Inside the black box: The role and composition of compensation peer groups

Journal of Financial Economics

Volumn 96, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 257-270

  Faulkender, Michael ^a   Yang, Jun ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND   (United States)

^b INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Benchmarking; Executive compensation; Peer groups

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951209013     PISSN: 0304405X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2010.01.006     Document Type: Article

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