Nash equilibrium, team reasoning and cognitive hierarchy theory

Acta Psychologica

Volumn 128, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 402-404

  Sugden, Robert ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF EAST ANGLIA   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Cognitive hierarchy theory; Nash equilibrium; Social value orientation; Team reasoning

Indexed keywords

ARTICLE; COGNITION; COOPERATION; HUMAN; PROBLEM SOLVING; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY;

COGNITION; COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR; HUMANS; PROBLEM SOLVING; PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY;

EID: 44549084027     PISSN: 00016918     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2007.12.009     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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