Yes, managers should be paid like bureaucrats

Journal of Management Inquiry

Volumn 14, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 96-111

  Frey, Bruno S ^a   Osterloh, Margit ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ZURICH   (Switzerland)

Author keywords

Agency theory; Crowding theory; Intrinsic motivation; Management compensation pay for performance; Organizational citizenship

Indexed keywords

EID: 14544304150     PISSN: 10564926     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/1056492604273757     Document Type: Review

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