Incentives in markets, firms, and governments

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 24, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 273-306

  Acemoglu, Daron ^a   Kremer, Michael ^b   Mian, Atif ^c  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 51849156412     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewm055     Document Type: Article

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