The framing of games and the psychology of play

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 73, Issue 2, 2011, Pages 459-478

  Dufwenberg, Martin ^a,b   Gächter, Simon ^c,d,e   Hennig Schmidt, Heike ^f  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF GOTHENBURG   (Sweden)

^c UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM   (United Kingdom)

^d IZA   (Germany)

^e CESIFO   (Germany)

^f UNIVERSITY OF BONN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Framing; Guilt aversion; Psychological game theory; Public good games; Reciprocity; Voluntary cooperation

Indexed keywords

EID: 80053618536     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2011.02.003     Document Type: Article

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