questions about corruption. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19(3), 19-42.
28. Transparency International (2006). Global Corruption Report 2006.