Incentives and workers'motivation in the public sector

Economic Journal

Volumn 118, Issue 525, 2008, Pages 171-191

  Delfgaauw, Josse ^a   Dur, Robert ^a  

^a ERASMUS UNIVERSITY ROTTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INCENTIVE; LABOR PRODUCTIVITY; MODELING; PUBLIC SECTOR; SERVICE PROVISION; THEORETICAL STUDY;

EID: 37749051784     PISSN: 00130133     EISSN: 14680297     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02108.x     Document Type: Article

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