Family Firms

Journal of Finance

Volumn 58, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 2167-2202

  Burkart, Mike ^b   Panunzi, Fausto ^a   Shleifer, Andrei ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF BOLOGNA   (Italy)

^b NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0012615580     PISSN: 00221082     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1540-6261.00601     Document Type: Article

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