Serial CEO incentives and the structure of managerial contracts

Journal of Financial Intermediation

Volumn 20, Issue 4, 2011, Pages 633-662

  Giannetti, Mariassunta ^a  

^a STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Sweden)

Author keywords

Executive compensation; Firm specific vs. general skills; Managerial labor market; Optimal contracts

Indexed keywords

EID: 80051789448     PISSN: 10429573     EISSN: 10960473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfi.2011.04.003     Document Type: Article

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