Friend-or-foe intentionality priming in an extensive form trust game

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 43, Issue 1, 2000, Pages 57-73

  Burnham, Terence ^a   McCabe, Kevin ^b   Smith, Vernon L ^b  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF ARIZONA   (United States)

Author keywords

Bargaining; C78; C91; Evolutionary psychology; Reciprocity; Trust and trustworthiness

Indexed keywords

EID: 0002537966     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/s0167-2681(00)00108-6     Document Type: Article

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